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ABSTRACT 
 
“Political Beings:  Sociopolitical Influence on 
Federal District Court Judges’ Criminal 
Sentencing Behavior.” 
 
 
Scott Harris 
Judicial scholars have long debated what factors influence judges’ decision-
making.  Several competing theories have offered relatively parsimonious 
explanations for the motivations of appellate judges, but sources of influence for 
trial judges are relatively understudied.  One area ripe for testing potential 
determinants of trial court behavior is the criminal sentencing behavior of federal 
district court judges. Recent empirical research has examined federal district court 
sentencing, but this research has often focused solely on the effects of legal policy 
change and judges’ personal partisanship.  These efforts are informative but ignore 
other potentially important contextual determinants of sentencing behavior, such as 
sentiment in the legal/judicial community, sentiment among the public, and 
pertinent objective conditions, such as crime rates and incarceration rates.  Using a 
variety of methods in three different research designs, each emphasizing the 
change in judicial behavior over time, I test the extent to which district judges’ 
sentencing decisions are impacted by broader social and political concerns.  
Results from the dissertation are decidedly mixed, but they do suggest that 
contextual influences are clearly an important component of sentencing behavior 
for many district judges.  Future research efforts should pay heed to the potential 
impact of contextual factors on trial judge decision-making and seek to identify 
conditions under which social or political characteristics are most likely to affect 
judges. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal judges are appointed by the 
President of the United States and confirmed by the United States Senate.  Once appointed, these 
judges hold their position for life, barring impeachment.  One might suppose that given this type 
of job security, judges might be largely immune from political influence.  Indeed, in Federalist 
78, Alexander Hamilton justified life appointment for judicial officers by invoking the principle 
of a politically independent judiciary (Hamilton 2000).  Hamilton argued that “the complete 
independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution” (2000, 
497).   The extent to which judges should ignore social and political considerations in a 
representative democracy is an important normative question identified at least as early as the 
Anti-Federalist response to Mr. Hamilton (Brutus 2003).  Brutus argued that, while there should 
be some degree of judicial independence, in a republic, judges should ultimately be responsible 
to some body elected by the people.   
From an empirical perspective, numerous scholars, inside and out of the legal field, have 
rigorously examined and questioned the extent to which Hamilton’s principle of extreme federal 
judicial independence has been followed in practice (Woodford 2014; Carrington & Cramton 
2008; Ferejohn 2002; Spiller & Gelly 1992; Kaufman 1978; Cook 1973, 1977).  Other scholars 
have more narrowly focused on the extent to which public opinion impacts federal judges 
(Casillas, et. al. 2011; Friedman 2009; Mishler & Sheehan 1993; Franklin & Kosaki 1989).  
However, with some notable exceptions (See e.g. Kim 2009; Rowland & Carp 1996; Cook 1973, 
1977), the vast majority of scholarship has focused on the appellate judges of the United States 
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Supreme Court or the United States Court of Appeals.
1
   This asymmetry in research belies the 
fact that the majority of Article III judges are in fact trial judges, called “federal district court 
judges.”  
Every federal district court judge sits in one of ninety
2
 different districts throughout the 
United States.  District court appointees are almost always long-time residents of the district to 
which they are appointed (Rowland & Carp 1996; Silver & Shapiro 1984).  One duty of district 
court judges is to preside over criminal cases brought by the federal government against alleged 
violators of federal law.  A particularly important aspect of this judicial task is to sentence 
criminal offenders once convicted.  In the words of one former federal district court judge, 
“criminal sentencing is the most important duty of a [district court] judge.3” 
Given the importance of the task of criminal sentencing, the relative dearth of scholarship 
on district judges, and the normative implications for the role of unelected judges, there is a 
necessity for further inquiry into the link between district judges’ criminal sentencing behavior 
and politics.  Accordingly, the central question of this study is as follows: are federal district 
court judges sensitive to social or political factors when sentencing convicted offenders? 
The argument I develop in this dissertation is that district court judges’ sentencing 
behavior is indeed influenced by these social and political factors to a greater degree than is 
appreciated in the extant research.
4
  It is important to note that my argument focuses on 
                                                 
1
 The federal judiciary is divided into three levels: ninety district courts, each underneath one of twelve court of 
appeal circuit courts, all underneath the Supreme Court of the United States. *excluding US territories. 
 
2
 Excluding the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, and the North Mariana Islands. 
 
3
 Interview No. 12, January 21, 2016.  See Chapter 4 for further details regarding these interviews. 
 
4
 Throughout this dissertation, I use several different terms to describe these influences: “sociopolitical”; 
“contextual”; “environmental”; “exogenous”, depending on the specific situation. Yet these terms can be thought of 
as interchangeable with respect to my broader theoretical perspective.  Namely: district judges’ decisions are shaped 
by the environment in which they operate. 
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exogenous influences, such as public and elite opinion and the objective conditions pertinent to 
crime, rather than on district judges’ party or ideology.  This is not to suggest that district judges’ 
political or personal preferences are irrelevant to their behavior, as they undoubtedly are.  
Instead, this research focuses on exogenous contextual factors in order to highlight the 
importance of context and demonstrate how much of district judge behavior is missed by 
simplifying it to a simplistic partisan or “left-right” dimension.  
In this Introduction, I first provide background on the history and mechanics of federal 
sentencing policy and highlight the important role of district court judges in this arena.  I then 
summarize competing theories of judicial behavior and explore how they fit with the present 
research.  Next, I summarize recent empirical research on federal sentencing policy, and 
highlight some unresolved questions.  I then develop a model of judicial behavior that serves as 
the theoretical underpinning of my argument for sociopolitical influence on district judge 
sentencing.  Finally, I present a road-map of the dissertation by outlining the three chapters used 
to test my theoretical perspective. 
Background 
The Importance of Sentencing Policy and the Role of Judges  
There are two reasons the present dissertation focuses on criminal sentencing, rather than 
other areas of the law.  First, one of the most important aspects of judicial power is the power of 
the trial judge to sentence convicted criminals.  The Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution grants the power to determine the guilt or innocence of accused criminals to an 
impartial jury.  However, dating back to British common law, the power to determine the 
punishment for criminals upon conviction has traditionally been left within the authority of 
judges (Mandiberg 2009).    
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Beginning in the late 1980’s, the discretion afforded to district judges in sentencing 
decisions was reduced significantly.  Legislators, police and other law enforcement, attorneys, 
probation officers, and other actors are all intimately involved in setting forth punitive policies 
(Stith & Cabranes 1998).  Furthermore, the past few decades have seen the growth of policies, 
such as mandatory minimum sentences and/or implementation of sentencing guidelines, seeking 
to restrict the sentencing authority of trial judges (USSC 2012).   Even Attorney General Eric 
Holder has acknowledged the increased role of federal prosecutors in higher incarceration rates 
and has taken measures to curb mandatory minimum sentences for many nonviolent offenders 
(Holder 2010).
 5
  
Despite the multiple actors involved in sentencing policy, district court judges still have 
to make important sentencing decisions in the majority of individual cases.  And while district 
judge sentencing discretion is no longer unfettered, the role of district court judges’ individual 
preferences in determining sentencing outcomes has increased over the past decade (USSC 
2012).  Furthermore, as multiple studies have demonstrated the negative impact that mass 
incarceration has on society (Alexander 2012; Travis, et. al. 2006; Pattillo, et. al. 2004; Braman 
2002; Freudenberg 2002), it is an extremely important societal question to ask how/why district 
judges arrive at these important sentencing decisions.    
Aside from the theoretical appeal of a study of federal criminal sentencing, there is also a 
practical matter that renders research on the subject pertinent and timely.  The United States 
Sentencing Commission (“Sentencing Commission”) has developed and recorded a wealth of 
                                                 
5
 A substantial minority of federal offenders are convicted of offenses that carry these “mandatory minimum” 
penalties.  In these cases, district judges have no discretion to unilaterally sentence criminals to shorter sentences 
than the proscribed statutory period.  These “mandatory minimum” sentences have understandably garnered much 
attention from criminal justice reform advocates.  However, it is important to realize that these cases still make up 
only 20-30% of all federal criminal cases, depending on the year (USSC 2011).  In the remainder of cases, as will be 
discussed in greater detail below, district judges have broader authority to arrive at their preferred sentence. 
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data, documenting and coding every case of a federal criminal sentence, reported by the various 
district courts.  This objectively-coded data provides extraordinary opportunities for both 
understanding relevant factors relevant to sentencing and for testing competing theories of 
judicial behavior.  
None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that criminal sentencing is the only important 
aspect of a federal district court judge’s role.  Nor do I suggest criminal sentencing is necessarily 
akin to other judicial tasks.  However, given the above considerations, criminal sentencing is an 
important and feasible policy area to test the theory of exogenous influences on judicial 
behavior.     
 Sentencing Policy in US District Courts 
In order to understand the role of the district judges on criminal sentencing, some history 
and background on the mechanics of federal criminal sentencing is also required.  Prior to the 
late 1980’s, federal district court judges enjoyed relatively broad discretion in determining the 
sentences of convicted criminals (Stith and Cabranes 1998).  Upon conviction, either by jury 
verdict or by plea agreement, judges were charged with the task of sentencing criminals within 
relatively wide statutory penalty ranges. Two early-to-mid twentieth century United States 
Supreme Court cases
6
 explicitly recognized this important distinction between determinations of 
guilt and determinations of punishment and further expounded that trial judges should be granted 
wide discretion in the latter area.  
The era of discretionary sentencing in the federal court system would not last through the 
final two decades of the century.  The passage of the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) 
fundamentally altered sentencing in the federal courts.  Specifically, among other provisions, the 
SRA provided for the creation of the Sentencing Commission to promulgate guidelines for 
                                                 
6
 U.S. v. Williams, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); Burns v. U.S., 287 U.S. 216 (1932). 
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federal district court judges to follow in issuing sentences for those convicted of federal crimes.
7
 
As a result, the Sentencing Commission was created as an independent agency of the judicial 
branch, with its members appointed by the President and approved by the Senate.  Following its 
creation, the Commission promulgated the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), 
which were placed into effect on November 1 1987.  The Guidelines set forth relatively tight 
ranges of sentences for criminal defendants based on the type of offense committed and the 
offenders’ criminal history.   
One primary motivation behind the SRA was to reduce disparity in federal sentencing 
outcomes (Tiede 2009).  In other words, the SRA sought to alleviate the problem of persons 
being convicted of similar or identical crimes in similar circumstances being sentenced to 
different punishments by different federal judges across the country.   Whether and to what 
extent the implementation of the Guidelines has achieved this goal of reduced disparity is subject 
to some debate, although the weight of the evidence seems to suggest that inter-judge sentencing 
disparity has indeed decreased under the Guidelines (See Waldfogel 1991; Payne 1997; Hofer, 
et. al. 1999; Anderson, et. al. 1999; Tiede 2009).  Regardless of the Guidelines’ effect on 
sentencing disparity, it is undisputed that the Guidelines reduced trial judges’ sentencing 
discretion from the pre-Guideline era (USSC 2012).  
Still, despite policymakers’ initial intentions, uniform sentencing through strict 
application of the Guidelines has also decreased markedly over time.  The proportion of 
offenders sentenced below the Guideline recommended range has more than tripled from 14.8% 
in 1988 to 51.8% in 2014 (USSC 1995-2014).  Crucially, this trend began well before 2005 when 
the Supreme Court ruled that application of the Sentencing Guidelines was merely “advisory” 
rather than mandatory (US v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, (2005)).  In fact, as will be discussed at 
                                                 
7
 18 U.S.C. §§ 351-386.   
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length throughout this dissertation, this trend of an increasing percentage of below-Guideline 
sentences has continued since Booker was decided in 2005 (USSC 1995-2014).  But if formal 
changes in judicial policy with respect to the application of the Guidelines cannot fully explain 
the above-noted trend, are there other explanations?  More fundamentally, what factors 
determine federal district court judicial sentencing behavior over time?   
A primary objective of this research is to provide a more comprehensive explanation of 
federal district court sentencing behavior than is offered by the current literature.  A secondary 
objective is to improve understanding of judicial behavior more generally.  While the focus of 
the dissertation is on sentencing policy in federal courts, it is possible that significant 
determinants can be expanded to test other areas of law and/or aspects of judicial behavior.  
Judicial Behavior and Sentencing Policy: A Brief Overview 
 General Theories of Judicial Behavior 
 Scholars of judicial behavior have emphasized a variety of different motivations affecting 
judicial decisions. In general, these scholars can be divided into four major schools: legal, 
attitudinal, strategic, and audience-based.  While a comprehensive summary of each of these 
models is outside the scope of this work, a brief overview is necessary to emphasize the major 
positions and disagreements regarding what motivates judges and how many of these accounts 
may be unable to fully explain district judge sentencing behavior.    
The traditional legal model essentially states that the judge’s role is to use case-facts and 
apply those facts to the law, which can be discovered through both reason and application of 
precedent (Weinrib 1988).  The attitudinal model proposed by Segal and Spaeth (2002) argues 
that the legal model does not conform to empirical reality and that the decisions of judges, 
especially Supreme Court justices, are driven almost entirely by their ideology. The strategic 
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model espoused by Epstein & Knight (1997) posits that justices do not simply vote their 
preference, but instead adjust their preferences based on the anticipated actions of other actors to 
arrive at the ultimate position closest to their preferences.  Finally, Baum (2006) argues that the 
strategic and attitudinal models explain a great deal of judicial behavior, but they fail to account 
for the fact that judges are not perfect utility-seeking robots and have personal audiences whom 
they seek to please, such as other judges and the legal community.    
While each of these models, excepting Baum’s (2006), serve as an extremely 
parsimonious account of judicial behavior, they are generally tested by analyzing Supreme Court 
or other appellate court decisions.  The attitudinal model, for example, has been extremely 
successful in predicting Supreme Court votes (Segal & Spaeth 2002). Yet given their direct 
exposure to case-facts, along with their distinct hierarchy of goals, it is extremely likely that trial 
judges are less motivated by ideological and strategic considerations than appellate judges (Kim 
2009; Baum 1997; Ashenfelter, et. al. 1995; Church, et. al. 1978).  Indeed, several examinations 
of federal district courts have shown the importance of a variety of other factors outside the 
scope of the attitudinal/strategic models (See e.g. Zorn & Bowie 2010; Swenson 2004; Sisk, et. 
al. 1998; Rowland & Carp 1996; Ashenfelter, et. al. 1995;  Kritzer 1978; Peltason 1971; Vines 
1964; But See Sisk & Heise 2012).   
For example, one such factor deemed influential on district judges is the local political 
culture.  As stated by two prominent scholars of district judges,  
“the sociological impact of the community, in combination with an appointment process 
that tends to ensure that judges are representative of the local political culture, causes us 
to believe district judges are (at least somewhat) representative of their respective 
communities”  
 
Rowland & Carp (1996, 74-75).   
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There is long-standing support for the notion that federal district court judges are 
influenced by their communities as Peltason (1971) and Vines (1964) found that Southern 
district justices following Brown v. Board did not enforce de-segregation, because of the judges’ 
concern over their standing in their southern, elite communities.  The importance of these works 
to the present dissertation is that they provide evidence that dominant appellate models of 
judicial behavior, such as the attitudinal model, offer an incomplete understanding of trial judge 
behavior.  Baum’s (2006) audience based framework is potentially more helpful, yet he offers no 
empirical test of this model, especially at lower-level courts.  
Specific Research on Federal Sentencing Behavior 
Moving beyond general studies of judicial behavior, there has also been a substantial 
amount of research done specifically on federal district court criminal sentencing.  Historically, 
scholars conducting research in the pre-Guideline era of federal sentencing policy sought to 
determine whether political factors, both local and national, would affect the sentences of “draft-
dodgers” in federal courts.  Specifically, Cook (1973) and Kritzer (1978) both analyzed the 
extent to which local and national opinion about the Vietnam War affected judges’ sentences for 
convicted “draft dodgers.” 
 Cook (1973, 1977) found the local political environment (both elite local opinion and 
public local opinion) influenced the sentences handed down to the “draft dodgers” by federal 
judges.  Kritzer (1978) conducted a similar test that sought to improve on the explanatory power 
of Cook’s model.  Importantly, Kritzer found variables related to the political environment (both 
local and national) were the most important factors in explaining the sentencing decisions of 
federal district court judges, as opposed to judge-based characteristics or case-specific facts.   
Several more recent empirical efforts have been aimed at modeling judicial discretion under the 
10 
 
Guidelines.  Indeed, these recent empirical efforts have conducted studies directly related to the 
determinants of judicial sentencing and what factors influence departure from the Guidelines 
(Lynch and Omori 2014; Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011; Tiede 2009; 
Wu and Spohn 2010; Schanzenbach & Tiller 2007).   
These research efforts have identified several factors that may affect district judge 
sentencing behavior.  These factors include: levels of discretion (Epstein, et. al. 2012; Fischman 
& Schanzenbach 2011; Freeborn & Hartmann 2010); the partisan composition of district judges 
in particular judicial districts (Fischman & Schanzenbach 2011); the partisan composition of 
circuit judges in the appellate court of appeals above the applicable district court (Epstein, et. al. 
2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011; Schanzenbach & Tiller 2007); and the prevalence of 
mandatory minimum prosecutions within districts (Lynch and Omori 2014).  Other recent 
research has attempted to explain inter-district variation in sentencing, but has focused broadly 
on ultimate outcomes, rather than on determinants of district judges’ behavior (Wu and Spohn 
2010;Tiede 2009; Kautt 2002).   
The Missing Link?  Contextual Conditions 
The above referenced studies generally focus on two variables: partisanship and legal-
policy change affecting district judge discretion (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and 
Schanzenbach 2011).  Stated in terms of the general models of judicial behavior, these works 
rely almost exclusively on strategic and attitudinal models of judicial behavior.  Absent from 
these studies is an explanation for how different judges might alter their sentencing behavior in 
the face of changing conditions.  
My argument with regards to district judge sentencing behavior is simple: context 
matters.  District court judges are members of local communities.  They live and work within 
11 
 
specific geographic areas, and the relevant conditions in these communities pertinent to crime 
and punishment vary greatly both across the country and over time.  As I will argue in more 
detail below, many district judges also care both about their reputations in these communities 
and the policy consequences of their sentencing decisions in these communities.  Accordingly, 
given this premise, it is unlikely that most district judges ignore pertinent conditions in their 
community when making their sentencing decisions.  
To add some specificity to this general argument, I posit that two types of contextual 
variables potentially influence sentencing decisions: objective conditions and societal 
punitiveness.  Pertinent objective conditions include factors such as crime rates and incarceration 
rates.  Societal punitiveness involves mass and elite opinion regarding crime and punishment.  
Intuitions aside, one might legitimately ask what evidence exists that suggests district judges are 
influenced by these contextual variables. 
As to objective conditions, high crime rates could lead judges to pursue more punitive 
courses of action, as a means of incapacitating convicted criminals or deterring future criminals.  
There is some support for the crime rate hypothesis as Ulmer and Bradley (2006) found that 
Pennsylvania judges in counties with higher crime rates tended to render more punitive 
sentences.  Gibson (1980) made a similar finding regarding Iowa judges.  Gibson’s findings are 
especially interesting, because Iowa state-judges travel across counties.  Thus, Gibson finds that 
the same judges sentence criminals more severely in areas with higher crime rates.  While there 
might be reasons to think that the Ulmer & Bradley and Gibson results would not hold for 
unelected judges, their finding at least merits testing of whether the crime-rate impacts federal 
sentencing.   
12 
 
Additionally, high incarceration rates resulting from the Guidelines (Stith and Cabranes 
1998) might both signal to district judges that the Guidelines are not desirable or simply that the 
cost of implementing them is too great.  There is scant past empirical work
8
 on the influence of 
incarceration rates on judges’ sentencing behavior.  However the notion that many judges care 
about good public policy independent of their partisanship (Baum 1997, 2006; Posner 2010) 
coupled with the facts that the skyrocketing federal incarceration rate observed since the 
implementation of the Guidelines has been mitigated by district judges in recent years (US DOJ 
2015; USSC 2012; USSC 1995-2014) make it intuitively plausible that incarceration rates affect 
judicial application of the Guidelines. 
As to societal punitiveness, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that judges care about 
elite opinion of themselves.  Posner (1993) and Epstein, et. al. (2013) characterize reputation in 
the legal community as part of a judge’s “utility function.”  Baum (2006) similarly argues many 
judges care about their ratings in law reviews and their standing among their judicial peers.  
Judges themselves have alluded to the influence of their peers on their behavior.  As stated by 
one prominent federal judge, “we are impressed with each other, and strive to enhance the level 
of work of all of us.”  (Weinstein 1994, 555).   Thus, to the extent the legal community and other 
elites have certain views regarding crime and criminal sentencing, we would expect district 
judges’ sentencing decisions to be influenced by those views, in lieu of gaining a poor 
reputation. 
Finally, there is also evidence that public opinion affects sentencing behavior.  As noted 
above Kritzer (1978) and Cook (1973) both find that evidence that that lower levels of public 
support for the Vietnam War were associated with lower sentences for “draft-dodgers” by federal 
                                                 
8
 Although Ulmer and Johnson (2004) do find a positive relationship between jail capacity and odds of incarceration 
in Pennsylvania, which is a related, if not identical, argument  
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district courts.   There is additional support for public influence over sentencing decisions as 
Kuklinski and Stanga (1979) find that California state courts reduced their sentences in 
marijuana cases after California public opinion shifted in a liberal direction.  Furthermore, 
Gibson (1980) interprets his crime-rate finding regarding Iowa judges as indirect support of the 
notion that public opinion influences judicial behavior, as he assumes that higher crime rates are 
associated with more punitive attitudes by the public.   
To be fair, there are also certainly reasons to be skeptical that unelected judges would 
care deeply about public opinion.  Evidence from state supreme courts suggests electoral 
calculations drive the effect of public opinion on judges’ death penalty case decisions (Brace and 
Boyea, 2008).  However, some studies have shown the sociological impact of a community 
shapes
9
 federal district court judge behavior (Rowland & Carp 1996; Kritzer, et. al. 1993).  
Furthermore, recent research on macro-politics implies that the public’s punitive attitudes 
prompted both elected and unelected policymakers to incarcerate more individuals for longer 
periods (Enns 2014; Nicholson Crotty, et. al. 2009).  Finally, given the specific findings of 
Kritzer (1978) and Cook (1973) that public and elite opinion factors affected federal district 
courts in criminal sentencing cases of draft-dodgers, the inclusion of public opinion variables to 
test the hypothesis more generally is certainly worthwhile. 
 
                                                 
9
 There is perhaps a more problematic issue with inferring a causal relationship between public opinion and judicial 
behavior.  Epstein, et. al. (2013) and Segal & Spaeth (2002) both note the difficulty of assuming that public opinion 
has a direct, causal effect simply because public opinion changes correspond with changes in judicial behavior.  
After all, judges are also members of the public, and they may simply be responding concomitantly to the same 
stimuli affecting the public at large.  However, some recent scholars using temporal methods have argued that direct 
influence exists (Enns 2014; Mishler and Sheehan 1993).  As I will discuss in greater detail throughout this 
dissertation, the debate over whether public influence is direct or indirect is important; but in my view, this inquiry 
is secondary to the more general question of whether judges concern themselves with exogenous contextual factors.  
Regardless of whether the influence of public or elite opinion is direct or indirect, it is most important to understand 
why the policy considerations of the public should matter to unelected judges who are, in theory, supposed to 
divorce themselves form extralegal considerations.   
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A Conceptual Framework of Judicial Behavior 
 The main contribution of this work is not necessarily to develop a novel theory but 
instead to broaden understanding of trial-judge behavior and provide a more comprehensive 
empirical examination of district judge sentencing behavior.  Still, the present dissertation has 
two general theoretical frameworks.  First, I argue that district judges engaged in sentencing 
decisions are actors who are influenced by a multiplicity of influences (Rowland & Carp 1996; 
Kritzer 1978).  These influences lead judges to have an ideal preference for each sentence he/she 
gives.  These ideal preferences are constrained by legal policy or other institutions, which 
influence, but cannot totally shape, the final sentencing decision (Kritzer 1978).   
 The causal diagram of my basic argument for judicial sentencing behavior is displayed in 
 
Figure 1 below. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 is a modified version of Kritzer’s (1978) similar diagram of federal judges’ 
decisions.  Like Kritzer (1978), I posit that judges’ sentencing decisions are complex and are 
ultimately the result of many different influences.  Figure 1 is also consistent with the theoretical 
framework of Baum’s (1997, 2006) audience-based perspective, which also emphasizes the 
multiplicity of influences on judges.  Importantly, the model is very much a simplified 
typology
10
, as some categories surely overlap (Reputational Factors could be considered an 
aspect of Judge Characteristics).  The model is categorized in this way simply, because it is a 
convenient heuristic for breaking down categories of potentially relevant variables that affect 
sentencing policy.   
                                                 
10
 I also acknowledge the above model may not precisely replicate the process of how human beings make political 
decisions and that such decisions often involve a more complex two-step process (See Fiske and Taylor 1991; 
Conover and Feldman 1984).  Instead, the model is simply intended as a simplification of how multiple influences 
may influence final sentencing decisions.  
 
15 
 
As noted above, this model should not be necessarily viewed as a marked departure from 
prior understandings of district judge behavior.  There seems to be scholarly consensus that no 
simplistic models would explain little of district judge behavior (See Rowland & Carp 1996; 
Kritzer 1978).  However, this more complex framework of multiple judicial influences has not 
been comprehensively tested in recent studies of district court criminal sentencing behavior (See 
Epstein, at. al 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011; Freeborn and Hartmann, 2010).   
In relation to Figure 1, these recent studies seem to assume that “Judge Characteristics” 
are the only factor that influences ideal sentencing behavior, and that legal policy changes then 
allow/restrict judges’ ability to transfer that ideal point into their decisions.  Yet, as discussed in 
greater detail above, there is both empirical and anecdotal evidence suggesting other contextual 
factors influence sentencing behavior of trial judges (Tiede 2009; Ulmer & Bradley 2006; Kautt 
2002; Gibson 1980; Kritzer 1978).  Furthermore, there is evidence that the legal factors 
associated with the Guidelines cannot completely constrain judicial sentencing decisions (Lynch 
and Omori 2014).  After all, there were still significant departures from the Sentencing 
Guidelines long before the Supreme Court ruled the Guidelines were not mandatory in 2005 (See 
USSC 1995-2014).   
It is of course true, that environment and context have not been entirely ignored in studies 
of federal sentencing.  Many scholars from the field of criminology have attempted to explain the 
causes of district variation in sentencing outcomes and have concluded that different district 
practices, especially those implemented in different U.S. attorneys’ offices, can result in 
substantial variation in sentences for offenders (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn 2010; 
Ulmer 2005; Kautt 2002).   However, as discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4, there is 
still marked inter-district variation in how often judges choose to initiate departures from the 
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Guidelines, independent of any differences in prosecutorial practices (USSC 1995-2014).  This 
suggests that exogenous factors affect district judges’ sentencing decisions, independent of any 
institutional differences amongst districts and their legal practices.  Moreover, these studies 
focusing on regional variability in sentence-length tend to skirt theoretical question of why 
judges might behave differently in different districts.
11
  Accordingly, there is still a deficiency in 
understanding why district judges behave differently in different social and political contexts.   
In summary, my general theoretical perspective, like Baum’s (2006) audience based 
perspective, emphasizes complexity and sacrifices parsimony for explanatory power.  This 
tradeoff should not be taken lightly as parsimony is surely a valuable trait for any research 
endeavor.  However, the dominant parsimonious models tend to leave unexplained variance in 
district judge behavior (Zorn & Bowie 2010; Ashenfelter, et. al. 1995).  If the inclusion of these 
additional factors identified in the bottom two boxes of Figure 1 can substantially improve our 
understanding of judicial behavior, this more complex model is a worthwhile endeavor. 
 In addition to the importance of studying multiple inputs, another theme present 
throughout this work is that district judge sentencing behavior is best studied over time.  Because 
of low turnover in the federal judiciary, the difficulties in determining causal ordering in cross-
sectional work, and the substantial variation in sentencing behavior observed over time, this 
project is particularly suited for longitudinal analysis.   While recent empirical works assuredly 
take into account trends in sentencing behavior, too often general trends are conflated with one-
time changes to legal policy.  In other words, these authors often assume that one time changes 
legal policy have lasting effects years after their adoption, irrespective of broader trends 
(Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman & Schanzenbach 2011; Freeborn & Hartman 2010).   
                                                 
11
 See Note 8, above. 
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 I argue that this assumption is simply not proper.  The trend in increased departures from 
the Guidelines began well before Booker, or other legal policy changes, occurred (USSC 1995-
2014).  Furthermore, the trend continued after Booker and can be observed in the most recent 
2014 data (USSC 1995-2014).  It is simply not reasonable to assume that these trends are solely 
the product of legal policy change that occurred in 2005.  My expectation is that the contextual 
variables identified above will help explain the more general trend and provide a better 
understanding of how district judges altered their sentencing behavior over time. 
A Road-Map of the Work 
 The present work aims to improve on the past literature by incorporating previously 
untested variables and studying district court sentencing behavior at different levels of analysis.  
Each chapter also employs different methods.  These different approaches are useful as both a 
robustness check of any potential findings as well as for explaining the potentially conditional 
nature of some explanatory variables.  The common themes throughout all three empirical 
chapters are the importance of different social and political conditions and the change in district 
judge sentencing behavior over time. 
Chapter 2: The National Level 
Chapter 2 is a time-series analysis of trends in national-level sentencing.  The primary 
contribution of Chapter 2 is to determine whether nationwide changes in: the partisanship of the 
judiciary; public punitive preferences; crime rates; and incarceration rates explain trends in the 
sentencing behavior of federal judges.  More generally, this chapter seeks to probe different 
causes of judicial behavior by comparing and analyzing multiple time series, each linked in some 
way to different theories of judicial behavior.  
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One might query why a theory focused on contextual influence would model the 
aggregate sentencing decisions of all district judges throughout the country.  One answer to this 
query is that the nationwide analysis of this chapter is focused on the effect that “time” has on 
sentencing decisions rather than “place”. Yet the national level time-series design allows no 
room for variation among different judicial districts nor for variation among different judges.  
Obviously, such a model is overly simplistic, as we know from past studies that different types of 
judges in different parts of the country behave differently (Tiede 2009; Wu and Spohn 2010; 
Kautt 2002; Rowland and Carp 1996).  Furthermore, the nationwide data is unable to tap into 
potentially relevant considerations for judges who must make sentencing decisions, such as 
regional/local reputational factors.  
However, there are certain distinct advantages for including a nationwide model of 
sentencing decisions.  First, a macro-analysis allows for potentially more parsimonious 
explanations of district judges’ sentencing behavior.  While the theoretical framework of the 
present work generally trades parsimony for explanatory power, this chapter potentially allows 
for results that carry less conditions and caveats than region-specific levels of analysis.   In 
addition, the nationwide analysis allows for comparisons of whether district judges respond to 
national trends or localized trends.   While my conception of district judges would expect 
stronger local influence, the conclusion chapter will discuss how the results from Chapter 2 
suggest some district judges might respond to different constituencies.     
Chapter 3: The District Level  
Chapter 3 employs a panel design, by examining annual Guideline Departure rates in 
every federal district court from 1996-2011.  Several of the same variables employed in Chapter 
2 are used in Chapter 3, but they are measured at state (or when possible district) levels.  The 
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major contribution of Chapter 3 is that it improves on past designs related to Guideline 
departures by including additional community-level variables that potentially impact district 
judges’ sentencing behavior over time.  As set forth above, many of these variables have been 
postulated in past theoretical work, but empirical testing has been limited. 
Moreover, Chapter 3 allows for the inclusion of localized/geographic concerns that were 
ignored in Chapter 2.  As argued above, and as noted by other scholars (Rowland and Carp 1996; 
Kritzer, et. al. 1993), district judges identify with other members of both their social and 
geographic communities.   Thus, it would be surprising to find that judges are not sensitive to the 
concerns of these communities. 
Third, although one focus of the second empirical chapter is intra-district change over 
time, separate “random effects” models also analyze differences between districts.  Different 
districts throughout the country have different crime types. Thus, judges in different districts deal 
with different types of cases and offenders, so comparisons between districts should be used with 
some caution.  Still, certain models in Chapter 2 attempt to account for these differences and 
parse out why/how certain judges in certain districts apply the Guidelines differently.  
Chapter 4: Qualitative Analysis of Four Districts 
The final empirical chapter of the present work is a more in-depth study of sentencing 
practice within four selected federal districts.  The primary purpose of this chapter is to assess 
whether the suggested explanatory variables from the models in Chapters 1 and 2 are supported 
by a more in-depth investigation into the actual behavior of district court judges over the relevant 
time period.  Unlike the two previous chapters, which are primarily quantitative, this chapter 
involves thick description and qualitative methods.   
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In particular, Chapter 4 presents results obtained from interviews with federal district 
court judges, former federal district court judges, federal public defenders, United States 
attorneys, and private practice criminal defense attorneys experienced in federal sentencing.   
The interviews probe sources of influence on federal district court judges’ sentencing 
determinations by discussing federal sentencing with both judges themselves and with attorneys 
who have experience observing, and potentially impacting, sentencing decisions. 
This final interview-based empirical chapter adds significant value to the dissertation.  In 
addition to the previously stated goal of providing potential corroboration for the quantitative 
studies, this interview-grounded chapter provides more detail and description of federal district 
court judges’ sentencing decisions.  This description is valuable by supplementing any facts 
gleaned in the prior two quantitative chapters with relevant interpretations of how and why those 
facts are influential on judges (Geertz 1973).   
Yet another strength of using these qualitative interviews is they provide insight into the 
process by which district court judges changed their sentencing practices throughout the policy 
changes that occurred over the past two decades (See George and Bennet 2005; Tansey 2007).   
As discussed previously, there is no doubt that federal sentencing has changed dramatically in 
recent years.  It is beneficial to understand how and why this change came about by soliciting 
perspectives from persons directly responsible for and/or observing this change.   
Finally, the interview chapter is also beneficial for testing competing theories of district 
court behavior.  Chapter 4 includes not only quotes and interpretations but also descriptive 
statistics and other qualitative methods used in hypothesis-testing.  Though the use of these 
methods do not allow for strong causal statements, the results will still be beneficial for facial 
validity testing (See MacDonald 2007).  In other words, it would be difficult to maintain any 
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theory of district court judge sentencing behavior (attitudinal, contextual, etc.) if strong 
majorities of experienced federal sentencing actors, including judges themselves, are 
resoundingly dismissive of this theory.   On the other hand, strong and broad support for a given 
theory by the interview subjects would further bolster that theory’s case and provide impetus for 
further empirical testing.  
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Research 
After the third empirical chapter, I conclude the dissertation with a chapter summarizing 
the results.  In this concluding chapter, I discuss in which ways my theoretical perspective of 
contextual/sociopolitical influence has been supported, and in which ways it has shown to be 
limited.  I also discuss implications of this research and suggest areas for further study. 
A More Complete Picture of Judicial Behavior & Federal Criminal Sentencing 
Criminal sentencing is one of the most socially important activities of the federal 
judiciary.  The United States incarceration rate stands as a dramatic outlier to the rest of the 
democratic world (Walmsley 2013).  This high rate of incarceration can, at least in part, be 
attributed to application of the US Sentencing Guidelines in the federal judiciary (Stith and 
Cabranes 1998).  This dissertation will lead to a better understanding of why and how district 
judges choose to apply the Guidelines or ignore them.   Understanding district judges’ use and 
application of the Guidelines over time can also allow us to assess more accurately the factors 
that affect judicial decision-making, regarding the socially important act of incarceration.  
This dissertation will also provide additional insight into judicial behavior generally.   
Using a variety of different methods and techniques, I test the extent to which district judges are 
influenced by contextual factors, personal factors, and legal constraints.  The relative weight 
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each of these variables has on judicial decision-making is fundamentally important to 
understanding the role of an unelected federal judiciary in our democracy.  
Finally, the dissertation also provides a more comprehensive examination of district 
judges’ sentencing decisions.  While past scholarship has examined the sentencing behavior of 
district judges under the Guidelines, I argue these approaches have been unduly limited in scope.  
In order to improve upon past research, this dissertation expands the scope of explanatory 
variables, uses multiple different methods, and accounts for longer-term trends in sentencing 
policy.  Thus, irrespective of results as to specific sources of influence, the broader framework of 
this dissertation will improve understandings of both district judge behavior and federal criminal 
sentencing.  
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Figure 1: Causal Diagram of the Determinants of Federal District Court Judges 
Sentencing Decisions 
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CHAPTER 2: 
“Not Like the Good Old Days: Judicial 
Departures From the US Sentencing 
Guidelines Over Time.”   
 
 
Abstract:   
Recent scholars in sentencing policy have identified several factors that have affected 
federal district court judges’ sentencing decisions under the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  
While this research has advanced our understanding of both sentencing policy and judicial 
behavior, they have not fully explained the extreme change in judicial adherence to the 
Guidelines since they were implemented in 1987.  The present chapter posits that district judges 
are attentive to both public views and the objective failures or successes of criminal justice 
policy.  This article employs a time-series ARIMAx model to test the potential effects of three 
possible causes of judicial sentencing behavior consistent with this theoretical perspective: the 
punitive attitudes of the general public, the crime rate, and the incarceration rate.  Results do 
not support the hypotheses that either higher crime rates or the punitive attitudes of the public 
are associated with judicial sentencing behavior.  However, results offer limited support for the 
hypothesis that higher incarceration rates lead sentencing judges to mete out more lenient 
sentences.  In total, while not strongly supportive of the present hypotheses, the findings do 
suggest that future research should utilize different methods and incorporate new variables to 
improve upon models of the sentencing behavior of district judges.   
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Introduction 
An important open question in federal sentencing policy is what factors federal district 
court judges consider when making sentencing decisions under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (hereafter “the Guidelines”)?  To be sure, substantial research has been conducted on 
federal sentencing during the Guideline era (Epstein, et. al., 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach, 
2011; Tiede, 2009; Schanzenbach & Tiller, 2007; Mustard, 2001).   These studies have made 
important contributions and have provided evidence that district judges may be influenced by 
changes in judicial policy (Epstein, et. al., 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011), partisan 
factors (Epstein, et. al., 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011; Stidham and Carp 1988), and 
the demographics of the offender (USSC 2012; Mustard, 2001) when making sentencing 
decisions.  
Despite these contributions, these pieces of research are limited in that they do not 
incorporate many potentially influential contextual and environmental variables into their 
studies. Scholars of judicial behavior have found that judges, especially at lower levels of the 
judiciary, respond to multiple inputs when making decisions and are generally representative of 
their communities (Sisk. et. al., 1998; Baum 1997; Rowland & Carp, 1996; Kritzer 1978).  Given 
these findings, pertinent sociopolitical factors such as public sentiment regarding crime, the 
crime rate, and the incarceration rate could all potentially influence judicial decision-making. 
Another limitation of past federal sentencing research is its tests cannot fully account for 
the dramatic changes to district judge adherence to the Guidelines over time (USSC 1995-2014).  
As argued more thoroughly below, district judges no longer apply the Guidelines at rates 
remotely comparable to the rates when they were first implemented, and this trend cannot be 
solely attributed to the effect of legal changes on judges’ discretion.  Thus, regardless of the 
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potential effects of the above mentioned exogenous variables, more comprehensive testing of 
district judge sentencing behavior over time is warranted.   
In this chapter, I first provide some background information regarding federal sentencing.  
Next, I survey some past efforts at examining judicial sentencing under the Guidelines.  Third, I 
explain some of the broader theories of judicial behavior and how they might fit in with the 
framework of district judge criminal sentencing.  Fourth, I develop the argument that public 
attitudes and objective conditions are potentially important, but largely untested, factors 
influencing district judge sentencing behavior.  Fifth, I execute the research design and provide 
the empirical results.  Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications.   
Background 
As discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 1, federal district court judges had a significant 
amount of discretion in sentencing federal criminal offenders prior to 1987.  However, beginning 
on November 1, 1987 with the implementation of the Guidelines, district judges were forced to 
calculate a recommended sentence for each offender.  Guideline recommended sentences are 
primarily based on two variables: 1) the seriousness of the offense (as quantitatively defined by 
the Sentencing Commission); and 2) the criminal history of the offender (passed upon a “points 
system”).  Table 1, below, is an example of the Guidelines sentencing matrix from 2012. 
[Table 1 about here] 
As can be seen in Table 1, the vertical axis of the matrix ascribes each federal offense 
with a “level,” and the horizontal axis of the matrix depends on how many “criminal history 
points” the offender has.  As can also be gleaned from Table 1, application of the matrix results 
in relatively tight ranges of sentences, measured in units of monthly imprisonment (e.g. 21-27 
months).  Although there are procedures within the Guidelines framework that allow for 
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adjustments to sentences in a limited number of circumstances, most sentences are calculated 
using solely these two deterministic quantitative variables.  In fact, federal probation officers, 
rather than district judges, are responsible for calculating the Guideline sentence for each 
offender. (Stith and Cabranes 1998).  Given the fact district judges enjoyed relatively uninhibited 
judicial discretion in sentencing prior to the Guidelines’ adoption, an important question to ask is 
how district judges responded to this dramatic change? 
The raw data presents a somewhat complex and era-dependent answer to this question.  
When the Guidelines first took effect in fiscal year
12
 (hereafter “FY”) 1988, the percentage of 
sentences within the proscribed Guideline range was 82.3% (USSC 1995-2014).  By FY 2014, 
the percentage of within-Guideline sentences was only 46%, and the vast majority of these 
deviant sentences outside the Guideline range (95.9%) were below, rather than above, the 
Guideline recommended range (USCC 1995-2014).  In other words, the Guidelines are not 
applied nearly as strictly as they used to be. 
A well-studied explanation for this dramatic trend relates to changes in legal rules/policy 
pertinent to the Guidelines.  Two such changes of import were portions of the 2003 PROTECT 
Act
13
 enacted by Congress and the 2005 Supreme Court case of US. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005) (“Booker”).  These two policy changes had opposing effects.  The PROTECT Act 
constrained district judges’ ability to depart from the Guidelines by allowing appellate courts to 
review sentencing decisions without deference to the original decision of the sentencing district 
judge.  On the other hand, Booker augmented judicial discretion by holding that the Guideline 
ranges must be merely “advisory,” rather than mandatory.  The Supreme Court further clarified 
                                                 
12
 The Federal Fiscal year runs from October 1 of the prior year to September 30 of the corresponding calendar year.  
Thus, for example, FY 2014 includes all cases from October 1, 2013-September 30, 2014. 
 
13
  Pub. L. No. 108-121, 117 Stat. 650 
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in Booker that district court judges could legally “depart” from the Guidelines’ recommended 
range so long as the departure was “reasonable.”  However, as will be evidenced in more detail 
below, neither the PROTECT ACT nor Booker tell the complete story of Guideline adherence.  
Figure 1, below, provides graphical representation of the annual percentage of offenders 
receiving below-Guideline sentences since 1988.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the trend in increased below-Guideline sentence-ranges 
began well before the PROTECT Act was passed 2003
14
, and said trend has continued after 
Booker was decided through FY 2014 (USCC 1995-2014).   Thus, it does not appear as if these 
policy changes are solely responsible for the increasing trend of below-Guideline sentences.   
To be sure, part of the explanation for the clear trend can be attributed to factors outside 
the purview of judges.  The Sentencing Commission has noted that increased government 
recommendations for below-guideline sentences helps explain the increased departure rate 
(USSC 2012).  However, the Sentencing Commission has also acknowledged these extra-judicial 
factors do not tell the whole story and have noted that non-government sponsored downward 
departures have increased in recent years (USSC 2012).  Furthermore, rates of below-Guideline 
sentences have increased across all major offenses, including the three most common non-
immigration federal offenses: drug trafficking, unlawful firearms possession/use, and fraud 
(USSC 1995-2014).   Thus, there remain unanswered questions about why district judges are 
increasingly less apt to apply Guideline-recommended sentences to offenders.   The fundamental 
question of this chapter is what other factors might be responsible for this trend? 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Although this trend did stall and reverse course after the passage of the PROTECT ACT in 2003. 
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Past Federal Judge Sentencing Research 
Social science research on how federal judges sentence criminals began at least forty 
years ago.  Cook (1973, 1977) and Kritzer (1978) both sought to examine what factors 
influenced federal judges sentencing “draft dodgers” of the Vietnam War.  One key finding from 
both scholars was that the local political environment influenced the sentences handed down to 
the draft dodgers by federal judges (Cook 1973, 1977; Kritzer 1978).  In other words, district 
judges did not appear to be making their decisions independently of the local and elite sentiment 
in the community towards the Vietnam War, which changed drastically over the course of the 
1960’s.  Of particular importance, Kritzer found that the political environment factors were most 
important in explaining the sentencing decisions of district judges, when compared to 
characteristics of judges or case-specific facts.    
Building upon the findings of Cook (1973, 1977) and Kritzer (1978), Silver and Shapiro 
(1984) conducted a more thorough test of the “representational model” of judicial behavior, 
which posits that judges’ behavior reflects public sentiment.  Applying this model to the district 
judges’ role in sentencing, Silver and Shapiro found that federal judges were less likely to 
sentence criminals to probation, as popular sentiment for harsher penalties rose.  Silver and 
Shapiro similarly found that increasing levels of public support for marijuana decriminalization 
and legalization were correlated with shorter sentences.  However, Silver and Shapiro also found 
that judges were actually more likely to imprison offenders as opposed to probation, even as 
public support for legalization increased.  Ultimately, Silver and Shapiro interpreted their mixed 
results as grounds for reappraising the representational model and posited that factors such as 
crime rates, incarceration rates, and issue salience should be included in examining the public 
opinion/sentencing connection.  
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Despite the future research avenues laid out by Silver and Shapiro (1984), little recent 
federal sentencing scholarship has subjected the representational model to further testing.
15
  
Instead, the recent scholarship on district judge behavior under the Guidelines has primarily 
focused on whether judges’ partisan preferences or changes in judicial-discretion policy (e.g. 
pre- or post-Booker) have affected district judge’s adherence to the Guidelines.  Specifically, 
Fischman and Schanzenbach (2011) find that the 2003 PROTECT Act provisions which allowed 
appellate courts to review district court judge departures from the Guidelines without giving any 
deference to the district court judge, increased district court adherence to the Guidelines.  
Fischman and Schanzenbach also find that the Booker decision, which invalidated this portion of 
the PROTECT Act and further rendered the Guidelines “advisory,” resulted in decreased district 
judge adherence to the Guidelines.   Similarly, in a recent study, Epstein, et. al. (2013) found that 
the rate of departures from the Guidelines has increased substantially in the post-Booker era.  
Both Fischman and Schanzenbach (2011) and Epstein, et. al. (2013) also detected strategic and 
partisan influences on sentencing behavior.  In particular, both found that higher proportions of 
Republican circuit judges on the Court of Appeals sitting above the sentencing district court were 
associated with lower probabilities of Guideline departures by district judges. 
This finding perhaps suggests that district judges are somewhat strategic when making 
sentencing decision and consider the odds their sentence will be overturned on appeal when 
making sentencing decisions.  On the other hand, the finding could simply be reflective of the 
                                                 
15To be fair, one likely reason that recent research on judicial sentencing has not tested the “representational model” 
as thoroughly as older studies is simply that the representational model has not held up very well when subjected to 
empirical testing in other contexts.  In their study of Supreme Court justice behavior, Segal and Spaeth (2002), find 
virtually no support for the notion that popular opinion influences justice decision-making.  Even scholars 
propounding the notion that public opinion is relevant to Supreme Court decision-making are extremely cautious 
and conditional regarding their conclusions (Mishler and Sheehan 1993).   On the other hand, other scholars find a 
strong connection between public influence and trial judge behavior (Kuklinski and Stanga 1979; Gibson 1980).  
Moreover, some recent research has promisingly examined the effect of public attitudes on sentencing policy in 
particular, and found evidence that sentencing outcomes (certainly not solely attributable to judges) are responsive 
to the public’s punitive attitudes (Enns, 2014; Nicholson-Crotty, et. al., 2009) 
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ideological composition of circuits and district courts.  Past research finds a relationship between 
the liberalness of circuit judges and the liberalness of their home-state Senators (Songer 1982).  
In addition, there is evidence that, unlike district judges, circuit judges retire strategically by 
waiting for a President to be elected who more closely resembles their ideological perspective so 
that a similar policy-minded jurist will replace them (Spriggs & Wahlbeck 1995).  This research 
suggests that perhaps the observed relationship between circuit judge ideology/partisanship and 
district judge departure rates (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman & Schanzenbach 2011) is actually 
the result of relatively liberal areas of the country preferring less punitive policies.  This 
interpretation is more aligned with the representational model of judicial behavior, as discussed 
above, as opposed to any sort of strategic behavior by district judges seeking to avoid reversal on 
appeal. 
Aside from attitudinal effects, other researches have emphasized demographics of 
offenders as a key component to understanding why/how judges arrive at their sentences 
(Mustard 2001; USSC 2010).  In a study of over 70,000 offenders since the implementation of 
the Guidelines, Mustard (2001) finds that African-Americans, males, and offenders with lower 
socio-economic status are generally sentenced more severely under the Guidelines.  The 
Sentencing Commission has reached similar conclusions based on analyses of the average and 
median sentences for all demographic groups (USSC 2010).  Several analyses have also 
addressed the degree to which increases in judicial discretion post-Booker exacerbated or 
mitigated racial biases in sentencing.  While the Sentencing Commission finds that the increased 
discretion given to district judges has resulted in increased biases and undue sentencing disparity 
(USSC 2012), several studies have questioned this finding and argue that increased unwarranted 
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disparities post-Booker are mostly due to prosecutorial behavior (Lynch & Omori 2014; Rehavi 
& Starr 2012). 
Reviving the Past: The Representational Model applied to the Post-Guideline Sentencing 
Era. 
 
The literature discussed above has advanced our understanding of how offender 
demographics, legal policies, and partisanship affect district judges’ sentencing behavior in the 
post-Guideline era.  However, most of this recent scholarship tests relatively narrow questions, 
and with the exception of studies on the effect of judges’ partisanship, little attention is paid to 
larger theories about how district judges arrive at their sentencing decisions. Furthermore, none 
of these studies seem to offer nuanced explanations for why below-Guideline sentences 
continually increased after the Booker decision.   
Perhaps the lack of attention to alternative influences on district judge decisions is a 
byproduct of the success of more parsimonious theories of appellate judicial behavior.
16
  The 
most prominent of these theories are likely the attitudinal theory holding that justices/judges are 
motivated by their personal ideology (Segal and Spaeth 2002), and the strategic theory holding 
that justices don’t purely follow preferences but adjust their decisions based on the actions or 
likely actions of other actors to arrive at the optimal outcome (Epstein & Knight 1998).  Both of 
these theories are incorporated into recent studies on district judge sentencing, at least to the 
extent judges’ partisanship (as deduced by the party of the President appointing them) is 
reflective of their ideology (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).
 17
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 See Chapter 1 for a more comprehensive explanation of trial judge/appellate judge differences. 
 
17
 Needless to say this assumption may not hold, and some scholars of judicial behavior prefer “common space 
score” measures of judicial ideology, which incorporates measures of ideology from both the appointing presidents 
and the judges’ home-state senators as an alternative to simple partisanship (See Giles, et. al. 2001).  
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Yet there is some evidence that the attitudinal and strategic models do not have the same 
explanatory value when applied to district judges.  Rowland and Carp (1996), perhaps the 
leading authorities on federal district court judges, argue these judges are often influenced by a 
multiplicity of influences that do not fit squarely within parsimonious attitudinal models.  
Similarly, Kritzer (1978) posits that several factors, including judge characteristics, case facts, 
and legal constraints, affect how district court judges make decisions.
18
  Baum (2006) claims that 
judges of all kinds take into account their audiences when making decisions and that the 
attitudinal and strategic models portrait of judges as “single-minded utility seekers” is overly 
simplistic.   
In addition, several scholars have noted that district court judges’ are generally 
representative of their communities (Rowland and Carp 1996; Kritzer & Zemans 1993; Peltason 
1971; Vines 1964).  It is an open question whether this representative nature of district judges 
applies to Guideline-era criminal sentencing, and if so, whether the relationship is causal or 
simply the result of judges being members of these communities (See Kritzer 1978; Cook 1973, 
1977).  However, some recent evidence suggests there is a causal relationship between public 
attitudes on crime and punishment and criminal justice policy outputs (Nicholson-Crotty, et. al. 
2009; Enns 2014).   
Finally, in addition to any representational factors, certain judicial behavior scholars 
maintain that some judges care about making the “right” decision and making “good public 
policy,” independent of partisanship or ideology (Baum 1997; Posner 1993).  In relation to 
criminal justice policy, district judges’ conception of “good public policy” could potentially be 
influenced by sociopolitical conditions such as crime rates and incarceration rates.  Scholars of 
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 See Chapter 1, Figure 1 for a diagram of my own theoretical perspective on district judge decision-making, which 
is similar in many respects to Kritzer (1978). 
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state judges have indeed found that higher crime rates are correlated with judges meting out 
harsher sentences (Ulmer and Bradley 2006; Gibson 1980).  There is also some evidence, 
however, that the crime rate bears little impact on district judges.
19
  It is perhaps possible that 
district judges are not as sensitive to crime-rate concerns because of the lack of an electoral 
connection.  Elected state court judges may simply be issuing harsher sentences in higher crime 
areas in order to increase their electoral prospects with a public who desire tough-on-crime 
judges (Gibson 1980).  Yet as discussed above, most scholarship on district judge behavior finds 
them susceptible to community influences, despite the lack of any electoral connection (Rowland 
and Carp 1996, Kritzer & Zemans 1993; Peltason 1971; Vines 1964).  Thus, it is worth further 
examining the relationship between crime rates and district judges’ sentencing. 
Incarceration rates also represent a plausible contextual factor district judges might 
consider in their sentencing decisions.   While there is little research on the effect incarceration 
rates have on judges’ sentencing habits, exploding incarceration within the federal system is a 
potential explanation for the trend observed in Figure 1.  The logic of this theory is based upon 
the initial premise that district judges’ preferences can change in the face of changing contexts. 
As more and more people were incarcerated in the post-Guideline era, especially for non-violent 
drug offenses, district judges may have viewed Guideline sentences as too punitive.  As a result, 
I argue district judges began sentencing offenders to shorter sentences.   
In summary, I aim to build upon recent studies on district judge sentencing practices 
(Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011) by reviving tests of the representational 
model of judicial behavior examined by researchers in the 1970s and 1980s (Silver and Shapiro 
1984; Kritzer 1978; Cook 1973). In addition, I choose to assess the impact relevant objective 
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 See Johnson, et. al. (2008) for a null finding of crime rate influence on district judges.   The findings of Johnson, 
et. al. (2008) regarding the crime rate are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.   
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conditions, such crime rates and incarceration rates, might also have on district judges’ 
sentencing decisions.  It is quite plausible that an examination of these previously untested 
variables might explain the drastic change in district judge sentencing behavior that is depicted in 
Figure 1.   
Research Design 
Hypotheses 
Consistent with my theory of contextual influences
20
 I posit three testable hypotheses.  
First, the “representational hypothesis” is: there will be a positive relationship between the 
public’s punitive preferences and district judges’ punitiveness in sentencing.  Second, the “crime 
rate hypothesis” is: there will be a positive relationship between the crime rate and district 
judges’ punitiveness in sentencing.  Finally, the “incarceration rate hypothesis” is: there will be a 
negative relationship between the incarceration rate and district judges’ punitiveness in 
sentencing.    
Dependent Variable 
 District Judge Punitiveness 
To measure the primary dependent variable of interest, district judge sentencing behavior, 
I use the proportions of offenders receiving two different types of below-Guideline sentences, 
also known as “departures,” in fiscal years 1988 to 2013.21  The first measure is the proportion of 
all offenders who receive any below-Guideline sentences (“Total Downward Departures”).  The 
second measure is the same proportion, except that all offenders who receive below-Guideline 
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 For a more thorough discussion of the theoretical justification for these hypotheses, please see above and Chapter 
1.   
 
21
 Although data from Fiscal Year 2014 is available, this year was excluded from this analysis due to lack of data 
availability for certain exogenous covariates.  
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sentences based upon providing “substantial assistance” to the government are excluded from the 
proportion (“Judge-Initiated Downward Departures”). 
The purpose of using two different departures measures is that some departures from the 
Guidelines are actually recommended and/or agreed to by the government or prosecution as part 
of a plea bargain.  The majority
22
 of these government-sponsored departure cases throughout the 
series are these “substantial assistance” departures wherein the government makes a motion that 
the offender has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another 
person who has committed a crime (See Sentencing Guidelines Policy Statement 5K1.1).  
Essentially, these substantial assistance cases are cases where Guideline departures are 
recommended by the government because the offender provides law enforcement with 
information that allows them to resolve more serious cases.  This distinction between total 
departures and substantial assistance departures sponsored by the government is possibly 
relevant, as there is some question as to whether Guideline departures recommended by the 
government should be included in an analysis of “judicial behavior.”  
On balance, I argue the Total Downward Departure measure is probably a more valid 
measure of district judge punitiveness.  Even if recommended by the government, district judges 
still must approve below-Guideline sentences and are free to ignore the government’s 
recommendation.  Additionally, there is negative correlation between substantial assistance 
departure rates and non-substantial departure rates among different districts (Weinstein 1998; 
USSC 1995-2014), which suggests that district judges are not beholden to the government’s 
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 Some government sponsored departures are not “substantial assistance” downward departures and include 
government-sponsored departure for other reasons.  Unfortunately the Sentencing Commission did not begin coding 
all other “government sponsored departures” until 2003.  Thus, the data does not allow for examination of only non-
government sponsored departures for the full series. Still, given the “substantial assistance” departures are, by far, 
the most common government-sponsored departure, the measure of departures that excludes these cases should 
provide a fairly strong proxy for all non-government sponsored departures.   
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recommendations.  Moreover, other recent studies of district judge sentencing examine total 
departure rates, rather than any subset of departures (See e.g. Epstein, et. al. 2013).   All of this 
evidence suggests that the Total Downward Departure measure is preferable.  However, as a 
robustness check, and to ensure substantial assistance cases are not driving results, I also include 
the secondary measure of Judge-Initiated Downward Departures. 
Setting aside the two alternative measures of departures, one might also question why the 
use of downward departure rates in general is an appropriate proxy for district judge 
punitiveness.
23
  The justification for using downward departure rates, as opposed to measures 
such as median length of sentence, is that laws, prosecutorial practices, and the Guidelines 
themselves change over time (USSC 2012).  There also are changes to the types of cases 
prosecuted over time, as is evidenced by the increasing proportion of immigration offenders in 
recent years (USSC 1995-2014).  Thus measuring Guideline downward departure rates more 
appropriately
24
 isolates the behavior of district judges than measuring mean or median sentence 
length.   
In spite of the foregoing, two points merit discussion regarding the downward departure 
measures of judicial sentencing behavior.  First, the measures do not include “upward 
departures” or occasions when the sentencing judge sentences the offender to a penalty that is 
more harsh that the penalty recommended by the Guidelines.  The reasons for excluding upward 
departures from the analysis are both that upward departures are rare (an average of 1.6% of 
cases from FY 1988-2014) and they do not appear to exhibit coherent trends over time.  
Conversely, downward departures are fairly common (an average of 32.2% of all cases in from 
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 Note also that lower values of the departure measure imply more punitive behavior by district judges.   
 
24
 Notably this measure of Guideline downward departures follows past research studying judicial sentencing 
behavior (Epstein, et. al., 2013; Fischman & Schanzenbach 2011; Freeborn & Hartmann 2010; Schanzenbach & 
Tiller, 2007).   
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FY 1988-2014) and exhibit relatively strong stability from one year to the next, with clear trends 
over the course of the series.    
The second point regarding the downward departure measures is that they are not the 
only potential measures for whether district judges are treating criminals harshly.  In addition to 
rates of Guideline departure, one alternative measure is the average Guideline minimum 
imprisonment sentence for all offenses in a given year compared to the average imprisonment 
sentence actually imposed in a given year (USSC 2012).   The logic of this “average difference” 
measure is that if average sentences become relatively shorter/longer than average guideline 
minimums over time, then we have some evidence that judges are shifting to a less/more punitive 
direction.    This alternative measure has the advantage of incorporating sentence length into the 
analysis and controlling for above-mentioned problems with average/median sentence length 
measures, such as changes to the Guidelines over time. 
Despite these advantages, the “average difference” measure also has two key 
disadvantages.  First, the average difference measure is susceptible to outliers.  A few judges’ 
decisions to give offenders the maximum Guideline-range, or above maximum Guideline-range 
sentence could greatly affect average difference.  Overall departure rates present a more accurate 
overall picture of how punitive district judges’ preferences are in a given year.   
Second, the U.S. Sentencing Commission only has data on this measure beginning in 
1996, rather than 1988, which eliminates nearly 30% of the observations.  For these reasons, I 
opt for the downward departure measures.  Still, the average difference measure may be 
appropriate in some contexts, and future tests and research should investigate whether this 
measure produces different results from the departure rate measure used in this design. 
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Input Variables 
Policy Change 
Variables related to the two major policy changes in Guideline application that occurred 
will be incorporated through adjusted dummy variables.  A “1” is coded for each fiscal year that 
the PROTECT Act was fully in effect, which limited judicial discretion, with a corresponding 
“0” for fiscal years when the PROTECT Act was not in effect.  Similarly a “1” is coded for each 
year after US v. Booker was decided, which expanded judicial discretion, and a “0” coded for 
years prior to the decision.  As neither Booker nor the PROTECT Act were placed into, or taken 
out of, effect at the exact beginning or end of fiscal years, I calculate the proportion of cases in 
the year the policy was in effect for those fiscal years.
25
  For example, since U.S. v. Booker was 
in effect for approximately 76% of all cases with departure data in FY 2005, I code FY 2005 as a 
“0.76” for Booker.    
Public Sentiment Regarding Crime 
A new measure for public punitiveness has recently been developed by Enns (2014).  The 
measure incorporates responses to 33 survey questions related to treatment of criminals and 
seeks to capture the general level of public punitiveness over time.
26
  For the years of 1988-2010, 
I simply use the gross measure utilized by Enns (2014).  However, since the Enns (2014) 
measure is only constructed through 2010, I employ an estimated measure for public 
punitiveness, updated for the years of 2011 and 2012.  Specifically, I utilize more recent data 
from survey questions to construct estimates of the same public punitiveness measure for the 
years of 2011 and 2012.  To construct these estimates, I use survey questions that: 1) Enns 
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 As the Sentencing Commission does not have separate information for before and after the PROTECT Act was 
placed into effect, I instead use the proportion of the number of days that the PROTECT Act was in effect out of the 
entire fiscal year.  This measure assumes that there is an even distribution of cases throughout the Fiscal Year.   
 
26
 For a more detailed discussion of how the measure is constructed, see Enns (2014). 
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himself incorporated into his measure in earlier years; 2) exhibit a strong correlation with Enns’ 
aggregated measure of public punitiveness (.75 or higher); and, 3) and have available response 
data for the years of 2011 and 2012.
27
  Assuming that the strong correlations between the 
particular survey questions and the gross measure of public punitiveness hold for recent years, 
this procedure should produce valid estimates of Enns (2014) public punitiveness measure for 
the updated years of 2011 and 2012.
28
   
Federal Incarceration Rate 
As discussed above, it is also plausible that district judges tend to depart from the 
Guidelines more often when the incarceration rate is high.  The logic here is that judges are 
directly observing the deleterious effects of placing more federal offenders into prison, so they 
adjust their sentencing behavior to mitigate this problem. Since this reasoning relates to judges’ 
direct impact and exposure to the problem and consequences of over-incarceration, the federal 
incarceration rate is a preferable measure to the overall incarceration rate.
29
    The federal 
incarceration rate from 1988-2012, is taken from the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (U.S. DOJ 2015). 
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 Specifically, three survey questions from Gallup and the General Social Survey (GSS) meet the above criteria for 
2011 and 2012.  Two of these questions concerning support for the death penalty and one question  concerns 
whether the courts treat criminals too harsh or not harsh enough.   To compute the measure, I take any percentage 
change in the ratio of punitive responses from the older survey questions, used in Enns (2014) measure, to the newer 
survey questions, and then incorporate that change into my 2011 and 2012 estimates for public punitiveness.  I then 
repeat this procedure for every question with available data that meets the above criteria.   
  
28
In fact, the resultant procedure yields a 2.7% decrease in the overall public punitiveness measure from 2010 to 
2011, which is consistent with the recent trend, and no change in the public punitiveness measure from 2011 to 
2012.    
 
29
 Despite the strengths of the federal measure, to the extent federal judges are able to internalize the incarceration 
problem that exists in the community beyond the federal system, it is possible that overall incarcerations also have 
some effect on their decisions.  
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Crime Rate 
As to changing objective conditions, the crime rate measure is taken using annual data 
published by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports from 1988-2012 for the country.  Notably, this 
measure assumes that district judges are able to recognize and internalize changes to the crime 
rate.  Due to district judges’ pervasive, if indirect, exposure to crime through their role as 
criminal case adjudicators, I argue this is a reasonable assumption.   
One potential issue with the crime rate measure is the fact that huge variation exists in 
crime rate trends across different parts of the country.  Since district judges are assigned to a 
specific geographic area, it is possible that they are sensitive to the local crime rate but not the 
national crime rate.  Despite this possibility, due to the fact that all other variables are measured 
at the national level, this design
30
 assumes that the annual crime-rates measure will average out 
any diverging and regional trends.   
Another issue regarding the crime rate, incarceration rate, and public punitiveness 
measures merits brief discussion.  For all three variables, annual data is compiled in calendar 
years as opposed to fiscal years.  The federal government’s fiscal year operates from October 1-
September 30, and as such, the Sentencing Commission publishes its annual data and reports 
based upon sentences issued during this time period.   This mismatch in annual data creates a 
potential difficulty when making causal inference in time-series analysis (Skog 2003).    
In the present models, I chose to correspond the fiscal-year variables with the previous 
calendar year variables. Although this decision creates only a three month overlap for 
corresponding variables, as opposed to a nine month overlap, it is preferable for two reasons.  
First, it prevents the inclusion of elements of input variables that occur after district judges issue 
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 For a test of whether state/local crime rates impacts district judges’ sentencing decisions, see Chapters 3-4. 
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sentences.  Obviously, it makes no theoretical sense that the independent variables of crime, 
incarceration, or public opinion could be affecting district judges, if the trends in these 
independent variables have not yet occurred when sentencing decisions are made.    
This first reason for this decision is closely related to the second reason.  Namely, the 
logic of this theory is that as district judges begin to become sensitive to the public sentiment or 
pertinent objective conditions surrounding them, they alter their individual sentencing decisions.   
It is implausible that this reaction would occur immediately with no lag time.  Accordingly, 
corresponding the preceding calendar year for these input variables with the remaining variables 
is the better option than corresponding the same fiscal and calendar years.   
Partisanship of District Judges 
Although my theoretical perspective de-emphasizes ideology and party, sentencing 
preferences are potentially related to partisanship of the judges (Fischman & Schanzenbach 
2011).  If this is the case, we would expect the proportion of district judges appointed by 
Democratic presidents to correspond with downward Guideline departures.  To measure this 
series, I calculate the proportion of active federal district judges appointed by a Democratic 
President for each year from 1988-2013.  In order to account for judges appointed/retiring within 
the year in question, I calculate this proportion at the halfway-point through each fiscal year 
(April 1).  Note this measure assumes both that there are roughly equal sentencing decisions 
made in each half of the fiscal year and that there are no partisan differences in whether judges 
retire in the first or second half of the fiscal year.
31
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 The sentencing data (USCC 1995-2014) , in addition to past research evidencing that district judges do not retire 
strategically (Yoon 2006), suggest these are both reasonable assumptions. 
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Partisanship of Circuit Judges 
There is also the possibility that district judges make sentencing decisions strategically 
and avoid deviating from the Guidelines when it is likely they will be overturned on appeal.   
Both Epstein, et. al. (2013) and Fischman & Schanzenbach (2011) find that the proportion of 
Democrat-appointees sitting on the court of appeals circuit with appellate jurisdiction over the 
sentencing district judge was positively associated with downward departure rates.  As discussed 
above, this finding may be evidence of strategic behavior of district judges who do not want their 
sentences to be overturned or it may simply be reflective of the observed relationship between 
circuit court ideology and region.   
To provide insight into these alternative theories, I also include a partisan variable for 
circuit court judges who do not make initial sentencing decisions.  This variable is measured 
simply as the proportion of circuit judges appointed by a Democratic President in each fiscal 
year from 1988-2013, as of April 1.
32
  If strategic behavior is truly the driving factor behind the 
circuit partisanship/departure rate relationship, we should expect to find that changes to the 
aggregate partisan proportion of appellate judges affects aggregate district judge sentencing 
behavior over time.   
Methods 
To test determinants of Guideline departures over time, I employ an autoregressive 
integrated moving average with exogenous variables (ARIMAx) model.
33
  An ARIMAx model is 
similar to the Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average Model (ARIMA) of Box and Jenkins 
(1970), except that it allows for the inclusion of additional exogenous covariates based upon 
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 As with the annual measure of the partisanship of the district courts, above, this proportion is calculated on April 
1 of each year, because it is the halfway point of the federal fiscal year. 
 
33
 Also sometimes referred to as “dynamic regression” Pankratz (2012). 
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cross-correlations between these covariates and the response series. (Andrews, et. al. 2013; Lee, 
et. al. 2013).  
There are several factors that make an ARIMAx dynamic regression model appropriate in 
this case.  First, a simple multiple linear regression model of judicial departure rates from the 
Guidelines, with the above-referenced independent variables included, results in positively 
correlated residuals, which violates assumptions of the linear regression model.
34
  An ARIMAx 
model is similar to a multiple linear regression model, except that it includes one or more 
autoregressive (AR) terms or moving average (MA) terms.  Inclusion of these terms can be used 
to ensure that the correlated residuals of a time series model can be translated into white noise.  
Secondly, the Guideline departure rate series exhibits substantial variation over time (See 
Figure 1) with many different plausible exogenous input variables explaining this trend (See 
above). These are the type of situations when ARIMAx models can potentially be utilized 
(Grillezoni 1993).  Furthermore, ARIMAx models allow for both lagged and decaying effects of 
covariates (Feng, et. al. 2013; Lee, et. al. 2013; Clavijo 1994).  As we would not expect any 
effects of the input variables to be either immediate or permanent on district judges, this 
inclusion of lagged and decaying effects is also appropriate.   Finally, due to the limited number 
of observations in the time series, a more complex model, such as a vector auto regressive 
(VAR) model, which uses multiple equations to estimate the effect of separate series at various 
lags, is inappropriate (Rautava 2004). 
Modeling with ARMA parameters requires that the modeled series be stationary, with a 
constant mean and variance over time (Copertwait & Metcalfe 2009).  However, as can be 
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 More specifically, a simple linear regression model of total departure rates, with all of the above noted variables 
included, results in a Durbin Watson statistic of 0.55., suggesting strong, positive serial correlation in the residuals.  
Accordingly, a simple linear model of departure rates does not comport with the assumption of linear regression of 
independently distributed residuals. 
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clearly seen from Figure 1, the Guideline departure rate series is not stationary, as it exhibits 
substantial drift upwards over time.  Indeed, it is this drift that the present model seeks to 
explain.  To address this issue, the departure rate series is differenced so that the series reflects 
annual changes in departure rates rather than annual levels of departure rates.  The first 
differencing technique of the departure rate successfully creates a stationary time-series, which 
allows for ARIMA modeling.  As is advisable for ARIMAx model-building, the input variables 
are also differenced using the same method as was used on the dependent variable (Andrews, et. 
al., 2013). Thus, the model represents the effects of changes in the input variables on changes in 
judicial departure rates at various lags. 
One disadvantage of the ARIMAx models is that, because the value of the dependent 
variable is dependent on prior values of the dependent variable, the coefficients of the input 
variables cannot be interpreted intuitively as a one unit change in the input variable producing a 
one-unit change in the dependent variable (Enders 2008).  However, as these models are 
exploratory, seeking to test the effect of previously untested variables on judicial behavior, the 
significance tests themselves are worthwhile endeavors. 
Results  
Recall that two different series are used as a measure of district judge punitiveness: Total 
Departures and Judge-Initiated Downward Departures.  Results from two different ARIMAx 
model specifications for the Total Downward Departures series are first presented in Table 2 
below.  The first column of Table 2 includes a model specification with only the policy 
change/partisanship of the judiciary input variables included.  The second column of the model 
represents the full specification, which adds the hypothesized variables: annual change in the 
incarceration rate, the annual change in the crime rate, and the annual change in the Enns (2014) 
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measure of public punitiveness.  Both models represent the best fitting ARIMA model order, or 
the one with the lowest AIC (Akaikie Information Criteria).
35
   
Before examining the effect of the input variables, note that the differenced series 
modeled in Table 2 include two significant moving average parameters, which are required to 
make the residuals of the series white noise.  After these parameters are included, the auto 
correlation function plots for the models produce no significant autocorrelation at any lags for 
the selected series, and each of the Ljung-Box Tests resulted in a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of independently distributed residuals.
36
  Thus, the observed serial correlation in the 
residuals of the simple linear regression model is no longer present.   
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Turning to the effect of the input series on below-Guideline sentences, there is some 
evidence for the hypothesis that increased levels of federal incarceration are associated with 
higher rates of downward departures.  The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the 
incarceration rate in the second column of Table 2 suggests that increase in the incarceration rate 
leads to increases in downward departures from the Guidelines.   
Despite the evidence supporting the effect of incarceration rates, results do not support 
the hypotheses that either the crime rate or public punitiveness are negatively associated with 
rates of below-Guideline sentences.  As can be seen from Table 2, the negative coefficient for the 
crime rate variable is in the expected direction but fails to obtain statistical significance.  
Additionally, contrary to expectations, the coefficient for public punitiveness is positive.   
                                                 
35
 See Bozdogan (1987) for a full discussion of AIC and how it works well as a test of model strength in ARIMA 
models. 
 
36
 The p values for the Ljung Box Test are: 0.80, 0.34 for the two models respectively.  Thus, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of independently distributed residuals. 
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Not surprisingly, we do observe negative, significant coefficients for the legal policy 
change of the enactment of the PROTECT Act.  This finding is consistent with past research 
regarding district judge adherence to the Guidelines and suggests that the PROTECT Act 
constrained district judges’ ability to depart from the Guidelines, (Tiede 2009, Fischman & 
Schanzenbach, 2011).  On the other hand, neither model finds that Booker significantly increased 
proportions of below-Guideline sentences, which is contrary to expectations (See Epstein, et. al., 
2013).   
The results in Table 2 are also somewhat mixed as to the effect the partisanship of the 
judiciary has on downward departure rates.  While the more parsimonious model has a 
significant positive coefficient for the proportion of Democratic-appointees on the district court, 
this statistical significance disappears in the full model.   Neither model finds a significant 
relationship between Democratic-appointees on the circuit court and departure rates.    
In comparing the two models, the inclusion of the newly added input variables does 
nominally improve the strength of the model.  The AIC in the second column is lower than the 
AIC in first column, which suggests that the additional parameters add explanatory power to 
predicting changes in departure rates.   The AIC measure of model strength is parameter 
efficient, so even after being “penalized” for including the additional variables, the model 
improves (Bozdogan 1987). 
Table 3 represents a similar set of models, but this time the dependent variable excludes 
downward departures based on “substantial assistance” to the government.  Recall that this series 
excludes certain downward departures from the Guidelines, wherein the prosecution 
recommends and sponsors a below-Guideline sentence due to the offender providing information 
to the government related to other criminals.  Thus, in contrast to Table 2, Table 3 does not 
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represent the full gamut of judicial guideline application but instead excludes a sizable minority 
of cases wherein the government recommends a reduced sentence to the judge based on the 
offender’s substantial assistance. 
As with the models of in Table 2, both ARIMAx models in Table 3 of Judge-Initiated 
Downward Departures are free of autocorrelation.  The autocorrelation function plots of the 
models’ residuals show no significant lags and results of the Ljung-Box tests provide no 
evidence of correlated residuals.
37
   
[Table 3 about here] 
  The two models of Judge-Initiated Downward Departures presented in Table 3 produce 
similar results to those observed in Table 2.  As with the Total Departure Model presented in 
Table 2, the positive and significant coefficient for the incarceration rate suggests that higher 
levels of incarceration are associated with district judges issuing more below-Guideline 
sentences.   The other two input variables of interest (public punitiveness and the crime rate), 
however, fail to reach statistical significance.   
One difference between the models of the Total Downward Departure series presented in 
Table 2 and the Judge-Initiated Downward Departure series in Table 3 is that the Booker 
coefficient is positive and significant in Table 3.  This is consistent with past research suggesting 
that judges increased their proportion of below-Guideline sentences in response to the increased 
discretion they received after Booker (Epstein, et. al. 2013).      
Discussion 
The results of the models presented above provide some support for the incarceration rate 
hypothesis suggesting increased incarceration is associated with more lenient district judge 
                                                 
37
 The p values for the Ljung Box Test are: 0.77 and 0.89 for the two models respectively.  Thus, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of independently distributed residuals. 
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sentencing. The incarceration rate variable reaches statistical significance in both the Total 
Downward Departure model in Table 2 and the Judge-Initiated Downward Departure model in 
Table 3.  Thus, there is some preliminary evidence that increased federal incarceration has 
softened the sentencing behavior of district court judges over time. 
However, when viewed overall, the results are certainly not strongly supportive of the 
theoretical perspective of contextual influence.  Specifically, results did not support the 
hypotheses that either the crime rate or public punitiveness are positively associated with 
punitive judicial behavior.  Overall, there is little to no support for the “representational model” 
of judicial behavior suggesting that judges’ decisions are representative of the people (Silver and 
Shapiro 1984; Gibson 1980; Vines 1960).   
While it is quite possible that the expected variables simply do not influence judicial 
behavior as theorized, it should be noted that there are other potential explanations for the failure 
of the above tests to provide strong results.  First, the limited number of observations in the 
series makes the results susceptible to data from a single variable in a single year.  This problem 
is exacerbated by the policy changes that occurred in the early 2000’s (the PROTECT Act and 
Booker) that impacted departure rates.  To address the small sample size issue, Chapter 3 
employs a panel design, utilizing data from different US district courts throughout the country in 
different years.  This method vastly increases the sample size and could perhaps lead to different 
results.   
 Second, it is possible that district judges do respond to crime rates and public punitive 
attitudes, but they are concerned with crime and opinion at the local level only.  Indeed, this 
finding may be what would be expected by scholars of district court behavior who note their 
connection local communities (Kritzer & Zemans1993).  If this is the case, and changes in public 
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punitiveness and the crime rate vary throughout the country, the results from these national-level 
models will not be able to fully capture these variables’ import.  Once again, to test whether this 
is the case, models presented in Chapter 3 will test the potential impact of localized crime rates 
and local public preferences, as opposed to any national-level changes. 
Finally, the results do indirectly support one aspect of my theoretical perspective. While 
failing to strongly support the specific hypotheses, the results do tacitly suggest that district 
judge behavior is complex and cannot be easily captured by a handful of variables.  Stated 
differently, minimal change in judicial sentencing behavior over the past few decades was 
explained by the partisan and policy-change variables.  However, and notably, the inclusion of 
the additional contextual variables into models of departure rates resulted in improvements in the 
models’ explanatory power.  This model-strength improvement implies that the hypothesized 
contextual variables should be subjected to future testing using alternative methods to better 
determine their possible relationship with district judges’ sentencing behavior. 
In sum, the results of this test were somewhat disappointing but do lay some initial 
groundwork for future empirical testing.  Notwithstanding some promising results regarding the 
effect of incarceration rates, the most reasonable interpretation of the findings is that the strong 
trend exhibited in Figure 1 remains largely unexplained.  Accordingly, future scholars should 
follow the advice of Silver and Shapiro (1984) and continue to use new methods and probe 
additional variables that may help explain causes of district judges’ sentencing decisions.   
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Table 1:   FY 2012 Sentencing Table 
*Source: USSC 
    Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points) 
  
Offense 
Level 
I (0 or 1) II (2 or 3)   
III (4, 5, 
6) 
  IV (7, 8, 9)   
V (10, 11, 
12) 
  
VI (13 or 
more) 
                        
 
Zone A 
1 0-6 0-6   0-6   0-6   0-6   0-6 
2 0-6 0-6   0-6   0-6   0-6   1-7 
3 0-6 0-6   0-6   0-6   2-8   3-9 
4 0-6 0-6   0-6   2-8   4-10   6-12 
5 0-6 0-6   1-7   4-10   6-12   9-15 
6 0-6 1-7   2-8   6-12   9-15   12-18 
7 0-6 2-8   4-10   8-14   12-18   15-21 
8 0-6 4-10   6-12   10-16   15-21   18-24 
Zone B 
9 4-10 6-12   8-14   12-18   18-24   21-27 
10 6-12 8-14   10-16   15-21   21-27   24-30 
 
Zone C 
11 8-14 10-16   12-18   18-24   24-30   27-33 
12 10-16 12-18   15-21   21-27   27-33   30-37 
Zone D 
13 12-18 15-21   18-24   24-30   30-37   33-41 
14 15-21 18-24   21-27   27-33   33-41   37-46 
15 18-24 21-27   24-30   30-37   37-46   41-51 
16 21-27 24-30   27-33   33-41   41-51   46-57 
17 24-30 27-33   30-37   37-46   46-57   51-63 
18 27-33 30-37   33-41   41-51   51-63   57-71 
19 30-37 33-41   37-46   46-57   57-71   63-78 
20 33-41 37-46   41-51   51-63   63-78   70-87 
21 37-46 41-51   46-57   57-71   70-87   77-96 
22 41-51 46-57   51-63   63-78   77-96   84-105 
23 46-57 51-63   57-71   70-87   84-105   92-115 
24 51-63 57-71   63-78   77-96   92-115   100-125 
25 57-71 63-78   70-87   84-105   100-125   110-137 
26 63-78 70-87   78-97   92-115   110-137   120-150 
27 70-87 78-97   87-108   100-125   120-150   130-162 
28 78-97 87-108   97-121   110-137   130-162   140-175 
29 87-108 97-121   108-135   121-151   140-175   151-188 
30 97-121 108-135   121-151   135-168   151-188   168-210 
31 108-135 121-151   135-168   151-188   168-210   188-235 
32 121-151 135-168   151-188   168-210   188-235   210-262 
33 135-168 151-188   168-210   188-235   210-262   235-293 
34 151-188 168-210   188-235   210-262   235-293   262-327 
35 168-210 188-235   210-262   235-293   262-327   292-365 
36 188-235 210-262   235-293   262-327   292-365   324-405 
37 210-262 235-293   262-327   292-365   324-405   360-life 
38 235-293 262-327   292-365   324-405   360-life   360-life 
39 262-327 292-365   324-405   360-life   360-life   360-life 
40 292-365 324-405   360-life   360-life   360-life   360-life 
41 324-405 360-life   360-life   360-life   360-life   360-life 
42 360-life 360-life   360-life   360-life   360-life   360-life 
  43 life life   life   life   life   life 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Offenders Sentenced Below Guideline Recommended 
Range: 1988-2014 
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Table 2: Dynamic Regression Determinants of Total Downward Departure  
Rates (FY 1988-2013)      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable    (1)   (2) 
      
Booker     3.95        0.87    
                  (4.01)   (4.73) 
   
PROTECT Act    -5.88**   -4.28*  
     (2.14)   (2.35) 
   
DemDist %    0.19**   0.10    
     (0.06)   (.12) 
 
DemCirc %    -0.04   0.12 
     (0.09)   (0.12) 
 
Incarc. Rate       -   0.44* 
        (0.23) 
   
Crime Rate       -   -0.03  
        (0.14) 
         
Public Punitiveness      -   0.20            
        (0.10)                                  
 
ARIMA Order   (p,d,q)   (0,1,2)      (0,1,2) 
   
         
MA(1)     0.62**      0.98**  
     (0.18)   (0.31)  
 
MA(2)     1.00**   1.00**                                  
     (0.19)   (0.20)                                  
 
MSE     1.07   0.80  
(Mean Squared Error) 
 
Degrees of Freedom   19   16 
 
AIC     86.93   86.07 
    
 
 Note: standard errors  in parentheses  *p<.05   ** p<.01   (one-tailed tests) 
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Table 3: Dynamic Regression Determinants of Judge-Initiated Departure Rates 
(FY 1988-2013)      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable    (1)   (2)  
     
Booker     6.95*   4.38   
                  (3.52)   (3.69)  
  
PROTECT Act    -2.62   -1.53   
     (1.95)   (2.18)  
  
DemDist %    0.00   -0.04   
     (0.05)   (0.06) 
 
DemCirc. %    0.02   0.16*   
     (0.07)   (0.08)  
  
Incarc. Rate       -   0.41*   
        (0.15)  
  
Crime Rate         -   -0.01   
        (0.01) 
 
Public Punitiveness      -   0.10   
        (0.07) 
   
ARIMA Order   (p,d,q)   (0,1,2)      (0,1,2)  
  
         
MA(1)     0.75**      1.11**   
     (0.16)   (0.30)                                  
 
MA(2)     1.00**   1.00**                                  
     (0.20)   (0.21)       
                            
MSE     0.76   0.60   
(Mean Squared Error) 
 
Degrees of Freedom   19   16 
 
AIC     78.78   78.5  
   
 
Note: standard errors  in parentheses  *p<.05   ** p<.01   (one-tailed tests) 
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Chapter 3: 
 
“Of Time and Space: How Localized and 
Temporal Factors Influence Federal Judges’ 
Criminal Sentencing Decisions.” 
 
 
Abstract: 
Recent research on sentencing outcomes in federal district courts suggests 
that sentencing practice is complex and contingent upon the location of the federal 
district.  While researchers have identified several sources of this inter-district 
variation, potentially relevant sociopolitical characteristics have not been fully 
explored.  I argue that district court judges, despite being unelected, are likely to 
be sensitive to salient sociopolitical inputs.  Using a panel-design, pooling data 
from ninety (90) federal districts across sixteen (16) years, this paper tests whether 
two such sociopolitical variables: 1) the state crime rate and 2) state citizen 
ideology, affect the harshness of sentences through judicial application of the US 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Results suggest that both the crime rate and the ideology 
of the citizens are associated with judicial departures from the Guidelines.  Results 
further suggest that while there is substantial inter-district variation in judicial 
behavior, sociopolitical factors have an effect over-time within districts. Broadly, 
these findings suggest that federal district court judges may be accounting for 
broader sociopolitical factors in their individual decisions. 
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Introduction 
Trial judges are members of communities.  Trial judges in many state-court systems in 
the United States are directly elected by the people of these communities.  In the federal system, 
trial judges, or “district court judges,” are instead appointed by the President and confirmed by 
the US Senate.   Despite this lack of an electoral connection to their communities, district court 
judges are often long-time residents of the geographical areas to which they are appointed (Sivler 
and Shapiro 1984). The federal judiciary is divided into ninety distinct geographic districts 
within the fifty U.S. States and the District of Columbia.
38
  Accordingly, federal district court 
judges are political actors both within a nationwide federal system and within much smaller 
geographic areas.   
For obvious reasons, a substantial body of research on Congress has focused on the 
extent to which members differ and/or are reflective of the views of the district or state they 
represent (Miller and Stokes 1963; Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974; Bartels 1991; Clinton 2006).  
Yet, while these questions have been explored by federal judicial scholars, especially in prior 
decades (Rosenberg 1991; Silver and Shapiro 1984; Cook 1973, 1971; Vines 1964), there have 
been comparatively fewer attempts to explain whether national variation in federal district judge 
behavior is explained by social and political qualities of the location where the judges sit.
39
   
Accordingly, the broader question of this chapter is: to the extent that we observe 
national variation in district court judicial behavior, how much of said variation can be explained 
                                                 
38
 There are also four (4) additional districts for the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, and 
the North Mariana Islands. 
 
39
 Criminologists and Criminal Justice scholars interested in sentencing practice have more thoroughly examined 
national variation.  See Johnson, et. al. (2008); Wu and Spohn (2010).  However, as explained much more 
thoroughly, infra, there is a need to update and build upon these studies.    
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by district or statewide features of the community?  Thus, rather than attempting to understand 
judicial behavior by focusing on national or case-specific factors, this paper takes a less-utilized 
“middle” approach and focuses on qualities of states and districts.  I argue these more localized, 
but not necessarily case-specific, factors are influential on federal district judge behavior.  It is of 
course true that we would expect social and political characteristics of states and districts to 
affect elected political actors, such as members of Congress, more than unelected political actors, 
such as federal district court judges. Still, district judges are a unique type of policymaker in that 
they operate within a national political system, but exercise jurisdiction over only a 
geographically defined area.  Thus, it is worthwhile to examine the potential impact 
characteristics of these local areas have on district judges. 
Criminal sentencing, as a policy area, may provide unique and powerful insight into how 
characteristics of a local area might impact district judges. First, the United States Sentencing 
Commission (“USSC”) has kept a wealth of data on the sentencing practices of each federal 
judicial district  This data provides researchers with a rare opportunity to compare judicial 
decisions in different districts using objectively coded data.   
Second, cursory examination of the raw sentencing data reveals extreme inter-district 
variation with respect to how criminals are sentenced throughout the country.  This variation is 
certainly not solely the product of differences in judicial behavior, as different areas of the 
country have differing profiles of both crimes committed and types of offenders (USSC 2012).  
Still, recent research has observed variation even when controlling for some or all of these 
conflating factors (Wu and Spohn 2010; Tiede 2009; Kautt 2002).  Moreover, the considerable 
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size of the variation in different areas of the country is itself grounds for examination of the 
potential effect of geographic-specific sociopolitical factors on judicial sentencing practices.
40
    
 Finally, criminal sentencing is an incredibly important duty of federal district court 
judges.  The rise of the federal prison population through approximately the last twenty five 
years is striking.  In 1988 federal prisons held approximately 50,000 inmates.  By 2012, that 
number had nearly quadrupled to over 196,000 inmates.  The rates of federal incarceration have 
also risen markedly from roughly 20 inmates per 100,000 US residents to more than 60 per 
100,000 (US DOJ 2015).  While several factors outside of judicial control, such as increased 
prevalence of mandatory minimum sentencing, are largely responsible for the upward trend in 
incarceration, district judges possess some power to either exacerbate or mitigate these effects 
(Lynch and Omori 2014; USSC 2012).  To the extent we believe high levels of incarceration are 
a societal problem, the potential effects of localized sociopolitical variables on either 
contributing to or alleviating this problem is certainly a worthwhile inquiry. 
In this chapter, I focus on two state-level sociopolitical variables that may impact 
sentencing decisions on judges within those states: (1) the crime rate; and (2) the ideology of the 
citizens of the state.  These two factors provide potentially important explanations for inter-
district sentencing variation.  Testing potential effects of the crime rate is predicated upon the 
notion that judges are sensitive to relevant environmental conditions occurring in their 
community when ruling on cases (Kritzer 1978).  Accordingly, judges who live and work in 
higher crime areas are likely to seek to address this crime problem by punishing criminal 
                                                 
40
 The size of the variation can perhaps best be illustrated by an example from the distribution of judge-initiated 
departure rates amongst districts in FY 2013.  At the 25
th
 percentile, or a typically Guideline-adherent district, 
offenders received a judge-initiated downward departure approximately 15% of the time. At the 75
th
 percentile, in a 
typically Guideline-resistant district, offenders received a judge-initiated departure 27% of the time.  Thus, offenders 
are almost twice as likely to receive a judge-initiated downward departure in a Guideline-resistant district than a 
Guideline-adherent district.   
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offenders with longer sentences.  Moreover, irrespective of the lack of evidence that long 
sentences deter crimes in the future, district judges are probably more likely to be receptive to 
the general deterrence justification for sentencing, when the crime problem is severe.  Finally, 
there is some qualified support for the proposition that higher crime rates cause judges to issue 
harsher sentences, albeit for elected judges (Ulmer and Bradley 2006; Gibson 1980).   
The logic underlying state citizen ideology is based upon the “representational model” of 
judicial behavior suggesting that judges are reflections of the communities in which they sit 
(Rowland & Carp 1996; Goldman and Sarat 1978; Silver and Shapiro 1984; Peltason 1971; 
Vines 1964).
41
  Although the question of public influence on unelected judges is far from settled, 
and general ideology is by no means a perfect proxy for treatment towards criminals, some 
recent evidence suggests that unelected officials in the criminal justice system may be responsive 
to public opinion (Enns 2014; Nicholson-Crotty, et. al. 2009; Johnson, et. al. 2008).   
It is worth noting at the outset that these two variables are not thought to be exclusive of 
other geographic-specific effects on judicial sentencing.  Other potentially relevant factors may 
include economic factors (Johnson, et. al. 2008) or local sentiment in the legal community 
regarding crime and punishment (Kautt 2002; Posner 1993; Baum 2006).
42
  Still, the crime rate 
and citizen ideology are measurable factors that vary widely across states.  They provide an 
excellent starting point for testing whether and to what extent federal judges respond to 
sociopolitical factors when making decisions in individualized cases.   
The outline of this chapter will proceed as follows. First, I develop the theoretical 
framework of why district judges may be sensitive to environmental conditions.  Second, I give a 
necessary background of sentencing policy and procedures in the United States.  Third, I 
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 For a more thorough discussion of the “representational model”, see Chapter 2. 
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 This latter factor is examined in Chapter 4. 
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examine recent research on federal judicial sentencing and explain how the present model builds 
and improves upon said research.  Fourth, I set forth testable hypotheses derived both from my 
theoretical perspective and important prior findings.  Fifth, I construct a model to empirically test 
these hypotheses.  Finally, I examine the results of the model and discuss the results. 
Location and District Court Behavior 
Many early researchers of judicial behavior sought to examine the influence of contextual 
factors on district court decision-making.  As set forth in the prior chapters, several scholars have 
found a link between local communities and the behavior of federal judges (Peltason 1971; Vines 
1964; Cook 1973, 1971; Kritzer 1978; Kuklinski and Stanka 1979; Rowland and Carp 1996).
 43
  
While these studies provide some preliminary support for community-based influence on 
appellate behavior, empirical testing of public influence on unelected appellate judges has also 
produced several null or highly conditional results.  (Brace and Boyea 2008; Segal and Spaeth 
2002; Mishler and Sheehan 1996).  
To reconcile the foregoing findings, I argue that trial judges, as opposed to appellate 
judges, are fundamentally more likely to be responsive to local contextual factors.  First, trial 
judges deal directly with people in their community on a daily basis.  Whether it is civil litigants, 
criminal defendants, or jurors, federal district court judges are directly exposed to many different 
members of their district that appellate judges simply are not.  This fact alone could make these 
trial judges more sensitive to environmental factors than their appellate brethren. Moreover, trial 
judges are less driven by their personal ideological orientation than judges at higher levels of the 
judiciary (Posner 1993; Epstein, et. al. 2013).  Thus, it is plausible that if judges’ personal 
ideologies are less influential, then other factors, either case-specific or environmental, have 
greater import.   
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 For a more thorough discussion of these pieces of research, please see Chapter 1. 
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The idea that trial judges are fundamentally different than appellate judges is certainly 
not a novel argument.  One federal Court of Appeals judge compared the difference between trial 
judges and appellate judges to watching Gone with the Wind vs. reading a TV Guide description 
of the film (Batchelder 1993).  Goldman and Sarat (1978) point to several differences between 
trial court judges and appellate court judges, including direct interaction with litigants.  Baum 
(1994) argues that since district court judges live in their district, they may be particularly 
sensitive to environmental factors, because their rulings may affect judges’ standings among 
their friends and associates in the district. 
Aside from trial/appellate judge differences, there is also some recent indirect evidence 
that public opinion is influential on criminal justice policy generally.  Nicholson-Crotty, et. al. 
(2009) find that, over time, federal criminal justice policy is responsive to a dimension of public 
mood.  Enns (2014) similarly finds increasing public punitiveness is a contributing factor to the 
rising incarceration rate over the past approximately fifty years.  While these studies were 
conducted on a national level and do not isolate only judicial behavior, the results intimate the 
influence public sentiment, whether local or national, may have on unelected criminal justice 
decision makers.  
In summary, while the results regarding contextual influences on federal district court 
judges is somewhat mixed, there is certainly sufficient anecdotal and empirical support to 
warrant further study.  Federal district court judges are often long-time residents of their districts 
(Silver and Shapiro 1984).  They also directly interact with citizens and observe first-hand 
certain social and political characteristics of their community through their work on the bench.  
Thus, it would be surprising indeed to find that sociopolitical factors do not affect district judge 
decision-making. 
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Sentencing in Federal Courts 
Prior to discussing specific studies on federal sentencing, it is necessary to understand the 
historical background of modern federal sentencing practice.  For the purposes of this chapter, it 
is necessary to understand that there are different “eras” of judicial sentencing under the 
sentencing Guidelines.  The different legal rules and/or standards associated with each era are set 
forth below:
44
   
[Figure 1 about here] 
To summarize, the amount of discretion that district court judges have enjoyed in their 
sentencing practices has varied over time.  There is little doubt that judges in recent years have 
enjoyed the greatest amount of discretion in their sentencing decisions.  By 2014, more than half 
of offenders were sentenced below the range recommended by the Guidelines.  The Sentencing 
Commission and several recent researchers of sentencing under the Guidelines have analyzed 
this trend in depth and noted the strong effect that policy consequences, such as the PROTECT 
Act and Booker, had on district court sentencing practices (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011; 
Epstein, et. al. 2013; USSC 2012).  More specifically, this research, as well as the raw data, 
provides strong evidence that district judges are more willing to make departures from Guideline 
recommended ranges in recent years, which have been characterized by greater judicial 
discretion.    
The focus of this chapter however, is not simply to analyze how these national-level 
policy changes to discretion have affected judges, but instead to examine inter-district 
differences within the country.  These differences can be substantial.  For example, in FY 2014, 
the Eastern District of Wisconsin sentenced only 20.6% of offenders to a sentence within the 
recommended Guideline Range, while the Southern District of Mississippi sentenced 67.2% of 
                                                 
44
 For a more detailed background on federal sentencing over time, please see Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation.   
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offenders within the recommended range (USSC 1995-2014).  It is worth reiterating that state 
and local sociopolitical conditions are certainly not expected to be the sole explanation for this 
disparity, as differing prosecutorial practices (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn 2010; 
Bibas 2005), as well as crimes committed (USSC 2012), are also contributing factors.  Still, the 
size of the disparity is further indication that district judges in different parts of the country may 
have vastly different views regarding criminal sentencing.     
Before proceeding with a discussion of prior scholarship on federal sentencing, two 
additional facts regarding judicial discretion and federal sentencing practice merit brief 
discussion.  First, a substantial proportion of offenders, especially drug offenders, are subject to 
mandatory minimum sentences.  In these cases, judges are not permitted to depart from the 
Guidelines.   The increased use of mandatory minimum sentences in recent years has had the 
effect of mitigating any judicial departures on average imprisonment length (USSC 2012).   
 Second, an important distinction should be made between Guideline departures that are 
sponsored by the government and Guideline departures that are not sponsored by the 
government.  The most utilized of government sponsored departures are known as 5K1.1 
“substantial assistance” departures, wherein the government or prosecution moves the Court to 
grant the offender a below-range sentence based upon his/her assistance in the prosecution of 
another individual.  Essentially, substantial assistance departures give offenders or potential 
offenders an incentive to give the government valuable information regarding more serious 
criminals.  While the use of substantial assistance departures has declined over time, coinciding 
with increased levels of judicial discretion allowing judges to depart on their own, it is still a 
relatively prevalent policy, occurring in 12.8% of cases in FY 2014.   
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The prevalence of both mandatory minimum sentencing and substantial assistance 
Guideline departures are key background facts necessary to understanding federal sentencing 
practice.  Like departures themselves, there is great inter-district variation in the prevalence that 
these two methods are employed throughout the country.  To the extent this variation may have 
an impact on disparity in sentence length or judicial departures, both factors must be accounted 
for. 
Past Federal Judge Sentencing Research 
Some of the earliest research on federal district court sentencing addressed the question 
of whether district court judges were sensitive to contextual influences, such as public sentiment 
(Cook 1973, 1977; Kritzer 1978; Silver and Shapiro 1984).   While the findings of these scholars 
showed evidence of community-based influences on federal district court judges, more recent 
research on federal sentencing has focused on different variables.  Specifically, recent 
scholarship on district judge behavior under the US Sentencing Guidelines has primarily focused 
on whether or not changes in policy have affected judge’s adherence to the Guidelines.  
Fischman and Schanzenbach (2011) find the 2003 PROTECT Act provisions that allowed 
appellate courts to review district court judge departures from the Guidelines without giving any 
deference to the district court judge, increased district judge adherence to the Guidelines.  
Similarly, in a recent study, Epstein, et. al. (2013) found the rate of departures from the 
Guidelines has increased substantially in the post-Booker era.  Both Fischman and Schanzenbach 
(2011) and Epstein, et. al. (2013) also detected strategic and partisan influences on sentencing 
behavior, as both found that as the number of Republican judges on the Court of Appeals sitting 
above the district court judge increased, the less likely the sentencing district judge was to depart 
from the Guidelines. 
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While a great bulk of the research on federal sentencing has focused on the effect of 
nationwide policy change in discretion, recent research has examined the causes and 
consequences of sentencing disparity among similarly situated offenders throughout the country.  
The Sentencing Commission has attributed increased disparity to the increased discretion that 
resulted from the post-Booker Era (USSC 2012).  But Tiede (2009) finds that whether or not 
Booker increased or decreased disparity varied greatly based on region of the country.  Ulmer, et. 
al. (2011) and Lynch and Omori (2014) also question the Sentencing Commission’s conclusions 
regarding the effect of Booker and argue that increased disparity after Booker has much to do 
with adapted prosecutorial practice. 
Specific causes of the sources of inter-district sentencing variation has also been 
examined, if less thoroughly.  Kautt (2002) attributes much of inter-district variation in 
sentencing practice to local legal culture.  Wu and Spohn (2010) find differences in the 
prevalence of “substantial assistance” tactics by prosecutors can result in sentencing inequities 
between districts.  Ulmer (2005) examines variation in Sentencing Practices and finds that 
differing interpretations of Guideline terms and parlance can lead to disparate outcomes.  In their 
analysis of federal drug trafficking cases, Lynch and Omori (2014) find the use of mandatory 
minimum sentencing greatly impacted sentencing disparity between districts.  Of particular 
relevance, Lynch and Omori found there was much greater variation in average drug trafficking 
sentence length between districts than within districts (2014, 430).  
Still, most of these studies do not address “political environment” factors emphasized by 
earlier researchers, such as Cook (1971) and Kritzer (1978).  Johnson, et. al.’s (2008) study 
represents an important exception, as these researchers specifically examined the extent to which 
certain environmental effects, such as crime rates, caseload pressures, and the liberalness of 
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districts affected sentence length.  Johnson, et. al. (2008) find little relationship between the 
crime rate and judicial behavior.
45
  However, they do find that districts with higher levels of 
liberalism, measured by interest group ratings of the US Senators of the applicable state, exhibit 
more lenient sentencing practices. 
There are several reasons why the findings of Johnson, et. al. (2008) should be subjected 
to further empirical analysis.  All of these reasons relate to the relatively narrow time period 
covered by Johnson, et. al. (2008), namely FY 1997-2000.  First, as a result of this window, it is 
difficult to draw conclusions about how changes in sociopolitical variables within the same 
district may alter judicial behavior over time.   As discussed throughout this dissertation, this 
dynamic analysis is particularly useful in drawing causal conclusions, and many variables of 
interest (departure rates, the crime rate, and liberalness) have all varied substantially within 
districts over time.  Secondly, as all of the cases analyzed by Johnson, et. al. (2008) are prior to 
either the enactment of the PROTECT Act (which reduced judicial discretion) or the Booker 
decision (which expanded judicial discretion), we are unable to draw conclusions about how 
different judges in different areas of the country respond to different periods of judicial 
discretion. Yet the findings of Fischman and Schanzenbach (2011) and Epstein, et. al. (2013) 
suggest these policy changes dramatically altered sentencing practice, and the findings of Tiede 
(2009) suggest judges in different areas of the country may respond quite differently to increases 
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 However, Johnson, et. al. (2008) do find that increases in the crime rate result in increased the length of 
substantial assistance departures.  They interpret this result as possible evidence of judges working with prosecutors 
to address the crime problem by allowing departures for less serious offenders while aiding the prosecution of more 
serious offenders. 
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or decreases in their discretion.  Accordingly, a renewed focus on sociopolitical factors 
incorporating these differing levels of discretion over time is worthwhile.
46
   
In summary, the findings of Kautt (2002), Wu and Spohn (2010), Ulmer (2005), Tiede 
(2009), Johnson, et. al. (2008), and Lynch and Omori (2014) all support the same general 
conclusion: sentencing in federal district courts depends heavily on the location of the sentencing 
district court.  Despite this conclusion, with the notable exception of Johnson, et. al. (2008), there 
has been less direct research on the question of whether localized sociopolitical factors impact 
said localized difference.  Given the extent of the variation, and the findings of Johnson, et. al. 
(2008) over a limited period of time, further inquiries into these factors is clearly warranted. 
Hypotheses 
 
Given the foregoing I submit two testable hypotheses regarding the influence local 
contexts may have on district judges’ sentencing decisions.  The first such hypothesis involves 
the crime rate.
47
  Specifically: 
H1: District judges within states/years with relatively high crime rates will sentence 
offenders less leniently than district judges in states/years with relatively low crime rates. 
  
The logic of the crime rate Hypothesis is that district judges living and working in 
environments with high crime will be less sympathetic to criminals.  In addition, as judges from 
higher crime areas will likely see crime as a larger social problem, they will be more likely to 
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 It is also worth noting that the measure of state-level political liberalism used by Johnson, et. al. (2008) (US 
Senator, interest group ratings for the state) has been critiqued and potentially improved upon in recent years (See 
Enns and Koch 2013).   
 
47
 Ideally, I would also test of the effect of the incarceration rate on interdistrict sentencing variance.  However, there 
is not such variation in the federal incarceration rate, which is reported nationwide.  Further, unlike the crime rate, 
the incarceration rate at the state level is heavily dependent on the state criminal justice system outside exercised 
completely outside of the jurisdiction of district court judges.  Indeed, over 80% of incarcerated individuals are 
sentenced through the state-court system rather than the federal court system (DOJ 2015).  As a result, it is unlikely 
that state variability in incarceration rates is internalized by federal judges in any way that would affect their 
sentencing decisions. 
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attempt to deter future individuals from committing crimes through longer sentences.
48
  There is 
some qualified support for H1 as Ulmer and Bradley (2006) found that Pennsylvania judges in 
counties with higher crime rates tended to render more punitive sentences.  Gibson (1980) made 
a similar finding regarding Iowa judges.  Gibson’s (1980) findings are especially interesting, 
because Iowa state judges travel across counties.  Thus, Gibson (1980) finds the same judges 
sentence criminals more severely in areas with higher crime rates.  While there might be reasons 
to think that the Ulmer & Bradley (2006) and Gibson (1980) results would not hold for unelected 
federal judges, their findings at least merit the inclusion of the crime-rate variable in models of 
sentencing behavior.   
H2: District judges within states/years with relatively liberal ideologies will sentence 
offenders more leniently than district judges in states/years with relatively conservative 
ideologies. 
 
The state ideology hypothesis is consistent with a view of political behavior that judges 
are reflections of their community (Goldman and Sarat 1978; Rowland and Carp 1996).
49
  It 
should be noted that while general liberal/conservative ideology is by no means a perfect proxy 
for treatment towards criminals, there has historically been a strong correlation between 
conservative ideology and harsher treatment towards criminals (Enns 2014).
50
  Further, H2 will 
serve as a replication for the finding of Johnson, et. al. (2008) regarding citizen ideology, who 
found that judges in districts with more liberal ideologies have more lenient sentencing practices.  
Replication of this finding is prudent, as that study focused on a relatively narrow time period 
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 For a more detailed justification for the crime rate hypothesis, see Chapters 2 and 4. 
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 H2 is not necessarily meant to suggest that public ideology is directly influencing judges to sentence a certain 
way.  While public influence is a possibility, it is also likely that judges within states share the same ideological 
orientation as citizens of the state (See Segal and Spaeth 2002; Kritzer 1978).  Issues of endogenity and causality 
will be discussed further in the Discussion Section, below.    
     
50
 Although this may be changing.  See Act, et. al. (2015) and a further discussion of the possibly weakening 
relationship between ideology and punitive preferences discussed more thoroughly in Chapters 4-5. 
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and used a somewhat limited measure of state ideology (Johnson, et. al. 2008).  For these 
reasons, it is possible that the Johnson, et. al. (2008) model underestimated the influence that 
state ideology has on federal district court sentencing. 
Design, Methods and Measures 
 
To test the above-stated hypotheses, I employ a panel design, incorporating all available 
sentencing departure data from ninety (90) federal districts in the US States and the District of 
Colombia from 1996-2011.
51
  This time period was slightly condensed due to data availability, 
but the study still encompasses a relatively long time period that spans varying levels of judicial 
discretion.  Rather than focus on a single offense or set of offenses and conduct a micro-analysis 
(See e.g. Lynch and Omori 2014), the present analysis seeks to present a broad picture of 
sentencing practice across multiple offenses at the district level.   
The Dependent Variable 
To measure the primary dependent variable of interest, harshness/lenience in federal 
district court sentencing, I use two separate measures: 1) the proportion of all sentences that were 
downward departures from the Guideline-recommended range in a given district/year (“Total 
Downward Departures”); and 2) after excluding substantial assistance departures, the proportion 
of remaining sentences that were judge-initiated downward departures from the Guideline-
recommended range in a given district/year (“Judge-Initiated Downward Departures”).   
The basis for using two separate measures of departures is to ensure that the model truly 
captures judicial behavior. There has been some discussion in the literature as to whether 
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 Notably, this study differs from several other sentencing studies, as it analyzes sentencing data at the district-level 
rather than at the individual case level.  This approach is not to diminish the importance of well-established case-
specific facts, such as the race of the offender (Ulmer, et. al. 2011), the gender of the offender (Mustard 2001), or 
whether the offender is convicted by trial or plea agreement (Ulmer, et. al. 2010).   Instead, as the present study 
seeks to test only sociopolitical effects, all of such effects should be incorporated into district-level averages.  To 
ensure that sociopolitical factors and case-specific factors are not conflating, I control for offender demographics 
and plea rates, as explained below. 
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government-sponsored departures, especially those based on “substantial assistance” to law 
enforcement, should be included in models of judicial sentencing behavior (See Fischman and 
Schanzenbach 2011; Freeborn and Hartmann 2010; Schanzenbach and Tiller, 2007).  These 
departures require a motion from the government.  As such, they are not solely left to the 
discretion of the judges.  On the other hand, there is some evidence of a negative correlation 
between substantial assistance departures (the most widely-cited government sponsored 
departure) and unilateral judicial departures across federal districts (Weinstein 1998).  This 
finding perhaps suggests that judges may be compensating by departing from the Guidelines 
more often in districts wherein prosecutors file a relatively small number of substantial 
assistance motions (Weinstein 1998).  Furthermore, the judge still has the discretion to grant or 
deny government-sponsored departure motions.  Therefore, both measures of departures are 
presented as a general robustness check of any findings.   
The justification for using Guideline downward departures rates as a measure of judicial 
punitiveness in general, as opposed to median or mean sentence imprisonment length, is that 
both laws and the Guidelines themselves change over time (USSC 2012).  There also may be 
changes to the criminal-history and type-of cases prosecuted over time.  Measuring Guideline 
departures best isolates the behavior of the judge.  Importantly, this measure of Guideline 
departures also follows past research studying judicial sentencing behavior (Epstein, et. al., 2013; 
Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011, Freeborn and Hartmann, 2010; Schanzenbach and Tiller, 
2007).
52
 
 
 
Independent Variables 
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 See Chapter 2 for a more thorough discussion of the departure measure, as well as alternative measures. 
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To measure the various crime rates, I take the reported violent crime rates for each state 
in a given year.  The state crime rate data comes from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting 
Statistics and is measured as the number of violent crimes in the state per 100,000 citizens.  
To measure citizen ideology, I use a recently developed measure calculated by Enns and 
Koch (2013).  The measure is developed by pooling ideological self-identification survey 
responses from several different surveys by citizens in every state to develop a measure of 
liberalness in each state of each year.  The measure is an improvement upon interest-group 
ratings measures of state citizen ideology as it is not dependent on congressional behavior and 
exhibits more year-to-year stability (Enns and Koch 2013).
53
 
Two important assumptions should be mentioned at this juncture.  First, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, the state crime rate and state citizen ideology measures are calculated on a calendar 
year basis, while the sentencing data is presented on a fiscal year basis (October 1-September 
30).  Thus, for a panel design, the researcher must choose whether to correlate fiscal years and 
annual years or correlate prior calendar years with subsequent fiscal years.  Given that it makes 
no intuitive sense to ascribe judicial response to factors that have not occurred yet and given that 
we might expect some unspecified lag in judicial responsiveness, I adopt the latter option (e.g. 
the state crime rate from January 1, 2012-December 31, 2012 corresponds with total downward 
departures from October 1, 2012-September 30, 2013).  To ensure that these do not produce 
biased results, I shall also run models matching fiscal year with annual years (e.g. January 1, 
2013-December 31, 2013 corresponding with October 1, 2012-September 30, 2013).
54
 
Second, it is noteworthy that, in some cases, the level of analysis for the independent 
variables (measured at the state level) does not match the level of analysis for the dependent 
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variable (measured at the district level).  While twenty six states and the District of Columbia 
have only one federal district, the remaining twenty four states, generally higher population 
states, are divided into multiple districts (from two to four).  Accordingly, for each multi-district 
state, I am forced to utilize the statewide data for all districts within that state.  Given the 
localized focus of my theoretical perspective, this is certainly a limitation of my design.  
However, there are several factors that alleviate this limitation.   
First, I will create a control variable for the number of districts within states to ensure that 
the results are not substantially different from states with single districts.  Second, this method of 
using state-level inputs to measure federal district sentencing behavior has been utilized by 
recent researchers (Johnson, et. al. 2008).  Finally, and most importantly, any bias to the results 
created by this issue would certainly be in the conservative direction.  Stated differently, if 
localized social and political factors are impacting judges, we would expect using state-level data 
as opposed to district-level data to weaken, rather than strengthen, any results.   
Control Variables 
Several control variables will also be utilized to ensure any results related to the 
independent variables are not reflective of other district characteristics.  The percentage of 
African American and Hispanic offenders in each district for each year will be incorporated into 
the model as there is evidence that African Americans and Hispanics are less likely to receive 
Guideline departures than white offenders (Mustard 2001; Johnson 2003; Ulmer, et. al. 2011).  
Additionally, the proportion of female offenders will also be included as there is evidence that 
females are more likely to receive Guideline departures (Mustard 2001).  The proportion of four 
general offense types are also controlled for: drug trafficking offenses, firearm offenses, fraud 
79 
 
offenses, and immigration offenses
55
, to ensure that differences in departure rates are not simply 
due to different types of crimes. The size of each district is controlled for by the population and 
number of judges in each district.  There is also great inter-district variability in the caseload per-
judge, so this factor is also included in the models. 
District-specific prosecutorial practices also need to be accounted for. The percentage of 
sentences that were reached by plea agreement will be incorporated, as there is a well-
documented sentence “penalty” for offenders convicted after going to trial (Ulmer, et. al. 2011).   
The proportion of mandatory minimum sentences in the district is also included, as mandatory 
minimum practice varies widely and its prevalence restricts judge-initiated departures (Lynch 
and Omori 2014).  Furthermore, for the models that exclude substantial assistance departure 
(“Judge-Initiated Downward Departures”), substantial assistance departure rates will be included 
as an independent variable.   
There are also some districts that are especially unique for historical reasons and/or the 
type of cases they hear.  The five “border districts” with Mexico deal with huge caseload 
pressures and are faced with a disproportionate share of immigration cases.
 56
  As such, these 
districts are given a dummy variable.  Additionally, districts located in Southern States, as 
defined by the US Census Bureau, are controlled for using a dummy variable, as these districts 
are associated with higher punitiveness.  While it is possible that this variable may capture some 
of the effects of the “State Citizen Ideology” variable, it is worth examining whether there is 
                                                 
55
 Together, these four offenses comprise over 90% of all federal sentences.  Thus, remaining offenses (e.g. 
kidnapping), will serve as the reference category. 
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 These districts are the Southern District of California, the District of Arizona, the District of New Mexico, the 
Western District of Texas, and the Southern District of Texas. 
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some especially unique effect of sentencing behavior in the South, independent of simple 
conservative ideology. 
To account for changes to judicial discretion in making Guideline departures over time, I 
use dummy variables for the short time period the PROTECT Act was in effect and for the time 
period Booker was in effect.
57
  This control ensures that any observed effects in the contextual 
variables of interest are not simply the result of different periods of judicial discretion.  Finally, 
as to the judges themselves, the proportion of judges on the court who were appointed by 
Democratic Presidents in a given fiscal year is also a control, as we would expect “Democratic” 
judges to depart downward from the Guidelines more often (Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011; 
Epstein, et. al. 2013).
 58
  Incorporating this control into the model ensures that inter-district 
variation in judicial departures is not simply based on the partisan composition of the bench in 
each district. As each criminal case is randomly assigned a judge within a district, it is reasonable 
to assume that no individual judges sentence a highly disproportionate share of offenders within 
their district.  For reference, a table with complete descriptions of the measurement of all 
variables is provided in Appendix A. 
Methods 
As set forth above, I employ a panel design with ninety (90) federal districts over the 
course of sixteen (16) years (1996-2011).  To analyze relationships in this panel design, I utilize 
both a fixed- effect estimator (which control for each individual district) and a random effects 
estimator (which assumes all pertinent differences between districts are captured by the variables 
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 For FY 2003 and 2005, wherein each era of discretion was partially in effect, I take the proportion of cases that 
each particular policy was in effect and substitute this proportion for the dummy variable.    
 
58
 For a more precise explanation of how this measure accounted for judges commissioned or retired partially 
through a fiscal year, see Appendix A. 
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in the model).
 59
  Both since my theory is based upon localized factors and because the number of 
districts (90) is larger than the number of years (16), using only a random-effects model might 
seem initially attractive.  However, the fixed-effects models allow for analysis of the same 
district over time.   This within-case analysis is also of-interest theoretically, as it will allow for 
drawing inferences regarding whether or not changes to the variables of interest are associated 
with within-district changes in judges’ sentencing behavior. For this reason, both types of models 
are utilized. 
Similar to the national-level data analyzed in Chapter 2, the error structure of a simple 
linear model of departure rates at the district level is both serially correlated and heteroskedastic.  
In addition, as is often the case with panel data of states or countries, it is likely improper to 
assume the cross-sections (districts) are entirely independent from one another.
60
 Thus, to correct 
for these issues, Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are utilized in both sets of models, wherein the 
error structure of the model is assumed to be heteroskedastic, serially correlated, and correlated 
across districts (Driscoll and Kraay 1998).
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 Note that use of a random effects model assumes that any uncaptured differences between cross sections are 
uncorrelated with the independent variables.  The Hausman (1978) test comparing the coefficients of the random 
effects and fixed effects models, tests this assumption.  Results from the Hausman test for the departure series yield 
a statistic of 20.30 and a p value of .21.  Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the random effects model is 
valid.   
 
60
 For example, we might expect correlations between districts within the same state, between districts in 
neighboring states, and between districts with similar demographics. 
 
61
 While use of Driscoll and Kray standard errors can often produce somewhat optimistic standard errors, this 
procedure is still less optimistic than other methods of estimating standard errors when there is both cross-sectional 
and temporal correlation (Hoechle 2007).  For instance, technically both feasible Generalized Least Squared (GLS) 
and OLS with panel-corrected standard errors estimates are expected to be imprecise in cross-sectional dominant 
models (when N is large relative to T), as in the present case (Hoechle 2007).  However, in order to show the 
robustness of any results, alternative methods were used to examine relationships, including GLS, fixed effects 
estimators with clustered standard errors, and OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (See Appendices C-D). 
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Results 
Results from the models are presented in Table 1 below.  The four columns represent two 
fixed effects and two random effects models, for both Total Downward Departure Rates and 
Judge-Initiated Downward Departure Rates.  As can be seen from Table 1, the coefficients for 
both primary variables of interest are in the expected direction and statistically significant at 
conventional levels across all four models.  In support of the crime rate hypothesis (H1), higher 
crime rates are associated with lower rates of both total downward departures and Judge-Initiated 
downward departures.  Similarly, in support of the state citizen ideology hypothesis (H2), 
districts within states exhibiting relatively liberal ideologies are associated with higher levels of 
both types of downward departures.  The results are fairly robust and hold across several 
different specifications.
62
   
    [Table 1 about here] 
The fit for each of the models is reasonable.  The fixed-effects models (columns 1 and 3) 
both explain approximately 62% of within-district variance over the sixteen year period.  As to 
the random-effects models, the model presented in column 4, which excludes substantial 
assistance departures, performs better than the specification presented in column 2, as the Root 
Mean Squared Error is reduced from 10.3 to 8.5.  This is not surprising as we would expect the 
use of substantial assistance departures to be highly dependent on idiosyncratic differences in the 
policies/strategies of various U.S. Attorneys throughout the country.  Therefore it makes some 
sense that the variables in the model more successfully explain judge-initiated departures than 
total departures. 
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 See Appendices C-F for alternative specifications.   
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Turning again to the sociopolitical variables of interest, the effect-sizes for the state 
liberalism variable are comparatively larger for the random-effects models than the fixed-effects 
models.  This finding is expected as the fixed-effects models are essentially analyses of intra-
district differences over time.  Accordingly, we would expect greater inter-district differences in 
state ideology throughout the country than changes in citizen ideology within a single district 
over a limited time period.  Despite this decreased magnitude, the fact that the state liberalism 
variable retains significance in the fixed-effect models is of particular interest.  Specifically, this 
result demonstrates that not all causes of sentencing-variation are due to district-specific 
prosecutorial practices or other district-specific idiosyncrasies (See Lynch and Omori 2014; Bibi 
2005).  Columns 1 and 3 in Table 1 provide evidence that increasing liberalness 
[conservativeness] of a state over time is associated with higher [lower] rates of downward 
departures in districts within that state.   
As to the crime rate, the state crime rate coefficient is highly significant across all 
models.  As an additional robustness check, year-specific dummies were also added in separate 
models to ensure that the state crime-rate findings were not solely the product of the general 
decreasing crime rate over time matching spuriously with the increasing departure rate over time.  
Even after utilizing the year-specific dummies, the state crime rate variable remains significant 
across all four models, although the magnitude of the effect is weakened. (See Appendix F).   
Despite the general robustness and high significance-levels of the variables of interest, 
the effect sizes for both variables are relatively small.  Based upon the model in column 4, the 
best fitting fixed-effect model, a one standard deviation change in the crime rate is expected to 
alter departure rates by 2.8%.  A one standard deviation change in state citizen ideology is 
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expected to alter downward departure rates by 1.7%.  While these are by no means large effect-
sizes, they can have enormous practical consequences for convicted offenders.   
Figure 2, below, provides a graphic example of the effect-sizes of fixed-effect judge-
initiated departure rates (column 4).  Specifically, the left side of Figure 2 compares expected 
levels of judge-initiated departure rates based upon two hypothetical district/years with high vs 
low crime rates, with all other variables held at their means.  Similarly, the right side of Figure 2 
demonstrates the same comparison, but instead compares a relatively conservative hypothetical 
district/year with a relatively liberal hypothetical district/year.  In Figure 2, “Q1” and “Q3” of 
both input variables are used as proxies for relatively high/low state crime rates or liberal district 
years.  
    [Figure 2 about here] 
As can be seen from Figure 2, a district in a year with relatively high crime is expected to 
have an overall downward departure rate of approximately 18.9%, while the same district in a 
relatively low-crime year is expected to have a downward departure rate approximately 22.1% of 
the time.  Stated differently, the odds of an offender receiving a downward departure decrease by 
about 15% when a given district changes from having relatively low crime to having relatively 
high crime, holding all other variables constant.  The effects for state-citizen ideology are 
slightly more muted, but a hypothetical district shift from being relatively conservative to 
relatively liberal increases a convicted offender’s downward departure odds by 10%, holding 
other variables constant   These estimations are meant to be exemplary only, but they present a 
more intuitive picture of the degree to which sociopolitical variables can potentially influence 
downward departure rates.  
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Aside from the primary variables of interest, there are other interesting takeaways from 
the results presented in the four models of Table 1.  First, the results in columns 1 and 2, which 
include all downward departures, are extremely similar to the results in columns 3 and 4, which 
include only judge- initiated downward departures.  Aside from some interesting findings 
regarding prosecutorial practice discussed below, the inclusion or exclusion of substantial 
assistance cases does not seem to alter the results substantially. 
In addition, results from Table 1 replicate many prior findings of past researchers of 
federal sentencing data.  The PROTECT Act period of limited judicial discretion is associated 
with lower rates of downward departures (Fischman and Schanzenbach, 2011; Freeborn and 
Hartmann 2010; Tiede 2009), while the Booker period of expanded judicial discretion is 
associated with higher rates of downward departures (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Tiede 2009). 
Southern Districts are associated with much lower rates of downward departures (Lynch and 
Omori 2014).  Border Districts, due to a high proportion of immigration cases and the ability to 
use “fast track” departures unavailable in other districts, are associated with much higher rates of 
departure (USSC 2012; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).   Districts with a greater proportion 
of Democratic judges are significantly associated with higher rates of downward departures in 
three of the four specifications presented in Table 1 (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).     
Finally, two results support recent findings in the literature regarding prosecutorial 
practice.  The negative and significant coefficients for “% mandatory minimum” in columns 3 
and 4 support the Lynch and Omori (2014) conclusion that districts with high rates of mandatory 
minimum sentences restrict judicial departures. The negative and significant coefficients for “% 
substantial assistance” support the Weinstein (1998) conclusion that judges in districts that do 
not utilize substantial assistance will compensate by initiating departures themselves more often.  
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Taken together, these findings support recent findings that prosecutorial practices are influential 
on judge-initiated departure rates. 
Discussion, Limitations, and Implications 
This chapter sought to build and improve upon recent research in federal sentencing to 
account for contextual sociopolitical factors.  Specifically, the present design examined the 
potential effects state citizen ideology and state crime rates had on district judge sentencing 
decisions.  After conducting the test, there is fairly strong support for the argument that these two 
factors are indeed associated with federal district court judge sentencing decisions.  More 
specifically, the results provide broad support for both H1, predicting a negative relationship 
between crime rates and lenient sentences, and H2, predicting a positive relationship between 
liberal citizen ideology and lenient sentences. 
Despite the foregoing, the present study has some clear limitations.  First, there is the 
issue of matching state-level inputs with district-level sentencing data.  As explained above, to 
the extent this issue is problematic, the problem should weaken the foregoing results rather than 
strengthen them.  However, there is no question that a more precise model would utilize district-
specific sociopolitical variables.  Future designs may attempt to obtain measures, perhaps 
through county-level crime rate data or voting data from state legislative or congressional 
districts. 
A further limitation of the model, due to the district level of analysis, is the inability to 
determine under what conditions judges pay heed to broader social factors.  It is obviously 
extremely unlikely that all district judges are influenced by these contextual factors to the same 
degree in all types of cases.   Indeed, it is possible that certain district judges consider 
community conditions as a vital component of their general sentencing philosophy, while other 
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judges strongly believe these conditions should play no role in determining appropriate sentences 
for individual offenders.  Future research should attempt to conduct case-studies or gather judge-
specific data to determine if only particular judges are sensitive to these broader societal inputs. 
Limitations aside, the present research provides support for at least five propositions that 
build and improve upon present understandings of sentencing practice and federal district court 
behavior. First, there is fairly strong evidence that some federal district court judges incorporate 
contextual factors into their sentencing decisions.  This general finding serves as a basis to 
replicate these findings using different models and methods and incorporating different 
contextual variables.  For example, future research designs could examine the potential effect of 
local legal community sentiment or incarceration rates on sentencing practice. 
Second, the “representational model” of judicial behavior should be reevaluated and 
retested in both the sentencing context and in other contexts (See Silver and Shapiro 1984).  This 
research provides evidence that district court departure rates are associated with the citizen 
ideology of the state the district lies in.  I stop short of arguing that judges are responsive to 
citizen ideology.  As argued by Kritzer (1978), Segal and Spaeth (2002), and other scholars of 
the effect public opinion may have on the judiciary, judges are members of the public, not 
necessarily agents of the public.  The observed correlation between state citizen ideology and 
judicial behavior may simply be due to the fact that federal district court judges themselves are 
citizens of their states.   
Despite this possibility, there is some theoretical basis to suspect trial judges may be 
responsive to what the public thinks/believes. Trial judges, unlike appellate judges, have 
everyday dealings with citizens whose views may directly or indirectly enter their courtrooms.  
Moreover, recent research indicates that criminal justice policy in general is responsive to citizen 
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punitive attitudes (Nicholson-Crotty, et. al. 2009; Enns 2014).  Future designs, perhaps modeled 
after the elected-official responsiveness literature (See Edwards and Wood 1999), should attempt 
to sort out this causal issue and further examine whether judges are responding to the public or 
moving in-step with them.  
Third, the potential effect of crime rates on sentencing practice should be further 
scrutinized. This study’s findings with respect to the crime rate are particularly intriguing.  The 
effect of the state crime rate was highly significant, even when controlling for other factors such 
as plea rates and differing periods of judicial discretion.  These findings support state-court 
analyses, such as Gibson (1980) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006) but are somewhat contrary to the 
findings of Johnson, et. al.(2008) regarding federal district court judges.  Johnson, et. al. (2008) 
found little impact of higher crime rates, and their sole significant conclusion was that higher 
crime rates were associated with longer substantial assistance departures.  The fact that the 
findings herein do not square with Johnson, et. al. (2008) is possibly the result of the more 
restrictive time period of the Johnson, et. al. (2008) design.  More specifically, it may be that 
increased levels of judicial discretion in recent years not covered by the Johnson, et. al. (2008) 
study have allowed judges to better account for sociopolitical factors, such as the crime rate.
63
  In 
any case, the crime rate variable should be retested using different research designs to determine 
if it is in fact impacting judicial sentencing decisions 
Fourth, this research supports but modifies recent findings emphasizing the differences of 
federal judges based upon location (Lynch and Omori 2014; Tiede 2009; Kautt 2002).  As stated 
by one recent scholar “while the districts that make up the federal system operate under the same 
formal law, the system as a whole should not be treated as a single, unified entity that responds 
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 But See Ulmer, et. al. (2011) concluding that increased levels of judicial discretion are not associated with 
increased inter-district disparity. 
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lockstep to policy mandates” (Lynch and Omori 2014, 438).  This research underscores this 
sentiment, but adds a temporal element.  Not only does place matter, but time matters also.  The 
fixed-effects models provide strong evidence that changing conditions within districts can alter 
the behavior of judges.  Whether these changes in behavior are a result of turnover within 
districts or adapting behavior of the same judges should be subjected to empirical testing. 
Finally, the evidence of the effects of two state-level variables on judges in the criminal 
sentencing context should lead researchers to test contextual effects on judges in other contexts 
and policy areas.  For example, does income inequality make it more likely that district court 
judges would render summary judgment against wealthy litigants?  Do natural disasters in 
districts cause judges to be less favorable to insurance litigants in their rulings?  The list of 
potential inquiries is long, and the answers to said inquires could provide a much better 
understanding of both judicial behavior and the justice system generally.    
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  Figure 1: Periods of Judicial Discretion under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Uncertainty 
Period  
 
November 1, 1987-
June 12, 1996: 
 
-Uncertainty as to 
the Mandatory 
Nature of the 
Guidelines and the 
Standard of 
Appellate Review  
-Guideline 
Departure Rates 
Relatively Low 
Increasing 
Discretion 
 
June 13, 1996-April 
29, 2003: 
 
-District Court 
Judges able to 
Depart from 
Guidelines under 
an “Abuse of 
Discretion” 
Standard.  
-Guideline 
Departure Rates 
Increase 
Reduced 
Discretion  
April 30, 2013-
January 12, 2005: 
-District Court 
Judges given no 
Deference on 
Appellate Review 
- List of Bases for 
Guideline 
Departure is 
restricted 
-Guideline 
Departure Rates 
decrease 
 
Most 
Discretion 
 
January 12, 2005-
Present: 
-Sentencing 
Guidelines 
Rendered 
“Advisory” to 
District Court 
Judges 
- “Abuse of 
Discretion” 
Standard of 
Appellate 
Review Restored 
-Guideline 
Departure Rates 
increase 
substantially 
 
94 
 
Table 1: Fixed and Random Effect Determinants of District Total Downward Departure 
% and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90 districts (FY 1996-2011) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Total   Total    Judge-Initiated Judge-Initiated  
Downward Downward  Downward Downward 
   Departure % Departure %  Departure % Departure % 
   (Fixed Effect) (Random Effects)  (Fixed Effects) (Random Effects)  
(1)                       (2)   (3)  (4) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
State Crime Rate  -.011***  -.007***   -.010***  -.005***  
   (.002)  (.001)   (.002)  (.001) 
 
State Liberalism  .20*  .52***   .32*  .41*** 
   (.09)  (.06)   (.17)  (.08) 
 
Booker   9.18***  6.59***   13.21***  13.18***   
   (2.56)  (0.15)   (3.06)  (2.34) 
 
PROTECT Act  -5.04***  -7.76***   -6.07***  -6.80*** 
   (1.22)  (1.61)   (1.78)  (1.75) 
 
% Democrat  .06***  .00   .07***  .04** 
Judges   (.01)  (.05)   (.01)  (.01) 
 
# of Districts     -  1.76***     -  .81* 
In State     (.35)     (.39) 
 
# of Judges in District -.43  .19**   -.70  .09 
   (-0.66)  (.07)   (.41)  (.08) 
 
% African-American  -.07**  .03   -.04*  -.003 
Offenders   (.03)  (.03)   (.03)  (.02) 
 
% Hispanic  -.12**  -.05*   -.05  .04 
Offenders   (.05)  (.03)   (.06)  (.04) 
 
% Firearm  -.27***  -.13*   -.21**  -.24*** 
   (.08)  (.08)   (.08)  (.04) 
 
% Plea   .47**  .58***   .21  .18 
   (.18)  (.16)   (.17)  (.21) 
 
% Mandatory  -.07  -.04   -.25*  -.33*** 
Minimum   (.16)  (.12)   (.15)  (.09) 
 
% Substantial  -  -   .01  -.07**  
Assistance       (.02)  (-.03) 
 
Caseload   .015  .010   .01  -.001 
   (.010)  (.011)   (.01)  (.008) 
 
% Above   .28*  .22   .38**  .43** 
Median Sentence  (.14)  (.15)   (.15)  (.14) 
 
Border District    -  16.89***     -  22.84***  
     (1.47)     (2.43) 
 
Southern District    -  -7.18***     -  -5.79*** 
     (.74)     (.32) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2 (within R2 for FE models) .626  .407   .623  .655 
 
Root Mean2 Error  -  10.29     -  8.47 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
n=1440    *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001  (one-tailed tests)  
Note: Driscoll Kray standard errors in parentheses,        
 
** % Male Offenders, %Immigration, and %Drug Trafficking, and %Fraud omitted from Table 1 due to lack of significance in any model.  
See Appendix B for full table.  
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Figure 2: Expected Rates of Judge-Initiated Departures based upon Q1 and 
Q3 levels of State Crime Rates and State Liberalism, Respectively 
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 Appendix A: Description and Coding of Variables 
State Crime Rate # of Violent Crimes per 100,000 citizens in each U.S. State in each calendar year 
State Liberalism Enns and Koch (2013) Measure of Liberalism for Every State from 1996-2010 
Booker 
 
Dummy variable coded based on the proportion of each Fiscal Year that US v. Booker was in effect.   
 
*Note: all Fiscal Years prior to FY2005 were coded 0, all Fiscal Years after FY2005 were coded 1.   FY2005 
was coded as .745 reflecting the proportion of sentences after US v. Booker was decided* 
 
PROTECT Act 
Dummy variable coded based on the proportion of the Fiscal Year that the PROTECT Act was in effect.  
  
*Note: all Fiscal Years prior to 2003 were coded 0, all Fiscal Years after 2005 were coded 1. FY2003 was 
coded .417 reflecting the proportion of sentences in FY2003 after the PROTECT Act was enacted.  FY2005 
was coded as .255 reflecting the proportion of sentences after the PROTECT Act was partially overturned by 
US v. Booker.* 
# of Judges 
# of active, full-time District Court Judges in Each District and Fiscal Year. 
  
*Note: Judges must be active full-time for more than (50%) of a Fiscal Year to be included in measure 
**Note: “Senior Status” judges, with significantly reduced caseloads were excluded (See Fischman and 
Schanzenbach 2011) 
% Democrat 
Judges 
% of “# of Judges” Appointed by a Democratic President in each District and Fiscal Year. 
# of Districts Per State 
Total # of Federal Districts per State 
 
% Male 
Offenders 
% Male Offenders in Each District and Fiscal Year 
% African-Americans 
Offenders 
% African-Americans Offenders in Each District and Fiscal Year 
% Hispanic 
Offenders 
% Hispanic Offenders in Each District and Fiscal Year 
% Drug 
Trafficking 
% of Total Offenses that were Classified as Drug Trafficking by USCC in Each District and Fiscal Year 
% Firearm % of Total Offenses that were Classified as Firearms by USCC in Each District and Fiscal Year 
% Immigration % of Total Offenses that were Classified as Immigration by USCC in Each District and Fiscal Year 
% Fraud % of Total Offenses that were Classified as Fraud  by USCC in Each District and Fiscal Year 
% Plea 
% of Sentences that Followed Conviction by Plea agreement, as Opposed to Conviction by Trial in Each 
District and Fiscal Year 
% Mandatory 
Minimum 
% of Sentences Subject to a Statutory Mandatory Minimum Penalty in Each District and Fiscal Year 
% Substantial 
Assistance 
% Of Sentences That Received 5.K 1.1 Departures From The Guideline Range Based Upon Providing 
“Substantial Assistance” To The Government in the Prosecution of Another in Each District And Fiscal Year 
Caseload # of Criminal Findings per Authorized Judgeship in Each District and Fiscal Year 
% Above 
Median Sentence 
% of Sentences in Each District and Fiscal Year that fell above the Median Sentence for that same Fiscal Year 
across the United States 
Border District 
Dummy Variable Coded 1 for the Southern District of California, Arizona, New Mexico, the Western District 
of Texas, and the Southern District of California and Coded 0 for all Other Districts. 
Southern District 
Dummy Variable Coded 1 for all districts within the US Census Bureau Identified “South”, and coded “0” for 
all other districts 
 
*Note: This includes all districts within Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, 
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia, Maryland, and 
Delaware* 
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Appendix B: Fixed and Random Effect Determinants of District Total Downward Departure % 
and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90 districts (FY 1996-2011) (Full Model) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Total   Total    Judge-Initiated Judge-Initiated  
Downward Downward  Downward Downward 
   Departure % Departure %  Departure % Departure % 
   (Fixed Effect) (Random Effects)  (Fixed Effects) (Random Effects)  
(1)                       (2)   (3)  (4) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
State Crime Rate  -.011***  -.007***   -.010***  -.005***  
   (.002)  (.001)   (.002)  (.001) 
 
State Liberalism  .20*  .52***   .32*  .41*** 
   (.09)  (.06)   (.17)  (.08) 
 
Booker   9.18***  6.59***   13.21***  13.18***   
   (2.56)  (0.15)   (3.06)  (2.34) 
 
PROTECT Act  -5.04***  -7.76***   -6.07***  -6.80*** 
   (1.22)  (1.61)   (1.78)  (1.75) 
 
% Democrat  06***  .002   .07***  .04** 
Judges   (.01)  (.054)   (.01)  (.01) 
 
# of Districts     -  1.76***     -  .81* 
In State     (.35)     (.39) 
 
# of Judges  -.43  .19**   -.70  .09 
   (-0.66)  (.07)   (.41)  (.08) 
 
% Male   -.09  .13   .17  .07  
Offenders   (.09)  (.10)   (.07)  (.08) 
 
% African-American  -.07**  .03   -.04*  -.003 
Offenders   (.03)  (.03)   (.03)  (.02) 
 
% Hispanic  -.12**  -.05*   -.05  .04 
Offenders   (.05)  (.03)   (.06)  (.04) 
 
% Drug   .24*  .10   .02  -.01   
Trafficking  (.13)  (0.15)   (.11)  (.07) 
 
% Firearm  -.27***  -.13*   -.21**  -.24*** 
   (.08)  (.08)   (.08)  (.04) 
 
% Immigration  .06  .05   .02  .03 
   (.06)  (.06)   (.07)  (.06) 
 
% Fraud   .03  .12   .02  .02 
   (.06)  (.08)   (.06)  (.07) 
 
% Plea   .47**  .58***   .21  .18 
   (.18)  (.16)   (.17)  (.21) 
 
% Mandatory  -.07  -.04   -.25*  -.33*** 
Minimum   (.16)  (.12)   (.15)  (.09) 
 
% Substantial  -  -   .01  -.07**  
Assistance        (.02)  (.03) 
 
Caseload   .015  .010   .01  -.001 
   (.010)  (.011)   (.01)  (.008) 
 
% Above   .28*  .22   .38**  .43** 
Median Sentence  (.14)  (.15)   (.15)  (.14) 
 
Border District    -  16.89***     -  22.84***  
     (1.47)     (2.43) 
 
Southern District    -  -7.18***     -  -5.79*** 
     (.74)     (.32) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2 (within R2 for FE models) .626  .407   .623  .655 
Root Mean2 Error  -  10.29     -  8.47 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Driscoll Kray standard errors in parentheses,       n=1440   *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001  (one-tailed tests)  
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Appendix C: Fixed and Random Effect Determinants of District Total 
Downward Departure % and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90 
districts (FY 1996-2011)  
 
*Utilizing GLS Estimator (For Random Effects Models) and Fixed Effects 
Estimator, with District-Clustered Standard Errors.  
 
**Control Variables omitted.  Contact Author for Full Tables. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Total   Total    Judge-Initiated Judge-Initiated  
Downward Downward  Downward Downward 
   Departure % Departure %  Departure % Departure % 
   (Fixed Effect) (Random Effects)  (Fixed Effects) (Random Effects) 
 
            
(1)                       (2)   (3)  (4) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
State Crime Rate  -.009*  -.006*   -.010**  -.006**  
   (.004)  (.003)   (.004)  (.003) 
 
State Liberalism  .16  .29*   .30**  .36*** 
   (.10)  (.10)   (.09)  (.08) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2 (within R2 for FE models) .38  .46   .62  .64 
 
Note: clustered standard errors in parentheses,       n=1440    *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001  (one-tailed tests)  
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Appendix D: Random Effects Determinants of District Total Downward 
Departure % and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90 districts (FY 
1996-2011) 
 
*Utilizing OLS with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors. 
 
*Control Variables Omitted.  Contact Author for Full Tables. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Total   Total    Judge-Initiated Judge-Initiated  
Downward Downward  Downward Downward 
   Departure % Departure %  Departure % Departure % 
   (Fixed Effect) (Random Effects)  (Fixed Effects) (Random Effects)  
(1)                       (2)   (3)  (4) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
State Crime Rate  -  -.007***   -  -.005***  
   -  (.001)   -  (.001) 
 
State Liberalism  -  .52***   -  .41*** 
   -  (.08)   -  (.08) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2      .42     .66 
 
Note: panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses,       n=1440    *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001  (one-tailed tests)  
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Appendix E: Fixed and Random Effect Determinants of District Total Downward 
Departure % and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90 districts (FY 
1996-2011) 
*Utilizing Matching FY and Calendar Year Variables 
**Control Variables Omitted.  Contact Author for Full Tables. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Total   Total    Judge-Initiated Judge-Initiated  
Downward Downward  Downward Downward 
   Departure % Departure %  Departure % Departure % 
   (Fixed Effect) (Random Effects)  (Fixed Effects) (Random Effects) 
  
(1)                       (2)   (3)  (4) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
State Crime Rate  -.012***  -.006**   -.010***  -.005**  
   (.003)  (.003)   (.003)  (.002) 
 
State Liberalism  .15  .48***   .28*  .41*** 
   (.11)  (.07)   (.16)  (.08) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2 (within R2 for FE models) .38  .42   .62  .66 
 
Note: Driscoll-Kray standard errors in parentheses,       n=1440    *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001  (one-tailed tests)  
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Appendix F: Fixed and Random Effect Determinants of District Total Downward 
Departure % and Judge-Initiated Downward Departure % in 90 districts (FY 
1996-2011) 
*Including Year Dummies. 
**Control Variables Omitted.  Contact Author for Full Tables. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Total   Total    Judge-Initiated Judge-Initiated  
Downward Downward  Downward Downward 
   Departure % Departure %  Departure % Departure % 
   (Fixed Effect) (Random Effects)  (Fixed Effects) (Random Effects) 
  
(1)                       (2)   (3)  (4) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
State Crime Rate  -.006*  -.005***   -.005**  -.004***  
   (.002)  (.001)   (.002)  (.002) 
 
State Liberalism  .25*  .54***   .34*  .41*** 
   (.09)  (.07)   (.13)  (.08) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
R2 (within R2 for FE models) .53  .45   .70  .66 
 
Note: clustered standard errors in parentheses,       n=1440    *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001  (one-tailed tests)  
 
 
 Chapter 4: 
 
“In Their Words: The Sentencing Decisions 
of Federal District Court Judges According to 
Judges and Attorneys.” 
 
 
Abstract: 
Previous quantitative studies of federal district court judges have largely focused 
on the impact of partisan or ideological preferences of judges.  While a valuable inquiry, 
I argue that these studies fail to provide a comprehensive understanding of district judge 
behavior, due to the lack of attention to local contextual influences within district court 
judges’ individual districts.  In the context of the criminal sentencing, many scholars 
acknowledge the import of local contextual factors but analyses are too often reduced to 
generalities, such as “culture”, leaving several questions unanswered.  To gain a deeper 
understanding of district court judges’ criminal sentencing decisions, I conduct nineteen 
semi-structured interviews with district court judges, former district court judges, and 
experienced criminal attorneys in four selected districts.  Interview subjects were asked 
both to opine on district court judges’ sentencing behavior generally and to assess 
whether four specific contextual factors impacted judicial sentencing decisions: 1) local 
legal community opinion; 2) public opinion; 3) incarceration rates; and 4) crime rates.   
Results were mixed for each factor and there was a lack of consensus amongst subjects 
as to whether district court judges are influenced by the identified contextual factors.  
However, the vast majority of subjects cited at least one contextual factor as influential in 
shaping district court judges’ sentencing decisions.   More broadly the results advance 
understandings of district judge sentencing behavior by providing evidence both that 
certain judges actually altered their sentencing preferences in response to changing 
conditions and that partisan/ideological differences in district judges may be relatively 
unimportant in explaining differences in sentencing decisions. 
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“[Criminal sentencing] is a very important task of judges.  It takes a lot of 
reflection.  Families of victims and litigants are very concerned about what 
happens.  Judges have to take their time to get it right and do justice.” 
 
-Former Federal District Court Judge 
 
Introduction. 
As the above-quote illustrates, criminal sentencing is one of the most important tasks 
federal district court judges face.  But not only are these decisions important, they are also 
incredibly complicated.  The complex federal sentencing process compels district court judges to 
consider many different factors, most of which they have no personal control over.  These 
include the facts of each case, the personal qualities of individual offenders, the recommended 
sentence range of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), the application of 
other relevant legal standards, and many additional considerations posed by both prosecuting and 
defense attorneys.  Each of these factors undoubtedly plays a role in sentencing outcomes.   Yet 
despite these external elements, in the majority of federal cases
64
, and as illustrated by the above-
quote, the ultimate decision for the “appropriate” sentence rests with district judges’ themselves. 
 Given this important role, and given the increasing attention to the deleterious effects 
mass incarceration has on society (Currie 2013; Alexander 2012; Pattillo, et. al. 2004; Western 
2002), it is imperative to understand what factors district court judges consider when they make 
their sentencing decisions.  Many recent research efforts have studied the more general question 
of what inputs account for sentencing disparities for similar crimes in the federal system (Lynch 
and Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn 2010; Ulmer 2005; Kautt 2002).  Other research has framed the 
issue in terms of how district judges’ partisan preferences interact with changing legal 
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 A substantial minority of federal offenders (between 20-30% depending on the year) are convicted of crimes that 
carry a “mandatory minimum”  penalty, in which district judges have no discretion to unilaterally sentence criminals 
to shorter sentences than the proscribed statutory period (USSC 2011). 
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constraints on their sentencing discretion (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 
2011).   
This research has provided improved understandings of why we observe disparities in 
sentencing outcomes for similarly situated offenders (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn 
2010; Kautt 2002; Mustard 2001).  It has also shown how recent legal developments have 
allowed district court judges to obtain authority to arrive at their preferred sentence (Epstein, et. 
al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).  However, I claim that this research has left two 
major questions pertinent to federal sentencing policy largely unanswered: 1) the sustained 
decline in the punitive behavior of district judges over time; and 2) the observed geographic 
variation in the sentencing behavior of district judges. 
I argue that these two phenomena are best explained not by simply the 
partisan/ideological preferences of district judges or by changes in levels of judicial discretion, 
but instead by certain district-specific contextual factors.  Specifically, in this work, I study the 
potential impact of four such contextual factors: 1) the punitive preferences of legal elites; 2) the 
punitive preferences of the broader public; 3) crime rates; and 4) incarceration rates.  The 
theoretical basis for each of these factors is explained in greater detail both in Chapters 1-3 and 
below.  But the broader theory of contextual influence is based upon the logic that district judges 
both care about their professional reputations within their respective district and the policy 
consequences of their decisions in these districts.  Thus, to the extent both punitive preferences 
among certain groups and relevant objective conditions in communities vary across time and 
space, these differences will partially explain differences in district judges’ decisions.  
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Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation have used various quantitative methods to 
empirically test variants of this central question of contextual influence. This chapter takes a 
different approach.  Namely, I employ qualitative phone-interviews with elite legal actors who 
possess substantial experience in federal sentencing.  Interview subjects include current district 
judges, former district judges, former and current U.S. attorneys, federal public defenders, and 
private practice criminal defense attorneys.  As I will argue, this interview-based methodology is 
particularly well-suited for a study of district judge behavior, because it can provide a deeper 
understanding of the different contexts in which district court judges operate.  
 In this chapter, I proceed as follows.  First, I briefly review and summarize different 
theoretical perspectives of judicial behavior and explain their application to federal sentencing. 
Second, I explore the two specific puzzles left unexplained by previous sentencing research.  
Third, I discuss the value of using qualitative interviews as part of a mixed-methods approach to 
uncover determinants of district court sentencing behavior.   Fourth, I explain and defend the 
methods used to gather interview subject and collect data.  Fifth, I present the results of the 
research, intermixing both descriptive statistics and specific quotes from interview subjects.  
Finally, I assess how the results square with various theories and discuss potential avenues for 
future research. 
Theories of Judicial Behavior in the Context of Federal Sentencing 
 There is general scholarly consensus that trial court behavior is understudied in the sub-
field of judicial behavior (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Posner 2010; Kim, et. al. 2009).  Part of the 
difficulty with empirical studies of trial court behavior is that scholars have fewer tools at their 
disposal for analyzing and comparing trial courts when compared with appellate courts.  First, 
appellate judges generally sit on panels with other judges.  Thus, multiple judges vote on the 
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outcome of the exact same case.  In contrast, trial judges adjudicate cases solely, and it is rare for 
any two trial judges to hear the exact same case.  This feature obviously makes testing theories of 
trial court behavior relatively difficult. 
Another difficulty for scholars of trial courts is the dearth of written opinions.  Appellate 
cases almost always produce written opinions, wherein judges/justices justify and explain their 
decisions.  Accordingly, studies of appellate voting behavior (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Epstein 
and Knight 1997) or citation decisions (Hinkle 2015; Hume 2009) can provide insight into how 
jurists arrive at their decisions.  In the absence of written opinions or voting data, studies of trial 
court judge behavior must often use more creative approaches.
65
   
Despite the potential research limitations facing students of trial judges, several scholars 
have sought to explain the motivations behind trial court behavior.  While general theories of 
trial judges posit that judges are influenced by a multitude of factors (Kim, et. al. 2009; Rowland 
and Carp 1996; Kritzer 1978), some determinants have received more scholarly attention than 
others.   To cite the most prominent example, several research efforts examine the impact of 
judges’ personal partisanship and/or ideology on case outcomes.  Some of this scholarship finds 
that, like appellate judges, trial judges’ decisions are strongly influenced by their partisanship or 
ideology (Sisk & Heise 2012; Stidham, et. al. 1996; Rowland, et. al. 1996).  In contrast, other 
research on trial courts has found little or no impact of partisan or ideological variables (Zorn & 
Bowie 2010; Ashenfelter, et. al. 1995).  While certainly valuable to the study of trial court 
behavior, a debate focused solely on whether partisanship or ideology impacts decisions 
potentially overlooks other potentially important explanations.   
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 For example, in their study of California trial judges, Blank, et. al. (1989) videotape judges presiding over 
criminal trials and then code the judges’ verbal and nonverbal behavior along ten different paradigms (e.g. warm/not 
warm, professional/non-professional).     
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Specifically, I argue that contextual factors, related to the environments in which trial 
judges sit, can ultimately shape these judges’ decisions.  This is not a novel view.  Several 
scholars of judicial behavior have demonstrated that trial judges’ decisions often depend upon 
the different contexts in which they make these decisions (Rowland & Carp 1996; Kritzer, et. al. 
1993; Gibson 1980; Kritzer 1978; Cook 1973; Peltason 1964; Vines 1961).
66
   
But with respect to federal criminal sentencing, what type of contextual variables might 
we expect to be influential?  Stated differently, what different conditions might explain 
differences in district judges’ sentencing decisions?  I posit four potential sources of contextual 
influence worthy of exploration. 
Reputational Factors: Local Legal Community Influence & Public Influence 
Both for reasons of career advancement (Morriss, et. al. 2005) and for the personal desire 
to be liked and respected (Posner 2010; Baum 1994), many district judges desire to foster a good 
reputation within the local legal community.  Baum (2006) argues that judges with limited 
jurisdiction, such as district judges, see lawyers whom they interact with as a key audience 
whose opinions “may sway judges” (98).   
In fact, I argue that federal criminal sentencing is one area we would particularly expect 
to observe influence from the local legal community.  This is first because the majority of 
members of the legal community view the current federal sentencing regime as both incredibly 
important and overly punitive (Hofer and Allenbaugh 2003; Sisk, et. al. 1998).  Thus, district 
judges’ sentencing reputations are likely to be a significant factor upon which legal community 
evaluations of them are made.  In addition, there is strong evidence that district-specific legal 
norms affect sentencing outcomes in separate districts (Ulmer 2005).  Likely due to measurement 
difficulties, these works do not specifically study the connection between the punitive preference 
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 For a more thorough review of these pieces, see Chapter 1. 
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of the legal community and district judge sentencing.  Yet the fact that district-specific legal 
norms impact sentencing outcomes suggests that local legal communities may hold some 
influence over district judges. 
It is also quite plausible that the punitive preferences of the general public affect the 
sentencing behavior of district judges.  The extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court takes on a 
“representational role” and responds to public opinion has been the subject of much debate in the 
judicial behavior sub-field (Casillas, et. al. 2011; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Mishler and Sheehan 
1996).  Yet because district judges live and work within specific local districts, and because they 
deal directly with members of their community every day, it is likely that these trial judges are 
more representative of the local public than appellate judges (Rowland and Carp 1996).   
Indeed, studies of district judges from past decades often tested the impact of public 
influence on district judges (Silver and Shapiro 1984; Kritzer 1978; Cook 1973, 1977; Peltason 
1971; Vines 1964).  Indeed, with respect to criminal sentencing, Cook (1973) finds that the 
decline in public support for the Vietnam War caused district judges to be less punitive in their 
sentences for draft dodgers.  Yet recent Guideline-era sentencing scholarship has largely ignored 
any role in public influence on district judges.  This is in spite of the fact that the public’s 
punitive preferences vary by region (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001) and have changed markedly 
over time (Enns 2014).  Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, it is possible 
that the public’s ideological preferences explain regional and temporal differences in judges’ 
sentencing behavior.
67
  Still, whether district judges actually consider public preferences when 
making individual sentencing decisions remains an open question.   
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 There is serious debate regarding causality and reputational influences. Segal and Spaeth (2002) argue that any 
public influence on unelected judges is likely indirect, as judges are simply members of the public.  On the other 
hand, Mishler and Sheehan  (1996) and Casillas, et. al. (2011), argue that direct influence is present and that judges 
are actually responsive to public opinion some degree.  My theoretical perspective is consistent with aspects of both 
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Objective Conditions: Crime Rates & Incarceration Rates 
Aside from reputation-based factors, another source of potential contextual influence on 
district court judges are the objective conditions related to crime and punishment in their local 
community.  The reasoning for why these facts might influence judges is based on the 
assumption that judges seek to make their own view of good public policy (Epstein, et. al. 2013; 
Posner 2010; Posner 2009; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Songer 1979).  Undoubtedly, judges’ views 
of “good policy” are shaped by individual factors, such as personal partisanship, political 
ideology, and personal background (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Sisk and Heise 
2012).  However, I argue that these explanations are important but incomplete.  Given district 
court judges’ social connections with their geographic constituency, judicial views of “good” 
policy are likely supplemented by salient conditions existing in their community.   
Assuming judges sometimes seek to bring about the “best” consequences with their 
decisions (Posner 2009; Songer 1979), it is at least plausible that judges’ normative evaluations 
are informed by pertinent objective information, in addition to any preexisting partisan or 
ideological biases.  While social scientists have studied the impact of objective conditions on the 
behavior of the general public (Page, et. al., 1987) and other policymakers (Jones & Baumgartner 
2005; Cohen 1999), there has been little testing with respect to judges.  Since trial judges 
generally live and work in the communities where they have jurisdiction (Rowland and Carp 
1996), it is likely that the conditions in these communities are an important determinant of 
judges’ “preferences.”   
                                                                                                                                                             
sides of the debate.  In other words I would expect judges to adjust their behavior to conform to the opinions of 
those audiences they seek a good reputation with.  However, in lieu of direct influence, to the extent judges simply 
hold preferences that are consistent with local legal elites or the local public, this is consistent with my argument 
that sentencing outcomes must be viewed through the prism of local contexts (see Chapter 1, Figure 1). 
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The two objective conditions I address in this work are crime rates and incarceration 
rates. The logic underlying crime rate influence on sentencing behavior is that higher crime will 
prod judges to punish and deter criminal offenders through longer sentences.   There is also some 
evidence for this phenomenon.  Both Gibson (1980) and Ulmer and Bradley (2006) found that 
state-elected judges sentenced criminals more harshly in higher crime rate areas.  In addition, 
several of the models presented in Chapter 3 of this dissertation found a relationship between 
high crime rates and fewer below-Guideline sentences.  However, the question is not settled as 
Johnson, et. al. (2008) found no relationship between crime rates and sentence length for certain 
federal crimes at a given point in time.
 68
  In addition, there are many potential conflating factors 
intertwined with crime rates (urban/rural areas, caseloads, etc.), which might explain correlations 
between crime rates and sentences.  Overall, all of the above suggests further inquiry into the 
crime rate/judicial sentences connection is prudent.  
The reasoning behind incarceration rate influence on district judges’ sentencing 
preferences is slightly different.  Here, the logic is that, despite their defined role as neutral 
arbiters of the law, judges generally seek to arrive at decisions that provide the most workable 
consequences (Posner 2009).  This notion of judges as pragmatists suggests that they seek to 
avoid or mitigate negative policy effects. 
By 2016, it is fairly uncontroversial to claim that the policy of mass federal incarceration 
is generally regarded as a failure in policy (Clear and Frost 2015).  Large segments of both major 
political parties in the United States are now supportive of sentencing reform efforts to reduce 
the number of non-violent, incarcerated individuals.
69
  To a limited degree, district judges have 
the opportunity to mitigate this policy of long sentences absent-congressional action. If district 
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 For a further discussion of Johnson, et. al. (2008), see Chapter 3 of this Dissertation. 
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 See e.g. H.R. 3713; S. 2123 
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judges truly see to make the best policy, it is likely that they would be influenced by the surge in 
federal incarcerations and respond accordingly with more below-Guideline sentences.   
To be sure, the effect of incarceration rates might depend on whether individual judges 
see their role in government as active or passive (Scheb, et. al. 1993).  Still, just as proponents of 
the attitudinal model argue it is implausible to assume judges divorce their ideological 
preferences from their decisions, I similarly argue it would be unreasonable to believe judges 
will ignore pertinent objective facts.  Stated differently, if some judges care about avoiding 
negative policy consequences, it is likely those judges take account of pertinent facts relevant to 
those policy consequences when making decisions.  
Contextual Influence and Federal Sentencing 
All of the above suggest that certain contextual factors could impact federal district court 
judges’ sentencing decisions.  Yet as discussed more thoroughly both in Chapter 3 and below, 
most studies examining regional disparities in federal sentencing have tended to focus on 
differences in prosecutorial practices while de-emphasizing the role of district judges (Lynch and 
Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn 2010; Ulmer 2005; Kautt 2002).  As to the studies that do focus on 
judicial behavior, they are generally limited to “low hanging fruit” variables of judicial 
partisanship and legal policy change, to the determinant of other potentially important contextual 
factors, such as those itemized above (See e.g. Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 
2011).     
Overall, these past studies have undoubtedly improved understandings both why we 
observe sentence disparities within the complex federal sentencing system (Lynch and Omori 
2014; Wu and Spohn 2010; Tiede 2009; Kautt 2002) and how district judges have responded to 
changes in their levels of discretion (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).  
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However, certain questions remain unanswered.  In particular, there are two “puzzles” of federal 
sentencing policy that persist.  These are: 1) the gradual and continuing increase in below-
Guideline sentences over time; and 2) extreme interdistrict variation in judges’ propensity to 
grant below-Guideline sentences.  As I argue in greater detail below, the answer to these two 
“puzzles” may be explained by the above-discussed contextual influences. 
Puzzle #1: Gradual Increases in Below-Guideline Sentences Over Time  
Federal sentencing policy has changed drastically since the Guidelines were first 
implemented in 1987.  During the first few years after the Guidelines were implemented, federal 
district court judges sentenced offenders below the Guideline recommended range in less than 
20% of all cases (USSC 1995-2014).  However, by Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2014, the last year data 
was available, a majority of federal offenders were sentenced below the recommended range 
(USSC 1995-2014).  To be sure, part of the explanation for this marked change is the fact that in 
a 2005 decision, the US Supreme Court clarified that the Guidelines were not “mandatory” but 
rather “advisory” on federal district court judges (US v. Booker 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). Indeed, the 
Sentencing Commission, along with several scholars, have provided strong evidence that the 
Booker decision prompted district judges to sentence below the Guideline-recommended range at 
increasing rates (Epstein, et. al. 2013; USSC 2012; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011). 
However, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, while Booker was clearly a 
watershed moment that increased federal district judge sentencing discretion, Booker fails to 
fully explain the dramatic and continued trend of district court judges sentencing offenders to 
shorter sentences.  If it were simply the case that district court judges were constrained in their 
sentencing decisions pre-Booker but “freed” post-Booker to sentence their preference, we would 
expect to see a dramatic increase in Guideline departures post-Booker, followed by a leveling off 
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in the proportion of below-Guideline sentences.  However, the raw data does not bear this fact 
out, and below-Guideline sentences have continued to increase in later years.
70
  Current 
explanations in the literature for the continued post-Booker increase in below-Guideline 
sentences posit that judges are simply adjusting to the authority given to them by Booker 
(Epstein, et. al. 2013). 
This explanation, however, seems to underestimate the rationality of highly educated 
district court judges.  Booker clearly gave judges the freedom and authority to depart from 
Guideline sentences.  In FY 2006, the first full year after Booker was implemented, only 1.5% of 
below-Guideline sentences were overturned by an appellate court (USSC 1995-2014).  In other 
words, as district court judges would surely be aware, there was a very small chance post-Booker 
that any given sentence would be overturned on appeal for being “too lenient.”  So assuming that 
judges are rational actors who seek outcomes consistent with their preferences (Posner 2010), it 
would seem strange indeed for judges to holster their authority to implement their ideal, more 
lenient sentences for several years. 
Puzzle #2 Inter-District Variation in Judicial Behavior 
Despite the fact that the Guidelines are intended to be applied identically throughout the 
country, there is extreme variation in sentencing outcomes among the ninety federal districts 
(USSC 1995-2014).  To be sure, several researchers have noted this phenomenon and conducted 
empirical tests to uncover the sources of this variation in sentencing outcomes (Lynch and Omori 
2014; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011; Wu and Spohn 2010; Tiede 2009; Ulmer 2005; Kautt 
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 It is true that two Supreme Court decisions on December 10, 2007 further clarified that judges had wide discretion 
to depart from Guideline-recommended decisions (United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); United States v. 
Gall, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)).  However, these decisions were not of the same watershed character as Booker (2005).  
Moreover, even we were to assume that the Kimbrough and Gall decisions gave judges the full power they needed 
to sentence more leniently, these decisions  not explain the continued increase in the proportion of sentences below 
the Guideline recommended range from 39.1% in FY 2008 to 51.8% in FY 2014.   
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2002).  A central finding of these studies is that district differences in criminal sentences are 
partially explained by the differing application and interpretation of sentencing procedures and 
by district-specific prosecutorial practices (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and Spohn 2010; Ulmer 
2005; Kautt 2002).
 71
   
This research focus on court-community norms and prosecutorial practices is important 
and clearly helps explain much of the sentence-length disparity for offenders in different 
districts.   However this research has largely skirted the issue of why different judges might have 
different sentencing preferences throughout the country.
72
  Yet an independent focus on judges is 
important.  Regardless of any district-specific differences in prosecutorial practices, there is still 
marked district variation in how often district judges themselves choose to depart from the 
Guidelines (USSC 1995-2014).
73
  If we truly want to understand these regional differences in 
district judges’ sentencing, a deeper inquiry into the decision-making process of judges is 
warranted. 
Two Birds with One Stone: Local Contextual Influences 
I posit that a potential explanation for both of the above described puzzles is local, 
contextual influence.  District judges are residents and members of local communities.  It is true 
that district court judges are unelected, enjoy life tenure, and are instructed by law to ignore 
social and personal considerations.  Despite these facts, as discussed in more detail above, there 
is a wealth of evidence that district court judges care about their reputations in their communities 
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 For a more thorough summary of the findings of these individual pieces of research, see Chapter 3. 
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 Indeed, Kautt (2002) models judicial departure rates as an independent variable for explaining sentencing 
disparity.   
 
73
See Chapter 3, Footnote 41.  To be sure, not all of the differences in judge-initiated departures exemplified in said 
footnote can be attributed to differences in district judges’ sentencing preferences, as the composition of offenses 
and offenders also varies across districts.  Still, this stark difference in judge-initiated departure rates exemplifies 
how different prosecutorial policies are insufficient to explain differences between districts.    
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(Rowland and Carp 1996; Kritzer 1978; Peltason 1971; Vines 1964).  Relatedly, there is further 
evidence that judges gain utility from arriving at what they believe to be “good public policy” 
(Epstein, et. al. 2013; Posner 2009; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Songer 1979).   
Applying this theoretical perspective of local contextual influence to federal sentencing, I 
argue both reputational concerns and salient objective conditions help explain the two puzzles of 
federal sentencing outlined above.  More specifically, I submit that the dramatic and continually 
increasing rate at which offenders are given below-Guideline sentences (“Puzzle #1”) is partially 
explained by increasing evidence of the pernicious consequences of over-incarceration, the 
falling crime rate, and more recently, the softening sentencing preferences among both legal 
elites and the general public.  As district judges are almost assuredly aware, over the past two 
decades incarceration rates have increased significantly while crime rates have decreased.  Due 
to these facts, combined with the growing attention to the problem of incarceration, it is likely 
district judges began viewing longer sentences as ineffective policies.  Relatedly, as opinions 
began to shift in a relatively less punitive direction
74, judges’ opinions shifted in tandem.  
Therefore, because of both reputational concerns and concerns over the policy consequences of 
their decisions, district judges began adjusting their preferences and imposing less-draconian 
sentences.   
As to countrywide variation in district judges’ propensity to issue below-Guideline 
sentences (“Puzzle #2”), I argue that the source of this variation can be partially explained by 
local contextual influences on judges.  Specifically, there is clearly great nationwide variation in 
the punitive preferences of both elites and the general public (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001).  If 
judges care about their reputations amongst either of these communities, it is quite reasonable to 
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 See Enns (2014).  While punitiveness has risen markedly among the public over the past several decades, there is 
evidence suggesting that public punitiveness peaked in the mid-late 1990’s. 
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assume that their own sentencing behavior would, at least somewhat, reflect the preferences of 
these communities (Baum 2006).  
In a similar vein, I argue that varying crime rates also help explain regional variation in 
judges’ punitive sentences across the country.75  As discussed above, judges in areas with higher 
crime might see it as their duty to punish and deter criminals through longer sentences.  This 
factor is likely also linked to reputational concerns, as judges would not want to be perceived as 
either failing to deal with a serious crime problem, or as being overly-punitive in a community 
that has very little crime.  
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the four sources of contextual influence 
outlined above are the only factors that might influence judges.  We know many sentencing 
outcomes are influenced by facts related to the individual offender and crime (e.g. the criminal 
history of the offender, whether violence was used).  Further, as discussed above, recent research 
has also evidenced the importance of both prosecution policies (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and 
Spohn 2010) and different levels of discretion for district judges (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman 
and Schanzenbach 2011) in shaping sentencing outcomes.  However, the four contextual 
determinants probed herein (local legal community preferences, public preferences, crime rates, 
and incarceration rates) are all theoretically relevant factors that have yet to be sufficiently 
examined and may help account for the two puzzles of federal sentencing outlined above.   
Interview-Based Research 
To test my theoretical perspective, and to gain further insight into judicial sentencing 
behavior more generally, I employ the method of phone-interviews with experienced actors in 
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 For quantitative of the impact of crime rates on judicial sentencing behavior, see Chapter 3 of this Dissertation. 
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federal criminal sentencing.
76
  There are several reasons why use of this methodology is 
appropriate. The most pertinent justification for qualitative, interview-based research is that it 
allows for further mixed-method
77
 testing of my central argument of contextual influence on 
district court judges’ criminal sentencing decisions.    
Another reason to conduct interview-based research is its ability to assess the relative 
value of competing theoretical perspectives, by inquiring as to the opinions of actors who 
possess first-hand experience with district court judges’ sentencing decisions.  This method has 
proved valuable to political scientists studying the behavior of other policymakers, such as 
Congress (MacDonald 2007; Zegart 2011) and the President (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995).  In the 
context of the sentencing behavior of district court judges, the present research will assist in 
determining the relative importance of local contextual influences, personal partisan/ideological 
factors (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011), prosecutorial practices (Lynch and Omori 2014; 
Ulmer 2005), or top-down change to legal policy (Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and 
Schanzenbach 2011; Schanzenbach and Tiller 2007).  
Yet another reason to utilize the elite interviewing method is the dynamic nature of 
federal sentencing.  Regardless of geographic differences, a central question of this research is to 
determine why district judges issued below Guideline sentences about one-third of the time in 
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 This interview-based approach was also used by Ulmer (2005) as part of his mixed-method approach to 
understanding district differences in federal sentencing.  While Ulmer’s (2005) study clearly demonstrated the value 
of interviewing sentencing actors, the present study differs in important ways. Ulmer (2005) uses interviews largely 
to determine how legal actors interpreted certain terms in sentencing parlance (e.g. “substantial assistance”) and how 
these different interpretations could result in disparate sentences.  My area of inquiry is distinct, as I seek to probe 
exactly what factors judges look to in their general sentencing behavior. 
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 Recall that Chapter 2 found little evidence of national-level sociopolitical or public influences on district court 
sentencing, while Chapter 3 found support for more localized influence of both the crime rate and citizen ideology.  
Irrespective of these findings, there remains value in using a multitude of methods for theory testing (Martin 2013).  
In addition, interviews allow for the probing of previously to the probing of untested potential influences, such as 
local legal community sentiment on sentencing policy.  
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the wake of Booker but now issue these sentences in over half of all cases (“Puzzle #1).  These 
types of inquiries, often referred to as “process tracing” attempt to determine the casual chain of 
how certain events led to a particular policy outcome (George and Bennet 2005).  Interviews 
with elite policymakers has been identified as an important tool in the process tracing method, as 
they allow for researchers to gain first-hand perspectives of how a policy output evolved in the 
fashion that it did (Tansey 2007).  
Furthermore, targeted interviews of elite policymakers or persons with experience 
working with these policymakers can provide new insights into the thought processes of how 
decisions are made (Beckmann and Hall 2013).  Regardless of any observed strength of 
competing theories of judicial influence in quantitative models, probing interviews will provide 
insight into the mechanism by which those theories derive their validity. Stated differently, 
experienced interview subjects will be to opine as to why judges’ criminal sentencing decisions 
are (or are not) affected by certain inputs.   
Assuredly, interview-based research is not without difficulties
78
, and the opinions of 
interview-subjects should be assessed critically for both their veracity and their reliability 
(George and Bennett 2005).  Yet, at minimum, the opinions of a diverse sample of actors with 
years of experience in federal sentencing will provide additional insight into how sentencing 
decisions are made and what factors are thought to be important to district court judges.  
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 See Bleich and Pekkanen (2013) for a more complete discussion of some the problems associated with interview-
based research.  As will be explained in more detail, below, the present research design will attempt to mitigate the 
effects of many of these difficulties. 
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Methods 
 
District Selection 
The Federal Court system is made up of ninety
79
 federal districts.  Due to time and 
resource constraints, however, I chose to limit the pool of interview subjects to four districts
80
.  
A random sampling of all ninety districts, while well-suited to make generalizations about 
judicial behavior, would likely have led to only a single interview subject for each district 
studied.  This is not ideal for a research effort seeking to gain deeper understandings of local 
contexts.   On the other hand, a within-case study of a single district would also be problematic 
due to issues of generalizability (George and Bennet 2005).  In addition to the problem of 
generalizability, a single case study could provide no insight into “Puzzle #2” relating to why 
judges in different districts sentence differently.  Thus, I choose a middle way between random 
sampling and a single case-study.       
In order to ensure the protection of subject confidentiality (Mosley 2013), the four 
selected districts are will not be identified.  However, in order to provide verifiable information 
regarding case-selection, Table 1 provides aggregate and general information regarding the 
selected districts.  The purpose of Table 1 is to examine the extent to which the findings from the 
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 Not including the districts of the U.S. Territories (Guam, Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, and the North Mariana 
Islands). 
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 Originally, I employed a most similar system (“MSS”) research design to select the four districts in question.  
Application of the MSS method involves selecting cases that are similar in most fashions, but where we observe 
variation in the proposed independent variables and in the dependent variable (Przeworski and Teune 1970). This 
method allows researchers to control for many alternative explanations that might be causing the observed variation 
in the dependent variable.  However, due to the extremely small subset of interview subjects within each district, the 
I was not able to make valid comparisons between districts.  As a result, the analysis presented herein will largely 
focus on the aggregate opinions of interview subjects as to whether contextual variables are affecting judges’ 
sentencing decisions, regardless of differences between the districts.  In the future, I plan on expanding the subject 
pool so as to be able to make stronger claims regarding judges operating in different environments. 
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four selected districts can be generalized to federal district court judges in all ninety federal 
districts 
[Table 1 about here] 
As can be seen from the center column of Table 1, many different areas of the country are 
represented by the district pool.  However, the right hand column of Table 1 also highlights 
certain districts in the country not represented by the selection.  Due to the limited number of 
districts, the design was unable to include a small, rural district.  There is also a lack of any 
representation in this research of any Western districts, and not coincidentally, districts with 
relatively large populations of Hispanic-Americans.  Thus, to the extent district judges from 
small/rural districts, Western districts, or districts with large Hispanic populations have unique 
approaches to criminal sentencing, the present research will not be able to account for those 
differences.  The foregoing is certainly a limitation of this research, but future expansion of this 
project will seek to address this issue through the inclusion of additional districts. 
Identification of Subjects 
Given that the present research is focused on the sentencing behavior of district judges, 
the judges themselves are obviously an apt target for interviews.  This tactic of interviewing 
judges has been used before to test influences of judicial behavior (Levin 1972; Ulmer 2005; 
Hilbink 2007).  On the other hand, there are several reasons to not limit the inquiry to the 
response of district court judges alone. 
First, there are very real reasons to suspect that district court judges, especially sitting 
judges
81
, would not be completely candid regarding their sentencing practices.  Scholars of 
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 This concern of candidness is likely less problematic for retired district judges, who would doubtless be less 
concerned with their reputations as jurists after leaving the bench.  Still, due to the legal training and socialization 
discussed below, it is still likely that retired judges might have a difficult time admitting any true extralegal 
motivations for their sentencing behavior. 
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judicial behavior have pointed out that judges are loathe to admit that any “extralegal” 
considerations influence their decisions in individual cases (Carp & Stidham 1996).   Perhaps 
this is due to both legal formalistic training and legal socialization of judges, both of which 
convince judges the law is blind to such considerations (Spaeth and Segal 2001).  Perhaps 
instead, judges understand that extralegal factors influence them, but due to the fact that they are 
trained and instructed by law to ignore extralegal factors, it would hurt their reputation to admit 
their influence.  Regardless of the cause, these norms raise concerns that some district court 
judges would not be candid about extralegal motivations, even in confidential interviews. 
Secondly, judges themselves may not be able to accurately describe “why” they do the 
things they do in criminal sentencing.  Researchers of Congress have found that members have 
difficulty explaining exactly why they vote the way they do (Kingdon 1981; Beckmann and Hall 
2013). With respect to judges, many scholars associated with the legal realism movement are 
skeptical that judges are able to attach their actual motivations to their behavior on the bench 
(Tiller and Cross 1999). 
Finally, limiting interviews to only federal district court judges would likely do damage 
to the generalizability of the study.  Recall that the aim of this research is to achieve a deeper 
understanding of the sentencing behavior of district court judges who operate in different 
contexts.  Yet, given that district court judges decide cases individually and do not directly 
observe the sentencing behavior of other judges within their districts, interviews with a small 
proportion of judges or former judges from each district would not be appropriate for inferring 
conclusions regarding the district generally.  On the other hand, including perspectives from 
persons with experience appearing before multiple judges within the district could more easily 
generalize regarding “typical judges” in that district.    
122 
 
Given these concerns, it is reasonable to supplement district court judge interviews with 
interviews of non-judges.  The non-judicial actors best situated to address judges’ sentencing 
behavior are almost certainly attorneys. As argued recently by a prominent trial-court scholar, 
researchers seeking to better understand trial court behavior would do well to incorporate studies 
of attorneys into their approaches (Kritzer 2012).   Indeed, as attorneys are often professionally 
invested in the outcome of district court judges’ decisions, it seems as they would have some 
insight into what factors affect judges in making these decisions.   
The attorneys I specifically target as subjects are as follows: 1) attorneys working for 
U.S. attorneys’ offices who prosecute offenders; 2) attorneys working for federal public 
defenders’ offices, who provide criminal defense for indigent offenders; and 3) experienced 
private-practice federal criminal defense attorneys.  Given the potential for interested-parties to 
have differing views on sentencing policy and judicial behavior (Ulmer 2005), it is important to 
gain a broad perspective from both attorneys representing the government and those representing 
the offenders.  This tactic helps ensure results are not biased towards a particular source of 
judicial influence based upon the experiences or incentives of a subset of actors (Bleich and 
Pekkanen 2013).  
In order for attorneys to be meet criteria as an interview subject, they must have 
experience working in federal criminal sentencing within their district for over ten years.  Ten 
years of experience assures the subjects will have worked with enough judges in the district to be 
able to make credible generalizations regarding district judge sentencing behavior. The ten year 
time period is also not arbitrary.  2005 marks the year of the US v. Booker decision.  As one 
primary goal of this research effort is to explain the gradual, as opposed to abrupt, change in 
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judicial Guideline adherence since 2005 (“Puzzle #1”), it is prudent to find subjects who could 
speak to federal sentencing in the initial aftermath of Booker up through the present.  
Contacting the Subjects
82
 
I employ several different techniques to contact as many potential interview subjects as 
possible.  First, I contacted those individuals who unquestionably have knowledge and 
experience in federal sentencing.  In addition to being potential interview subjects, these subjects 
are also “toehold” subjects who can lead to additional subjects (Beckmann and Hall 2013).  The 
toehold subjects I directly contacted in all four districts were: 1) the U.S. Attorney for each 
district; 2) the Federal Public Defenders for each district; and 3) each retired
83
 U.S. district judge 
in the federal districts.  These subjects clearly meet the criteria of substantial experience in 
federal sentencing, and twenty one subjects were contacted via this method.  
As my initial means of contact, I sent written requests to all of the above persons, stating 
the nature of the project, the purposes of the research, and a request for a 45 minute-1 hour phone 
interview.  The written letters also informed potential subjects that their confidentiality would be 
protected and that I would be following up within one-two weeks by contacting recipients via 
phone.  After contacting these twenty one potential subjects by phone, I scheduled six interviews 
with willing participants for a response rate of 29%.   After scheduling the interview, I provided 
subjects with both written and oral informed consent for their participation.  
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 This research design was approved and categorized as “exempt” by the West Virginia University Institutional 
Review Board. 
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 Active district court judges in the four districts were not contacted directly due to their shared professional 
addresses and concerns over subject confidentiality.  In addition, active judges might be less likely to be candid, as 
they are instructed by law to ignore many extralegal considerations that the interviews would probe (e.g. personal 
partisanship or public opinion).  However, as shown by Table 2, below, two active judges were eventually included 
as interview subjects after being referred directly by other subjects.   
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Of course, there are several other persons who may have insight into federal sentencing 
beyond the toehold respondents discussed above, such as private-practice criminal defense 
attorneys.  However, for this subject pool, I chose a purposive sampling method intended to 
recruit subjects who could intelligently discuss as to the change and development of federal 
sentencing practice over the past decade (See Tansey 2007).  It would be imprudent to recruit 
these subjects from a broad pool of attorneys who advertised federal criminal defense, as this 
may include attorneys who had only recently or rarely appeared in federal court on criminal 
matters.   
Accordingly, in order to recruit additional qualified subjects, I used a second method: I 
contacted all officers of the Federal Bar Association (“FBA”) chapters of each selected district 
by e-mail correspondence and requested referrals.  The FBA is an organization with over 17,000 
members and 1,200 federal judges (FBA 2015).  The FBA’s district chapters, among other tasks, 
are charged with monitoring federal issues, providing opportunities for scholarship and 
continuing education, and providing for professional and social interaction between attorneys 
and judges (FBA 2015).  The rationale for contacting the FBA officers is that the officers are 
likely to have knowledge of the identities of the most experienced persons in the district with 
respect to federal sentencing.  The officers may or may not be involved in criminal law 
themselves, but they likely will have served actively in their districts for long periods of time and 
thus be able to refer experienced potential subjects.  After making these contacts to sixteen 
officers, I received eight e-mail responses and five referrals.
84
  Of these five referrals, two 
subjects agreed to interviews, for a response rate of 40%.  As with all subjects, these persons 
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 In order to protect subject confidentiality, I never communicated to any of the FBA officers whether their referral 
resulted in an interview.  Furthermore, specific quotes and results do not distinguish subjects based upon contact 
method. 
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were also provided both written and verbal informed consent of their participation in the 
research. 
Finally, at the conclusion of each interview, I asked all subjects if there was any other 
person in their district that he/she believed could answer the interview questions or otherwise be 
beneficial to this research effort. This strategy, known as “snowball sampling” is predicated on 
the notion that persons with knowledge regarding a particular subject will be able to refer 
researchers to other knowledgeable persons on the subject (Suchman and Cahill 1996).  This 
technique is especially fruitful in the area of federal criminal sentencing, where despite the large 
amount of criminal cases adjudicated, there are often only a small number of “insider” attorneys 
within each district (Narduli 1986).  
One critique of snowball sampling is that it might lead to overrepresentation of a single 
network of contacts, who share the same perspective (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013).  Thus I made 
clear to all respondents in my referral requests that I sought to get a wide range of interview 
subjects and that I would welcome opposing or different perspectives from themselves.   The 
snowball sampling method led to sixteen referrals, and ultimately eleven subjects, with an 
expectedly higher response rate of 69%.  The overall response rate for all three methods of 
contact was 45%. 
Conducting the Interview & Coding Responses 
When speaking with subjects, I used semi-structured interview techniques (Leech, et. al. 
2013).  I thus began with a list of prepared questions
85
, but left most questions open-ended for 
subjects to answer them as they saw fit.  I first asked general questions to gain insight into the 
inputs of district court judges’ sentencing decisions.  I also asked general probing questions, 
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 See Appendix A for a list of the prepared questions. 
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asking respondents to explain why they believed district court judges generally choose to apply 
Guideline-recommended sentences or issue below-Guideline sentences.  I asked similar general 
questions regarding whether and why the subjects believed judges approached sentencing 
differently over time, and what factors account for differences in judges in their sentencing 
behavior. 
After subjects gave general responses, I asked more specific yes/no questions regarding 
potential influences
86
 of judicial sentencing behavior in the aggregate.  For example, “generally 
speaking, do you believe the political party of the sentencing judge (based upon the political 
party of the appointing US President) affects departure decisions?  If so, in what way?”  It is the 
responses to these questions, I utilized for testing competing theoretical perspectives    
When coding results to specific areas of inquiry, I divided responses into three categories: 
“agreement”, “qualified agreement” or “qualified disagreement/disagreement.”  This coding 
procedure became necessary as many respondents believed that certain factors were influential 
on judicial sentencing decisions, but this influence were either secondary or conditional.  
Examples of qualified agreement statements would be answers, such as “yes, for some judges 
that matters” or “yes, in certain cases” or “yes, I think that plays some role.”  Once the “qualified 
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 Notably, some interview researchers have critiqued questions intended to uncover the general influences on 
policymaker behavior as too abstract and not necessarily likely to lead to valid and reliable results (Kingdon 1981; 
Hall and Beckman 2013).  The nature of the critique levied is that people do poorly at explaining why they do the 
things they do or whether certain factors influence behavior, and it is better to ask respondents concrete questions 
about specific results.  However, as exemplified by the interview-research for MacDonald (2007) and Baumgartner, 
et. al. (2009), when the substance of responses includes specific descriptions and examples of the issue being 
probed, there is strong evidence that subjects’ yes/no responses to sources have influence have some facial validity.  
As will be shown in the results below, subjects’ responses in the present study generally included this high level of 
specificity.  When subjects were asked about specific sources of influences on judicial sentencing policy, they would 
often relay a pertinent anecdote or cite specific reasons as to why a factor was, or was not, important.  Furthermore, 
based on their responses, most subjects seemed to have previously considered whether inquired sources of influence 
were relevant, providing further evidence that the subjects understood how sentencing decisions were made broadly.  
Thus, in spite of critiques of questions on behavioral inputs, both the judge and non-judge subjects demonstrated 
clear ability to competently opine on these sources of influence. 
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agreement” category was added, it was fairly easy to categorize responses into one of the three 
categories. 
In reporting results, I incorporate both quotations from individual subjects and descriptive 
statistics of aggregate responses to specific questions.  The quotations are the primary focus of 
the analysis, as they provide a more rich understanding of the thought process of district court 
judges in making sentencing decisions.  However, the use of descriptive statistics compliments 
the quotes and allows for facial comparisons of different theories of judicial sentencing behavior.  
Moreover, the use of the statistics alleviates qualitative research concerns of “cherry picked” 
quotes that conform to the researcher’s theoretical perspective (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013).  
Results 
The Subjects 
In total, I conducted nineteen approximately hour-long interviews with subjects. Each 
district yielded at least four subjects and no district yielded more than six subjects.  Some general 
information regarding the subjects is set forth in Table 2 below.  
[Table 2 about here] 
As can be gleaned from Table 2, the pool of subject was extremely experienced.  The 
median subject had twenty four years of experience in federal sentencing practice in the district 
and no subject has less than thirteen years of experience.  In addition to this gross measure of 
experience, qualitatively, all nineteen interview subjects characterized themselves as “very 
familiar” with federal sentencing practice in their district. 
As shown in the second row of Table 2, the interview subjects included six judges or 
former judges and thirteen attorneys.  Also of note there were seven subjects who practiced only 
criminal-defense, two subjects working the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and four “hybrid” attorneys 
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who formerly worked in the U.S. Attorney’s Office but were now private practice defense 
attorneys.  Although unfortunate, this disparity of more defense attorneys was expected as the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office is a hierarchical institution with published policies and opinions with 
respect to federal sentencing (See. e.g. Holder 2010).  Thus, U.S. attorneys and assistant U.S. 
attorneys were expected to be more reticent about expressing personal opinions that may diverge 
from these official positions.
87
  A mitigating factor that helps alleviate any concern of a defense-
biased perspective is the four hybrid subjects who are former Assistant U.S. Attorneys.  Thus, six 
of the thirteen attorney interview subjects at least have some experience prosecuting cases for the 
government.   
Finally, the last two rows of Table 2 illustrate another major caveat to the results of this 
research.  The subject pool is disproportionately white and male.  There are only three females, 
two African Americans, and no Hispanic Americans in the subject pool.  The pool is particularly 
disproportionate as to gender (16% female), when considering the legal profession as a whole.  
Based on the most recently available data, 34% of all lawyers and 33% of federal district court 
judges are female (ABA 2014).  Overall response rates were only slightly lower among women 
(30% vs. 45%), but the real source of the gender disproportionality appears to be in the lack of 
referrals to female subjects through the snowball sampling method (13% of referrals).  This fact 
perhaps underscores concerns that the snowball sampling method leads to overrepresentation of a 
single, interconnected social group (Martin 2013).   
However, the gender disparity in the subject pool might also be partially explained by the 
requirement that subjects have at least ten years of experience in federal sentencing.   Examining, 
                                                 
87
 As set forth below, all results reported herein reflect the personal opinion of the interview subject and the 
interview subject alone.  These opinions do not to reflect the official position or opinion of any other person, office, 
institution, or other entity. 
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past data, the proportion of both practicing female attorneys and female district judges in 2003
88
 
was much greater aligned with the proportion of the females in the subject pool (ABA 2003).  
Regardless of the causes of the disparity, interpretations of these results should bear in mind 
potential biases from a disproportionately white, male perspective.   
Individual Case/Offender Characteristics 
As will be discussed throughout these results, there was very little consensus among the 
interview-subjects as to what factors influence district court judges’ sentencing.  There was 
similarly little consensus as to what accounted for the two “puzzles” of sentencing identified 
previously, namely: the continued increase in below-Guideline sentences after 2005 when the 
Guidelines were declared “advisory (“Puzzle #1”); and interdistrict variation in judicial 
application of the Guidelines (“Puzzle #2”).  Thus, broad agreement amongst the interview 
subjects was the exception, rather than the norm.  However, there were certain aspects of federal 
sentencing policy the vast majority of respondents agreed on and therefore merit some 
discussion.  
First, most respondents cited individual case facts as the most important, or one of the 
most important factors, influencing a judge’s sentencing decision.  Indeed, when asked the 
general question of why judges choose to issue sentences below the Guideline-recommended 
range, 89% of respondents cited factors specific to each individual case.  Examples of these case-
specific facts include the criminal history of the offender, whether violence was involved in the 
offense, and whether the offender had familial responsibilities.   
This finding that individual, case-specific factors are crucial to determining sentencing 
outcomes is not at all surprising and is consistent with past sentencing research (Fischman and 
Schanzenbach 2012; Ulmer, et. al. 2011; Mustard 2001).    I place less emphasis on these 
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individual-case characteristics not because they are unimportant, but because many of these 
factors are incorporated into the framework of the Sentencing Guidelines (e.g. whether violence 
was involved, the criminal history of the offender, the offender’s acceptance of responsibility).  
Thus, unless offender or offense characteristics have changed drastically over time, which does 
not appear to be the case (USSC 1995-2014), these factors are very unlikely to be the cause of 
the increasing trend of more lenient sentences over time (“Puzzle #1”).    
However, some individual case characteristics, particularly offender traits such as the 
race of the offenders, may partially explain interdistrict variation in judges’ sentencing behavior 
(“Puzzle #2).  There is strong evidence African Americans and Hispanic offenders ultimately 
receive harsher sentences than similarly situated White offenders (USSC 2012; Mustard 2001).  
Thus, to the extent district court judges hold these racial and ethnic biases, and levels of bias 
vary throughout the country, it is possible these biases help explain differing sentencing behavior 
among district court judges.  Despite this possibility, recent research has largely rejected this 
theory and found that racial disparities in sentencing outcomes are largely driven by 
prosecutorial behavior rather than district court judge sentencing decisions (Hofer 2013; 
Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012; Rehavi and Starr 2012).   
This finding was supported by the interview subjects.  When asked whether racial biases 
impacted district court judges’ sentencing decisions in the aggregate, 74% disagreed.  A subset 
of the subjects who agreed dipartites existed argued that some district court judges were subject 
to “unconscious biases89” that resulted in fewer below-Guideline sentences for African 
Americans in the aggregate.  However, the subjects
90
 responses in total support recent findings 
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that district court judges’ sentencing decisions are not the cause of the clear racial disparities that 
exist in federal sentencing outcomes (See Hofer 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012; 
Rehavi and Starr 2012; Mustard 2001).   
On the other hand, subjects were much more willing to agree that the gender of the 
offender affected judges’ sentencing decisions.  79% of all respondents and 80% of 
judges/former judges admitted that, in the aggregate, women were more likely to receive a 
below-Guideline departure.
91
  Taken together, the subjects’ responses suggest possibly that 
gender but not race is a component of district court judges sentencing decisions.  Another 
possibility, however, is that subjects responses merely reflect the psychological propensity for 
people to be more willing to accept and admit gender biases as opposed to racial biases (See 
Czopp, et. al. 2003). 
Judicial Discretion 
Moving beyond individual-level factors, another area of consensus amongst subjects was 
their policy agreement with the ruling in the 2005 case of US v. Booker that rendered the 
Guidelines advisory.  All but one subject (94%) expressed agreement with Booker and preferred 
a system of “advisory” Guidelines to “mandatory” Guidelines.  Indeed, only about half of 
subjects supported the existence of the Guidelines at all.   As to the proscribed sentence ranges in 
the Guidelines themselves, one subject summarized the general sentiment of the subjects by 
stating, “as a general rule, the Guidelines are perhaps a little too punitive.”92 While U.S. Attorney 
and judges/former judge subjects were less likely to be critical of the Guidelines than defense 
attorneys, many of them cited certain overly punitive Guidelines as grounds for why they agreed 
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with Booker.    Not a single subject suggested the Guidelines were not punitive enough in 
general.  Nor did any subject give any example or anecdote of a Guideline sentence for a 
particular crime that provided for insufficient penalties.   
These results are important, because they indicate that there is some consensus in the 
legal community that the Guidelines are too punitive.  This is not a surprising finding, and is 
consistent with past surveys of Guideline criticisms in the legal community (Hofer and 
Allenbaugh 2003).  The finding is, however, a necessary condition of the reputational aspect of 
my theoretical perspective, which argues that judges’ reduced adherence to the Guidelines over 
time is partially explained by the legal-community’s growing hostility to harsh, determinant 
sentences.   If we observed substantial disagreement regarding the wisdom of Booker or the 
punitive nature of the Guidelines, it would be more difficult to claim that the legal community 
was influencing judges in a less punitive direction.  The fact that the subjects almost uniformly 
expressed support for discretionary sentencing means that a theory of legal-community influence 
retains plausibility. 
Differences in Judges 
A final point of consensus by the interview subjects was simply that different judges look 
to different factors when making their sentencing decisions.  The most common qualifier 
amongst subjects in their responses to whether certain factors were influential was “for some 
judges.”  In other words, despite question framing using terminology such as “in general” 
subjects were hesitant to lump all judges into one category and stressed the variability of judges.  
One interview subject described judicial individuality by stating each judge has a “sentencing 
persona” that he/she takes on, and the differences in these personas are clearly observable in 
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sentencing outcomes.
93
 This finding of variability amongst district court judges will be discussed 
in greater detail below, but as an initial matter, it clearly calls into question any parsimonious and 
simplistic explanations of how district court judges sentence offenders. 
Local/Contextual Influence 
Before analyzing the subjects responses to specific questions on potential sources of 
influence, it is prudent to get a senses of whether subjects agreed in general that judges could be 
influenced by local contextual factors.  Responses to this general question serve as a test of facial 
validity of my theoretical perspective.  If a strong majority of experienced subjects in federal 
sentencing do not believe that district court judges responded to contextual influences in 
sentencing decisions, it would be difficult to sustain support for the argument that these factors 
are important. 
 Subjects, however, were generally supportive of the notion of local contextual influence 
on sentencing decisions.  15 of 19 subjects (79%) expressed agreement or qualified agreement 
that the local environment impacted district court sentencing decisions.  As will be discussed in 
greater detail below, there was much greater disagreement amongst subjects regarding the 
source(s) or reasons for this contextual influence.  But it is noteworthy that several subjects 
believed that local, contextual factors played at least some role in shaping sentencing outcomes. 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of subject agreement/disagreement with the four 
queried sources of local contextual influence.  As can be gleaned from Table 3, there was little 
agreement among respondents as to whether these individual factors influence sentencing 
decisions.  None of the potential sources of influence was broadly supported by a large majority 
of subjects.  On the other hand, each variable had its fair share of proponents. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
As can also be seen from Table 3, there is fairly little difference in the levels of support 
for each of the factors verified.  Subjects were generally more likely to express unqualified 
agreement that the “reputational” variables of local legal community or public impacted judges 
than the “objective conditions” variables of crime rates and incarceration rates.  But in general, 
each potential source of influence was split fairly evenly between supporters and detractors.  
This leads to the pertinent question of whether it was all the same subjects supporting the 
importance of the various contextual influences.  This was not the case.  In addition to the 
aforementioned result of 79% of subjects supporting the notion of general environmental 
influences, 89% of subjects (17 of 19) agreed that at least one of the above four variables was 
affecting judges.  Thus, while there were two subjects in the sample who denied the impact of 
contextual factors both in general and when asked specifically, a significant majority of 
respondents agreed that at least one these influences had some impact on sentencing decisions.      
a) Local Legal Community Opinion 
As shown by Table 3, subjects disagreed whether judges’ ultimate sentencing decisions 
were impacted by the opinion of the local legal community on sentencing policy.  On the one 
hand, many subjects expressed strong agreement that judges’ in their district were very much in-
tune with the local legal community.  One such subject stated as follows:  
[This district] has one of the most active federal bar organizations in the country.  The 
Federal Bar consistently has the judges participate in events, come to lunches, head 
discussion groups, host book conferences.  [Judges] are very in tune of what is going on 
in the legal community.
94
 
 
Note, however, that the above quote does not specify whether this subject believes being 
“in tune” with the legal community resulted in any change in judges’ criminal sentencing 
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behavior.  When asked this follow up, the subject responded, “I do think judges take into 
consideration what is happening in [our district] when actually imposing sentences. It seeps 
in.”95   
Two other subjects reported that differences in local legal cultures were likely driving 
any interdistrict variation in sentencing outcomes.  One of said subjects argued there were 
“cultures of practice96” related to sentencing within each district’s legal community, and judges 
were a part of these cultures.  The other subject stated that to the extent there remained 
sentencing disparity across district this was probably due to different legal cultures.
97
   
These subjects’ perspectives are supportive of my own theory that as members of a local 
legal community, judges’ criminal sentencing will reflect that community.  They are also 
consistent with the findings of Ulmer (2005) and Lynch and Omori (2014) that different legal 
cultures ultimately lead to different sentencing outcomes in different districts in similar cases.  
However it should be noted, that not all subjects agreed the local legal community affected 
judicial sentencing behavior. 
One subject stated, “I think judges are actually more sensitive to other judges in other 
jurisdictions.  They don’t care what the local Bar thinks.”98  One former district court judge 
acknowledged that judges’ are concerned about their reputation amongst the local legal 
community, but denied that this concern had a tangible impact on their sentencing decisions.
99
  
This former judge argued that judicial reputations in the legal community were linked to 
perceptions of fairness and collegiality rather than the substance of the judges’ decisions.  
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Notably, however, many attorney subjects belied this opinion and made normative judgments on 
the quality of judges in their district based solely on their punitive tendencies in sentencing.
100
 
 Taken together, these results suggest that there is little consensus among actors 
experienced in federal sentencing on the impact of the local legal community on judges’ 
decisions.  Certain subjects explained how legal communities shape judges’ preferences, while 
other subjects were more prone to view judges as uncaring towards local practices and opinions.  
However, the fact remains that there is substantial interdistrict variation in how strictly judges 
are applying the Guidelines (USSC 1995-2014).  This variation is consistent across years and 
cannot merely be the product of random chance (Ulmer 2005).  Thus, to the extent interdistrict 
variation is not explained by differing local legal cultures, it must be explained either by some 
other district-specific factors.  
b) Local Public Opinion     
As shown by Table 3, there was slightly less agreement amongst subjects that sentencing 
behavior was impacted by the public’s opinion on crime and punishment, as opposed to the 
opinion of legal elites.  One subject described the difference in his own district as follows, 
“Judges are less influenced by the culture of the city or state.  They are more influenced by the 
courthouse community.  [This District] is pretty progressive on criminal justice issues, but the 
courthouse community is pretty dogmatic.”101 
 Despite this opinion, one former judge was happy to admit that the public’s view 
impacted his decisions:   
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I agree [that public views regarding crime influence judges].  Judges are part of 
the community.  We hear things and are very sensitive of the public. We read the 
news.  When we feel the public is outraged, we understand that.  At the same 
time, if there is perception that someone has been done an injustice, we are also 
mindful of that.
102
 
 
This statement perhaps reflects the strongest anecdote for how judges’ sentencing 
behavior can be influenced by the public, especially it seems, when the public is paying 
particular attention to crime or a particular offense.   Interestingly, this subject was not alone in 
volunteering the impact media coverage of crime might have on judges.   Another defense 
attorney subject when asked the question on public opinion influence, agreed that it was 
influential and then gave an anecdote of how the judge justified his sentence: 
Yes [the public influences judges’ sentencing], because [judges] live in the 
community, most often.  They read the papers, and they watch the news, and they 
see the pain in the community.  I just did a case that involved a weapon in federal 
court and the judge slammed him.  He went on a little speech and said ‘all you 
have to do is listen to the news or read the paper to know that guns are illness in 
our society, and you have to figure out a way to stop it.’103 
 
While this anecdote may be more indicative of media influence and/or crime rate 
influence on judges than it is demonstrative of direct public influence, it clearly shows how 
judges’ connection to their communities can be important. 
Yet another subject conditioned public influence on judicial sentencing decisions to “high 
publicity cases.”  These responses by the subjects regarding media attention and publicity 
highlight an important issue regarding the mechanism by which the public may influence 
sentencing decisions.  If judges are concerned about their reputation in their community 
regarding sentencing, it is very likely that there sentencing behavior may only be altered or 
adjusted in cases of high media attention.  This theory could be tested in future research by 
                                                 
102
 Interview No. 17, December 18, 2015. 
103
 Interview No. 2, August 19, 2015 
138 
 
examining sentencing decisions by federal district courts in similar cases with varying levels of 
publicity.  
A related issue regarding public influence on the judiciary is the debate between scholars 
like Mishler and Sheehan (1996) and Casillas, et. al. (2011) who argue that the public can 
directly influence the judiciary, and Segal and Spaeth (2002) who instead claim that any public 
influence is likely to be merely “indirect” as judges are members of the public.  As discussed 
above, some subjects supported the notion of indirect influence by describing judges as “people 
too” whose opinions changed with changing conditions. However, it is noteworthy that at least 
the quote of the former judge above seems to acknowledge some degree of direct influence (e.g. 
“we are sensitive to that”).   The debate is difficult to untangle and certainly not the focus of the 
present study.  Yet given recent evidence from Casillas, et. al. (2011), Nicholson-Crotty, et. al 
(2009), it is worth exploring further whether or not the public directly influence district court 
judges’ sentencing.   
Finally, notwithstanding the views of several subjects, it is worth reiterating that a slight 
majority of subjects (10 of 18) did not agree public views impact judges’ sentencing decisions in 
general.  As with many sources of influence examined, the results suggest a lack of consensus 
and also that different judges pay attention to different inputs in their sentencing decisions.  
While some judges surely are concerned with their reputation in both the broader community and 
the legal community, some judges, in the words of one subject, “don’t give a shit104” about what 
anybody else thinks. 
c) Incarceration Rates 
As shown by Table 3, results related to the incarceration rate were mixed.  The relatively 
high number of “qualified agreement” responses for this variable also suggests that many 
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subjects believed the impact of high levels of incarceration on judicial sentencing was 
conditional on other factors.  One such condition might relate to the judges’ ideological 
preferences.  One subject stated,  
It’s becoming more and more obvious we incarcerate more people in this country 
than anywhere in the world, and it’s not accomplishing anything.  But [the effect 
of the incarceration rate on judges] depends on the ideological spectrum.  More 
conservative judges, still think ‘lock em up.’105 
 
On the one hand, this view is consistent with my perspective of increased judicial 
sensitivity to the social problem of incarceration.  However, it is also supportive of the Fischman 
and Schanzenbach (2011) and Epstein, et. al. (2013) perspective that judges’ personal 
partisan/ideological preferences are key to determining district judge sentencing behavior.  
Future examinations of the potential effect incarceration rates have on judges’ sentencing 
behavior should exhibit more closely whether liberal/Democratic judges might be more 
influenced by the incarceration problem than conservative/Republican judges. 
Another interesting aspect of the subjects’ responses to questions regarding incarceration 
was its temporal nature.  Specifically, many subjects described how only recently did they notice 
judges becoming sensitive to the incarceration issue.  One subject stated “more recently, judges 
have become sensitive to [incarceration rates].  Historically, I don’t think they have, though I 
don’t think judges cared about this at all.”106  This sentiment was echoed by another subject 
stating, “A number of judges have been increasingly sensitive to [incarceration rates].  They are 
seeing that locking these people up for a long time is not doing a thing.”107  
The temporal nature of the effect of incarceration is further exemplified by the 
comments of one federal district court judge describing his evolving views on sentencing,  
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The longer I’ve been a judge, the more hostile I am to the system.  My attitude 
towards long sentences has significantly changed over time.  I’m more conscious 
of the lack of social utility of long sentences. If you want to really teach 
[offenders] a lesson, you should do public shaming or lashes.  That has social 
utility….not just sending them to prison and forgetting about them.  There is no 
deterrent effect.
108
 
 
This statement is somewhat striking in that it evidences a federal district judge supporting 
the somewhat arcane form of punishment of public shaming.  But the more relevant point is that 
this judge is suggesting he engaged in some form of policy evaluation that altered his sentencing 
preferences.  This judge’s self-described change was apparently not aberrant.  Another attorney 
interview subject described a judge who had previously been an “unsympathetic former 
prosecutor who put a lot of people in jail for a really long time.”109  However the judge “has now 
seen the drug war is unwinnable” and “has become a much more lenient sentencer.”   
These findings are supportive of my argument that judges’ views of good policy, and thus 
their behavior, can change over time due to changing conditions (See Kritzer 1978).   Based upon 
the above two quotations, both of these district court judges used to believe that long sentences 
were “good policy” but over the course of his years on the bench, they changed courses and 
began to sentence offenders more leniently.   The temporal aspect of the effect may help explain 
why we continue to see lower sentences and more Guideline departures a decade after Booker 
was decided (“Puzzle #1”).   
However, it should not be overlooked that many subjects believed that district court 
judges were not concerned with the broader social problem of incarceration.  One former district 
court judge described the lack of influence of incarceration rates as based on the role of judges, 
“judges have an obligation to impose a sentence within a framework, in which the definition of 
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crime and sentencing range are dictated by the legislative branch of the government.”110 Another 
subject suggested that incarceration rates would likely influence judges in the future if they 
became “part of the conversation” in the legal community, but in his view that had not yet 
occurred in his district.  Other subjects disagreed, and one assistant U.S. attorney subject 
lamented that defense attorneys raise the issue of high incarceration “all the time” at sentencing 
hearings, and that some judges have agreed with these attorneys and have justified lower 
sentences by stating “the jails are overcrowded.”111 
 When viewed together, the mixed and conditional results of the effect of the 
incarceration rate on sentencing behavior, likely reflect differences in judges.  While many 
judges might see incarceration as a social problem they can fix, some judges might restrain 
themselves from exercising this role (Gibson 1978).  Relatedly, some more conservative judges 
may not see incarceration, in and of itself, as a problem at all and might be pre-disposed to agree 
with Guideline sentences (Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).  Still, the responses in total 
suggest that at least some judges under some conditions pay heed to social factors such as 
incarceration when making their sentencing decisions. 
d) Crime Rates 
 The second “objective condition” the subjects were asked about were crime rates.  The 
logic underlying crime rate influence on sentencing behavior is that higher crime will prod 
judges to punish and deter criminal offenders through longer sentences.   There is also some 
evidence for this phenomenon found by Ulmer and Bradley (2006) and Gibson (1980) with 
respect to state-elected judges, in addition to various models presented in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation.   
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 The results from the subjects’ responses on crime rate influence were mixed.   As shown 
in Table 3, the same percentage of respondents (53%) who believed incarceration rates were 
impacting sentencing decisions believed crime rates were impacting sentencing behavior.
112
  One 
notable difference in the responses to the two objective variables is that more subjects were more 
willing to give unqualified support for the notion that crime rates affect sentencing decisions.  
Curiously, however, the relatively unconditional support for the impact of crime rates on 
sentencing decisions manifested itself in several different ways.   
 One U.S. attorney agreed wholeheartedly that high crime rates resulted in harsher 
sentences by judges, and cheerfully attributed this judicial attention to the crime rate as the result 
of the U.S. Attorney’s Office “pushing” the issue of societal crime into the judicial focus.113  One 
defense attorney similarly agreed judges seek to address problems of higher crime through 
longer sentences.  Not surprisingly, however, this defense attorney had a different view on 
whether judges should be doing this.  He stated, “some judges foolishly believe the general 
deterrence argument has some value.”114   
This reference to “general deterrence” is the notion that longer sentences will deter future 
individuals from engaging in similar behavior.  The value of general deterrence is a largely 
empirical question outside the purview of this research.  However, the importance of the concept 
to the present research is that this subject’s comments, implies that some judges do believe in 
general deterrence.
115
  This suggests some judges view sentencing criminals as a task that goes 
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beyond arriving at individually just sentences, and consider their potential ability to control 
future crimes.  
 On the other hand, one unexpected finding from subjects responding to questions on the 
crime rate, was that some subjects expressed opinions that higher crime rates might actually 
influence judges in a less punitive direction.  One district judge acknowledged this possibility 
with the following paraphrased
116
 statement related to drug crime in particular:  
There is so much drug crime, it must have an influence.  But it could work either 
way. One way of looking at it would be judges in high crime areas don’t see the 
point of incarcerating harshly, because the drug war is unwinnable.  But another 
way of looking at it is judges in these areas might sentence criminals more 
harshly, because drugs are driving out business, and they want to punish and deter 
perpetrators.
117
 
 
 Thus, this district judge suggested that high crime might pull judges in opposite 
directions.  This subject was not alone in proposing this alternative theory of higher crime 
being associated with more lenient sentences.  Indeed, two other subjects went further 
and argued more forcefully that judges living in low-crime rural areas were less familiar 
with serious crime, and thus were more prone to treat offenders as deviants and punish 
them harshly.
118
  Notably, while these alternative theories for crime rate influence differ 
from my expectation, they are consistent with my broader theoretical perspective of 
contextual influence.  In other words, many subjects agreed that the crime conditions in 
judges’ communities will shape their sentencing behavior.     
In summary, the crime-rate results were the very definition of mixed.  While a majority 
of subjects agreed the crime rates were influential on sentences in some circumstances, a 
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substantial minority of subjects saw no impact.  Moreover, those who did see an influence of the 
crime rate disagreed about the direction of the effect.   
Alternative Theoretical Perspectives 
a) Partisan/Ideological Factors 
In addition to probing potential exogenous contextual influences on district court 
sentencing decisions, I also asked subjects regarding alternative sources of influence.  One such 
alternative theoretical perspective is that judges’ personal partisanship or ideology affects 
whether they tend to issue relatively more or less punitive sentences. (Epstein, et. al. 2013; 
Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012).  However, the pool of subjects generally disagreed that 
district court judges’ personal partisan or ideological preferences impacted their sentencing.  
More precisely, the percentages of subjects who agreed
119
 district court judges’ party or ideology 
influenced their sentences were only 26% and 37% respectively.  
In their responses to these questions, many subjects volunteered specific examples.  One 
defense attorney stated, “probably the judge you want the most in my district is a Republican 
appointee.”120   Another district court judge subject stated “political philosophy doesn’t always 
translate to criminal sentencing” and explained that fiscal conservatives are now probably less 
supportive of longer sentences.
121
  Similarly, other subjects described personal partisan or 
ideological factors as “not accounting for a whole lot” of why judges approach sentencing 
differently.
122
 
Indeed, somewhat surprisingly, a lower proportion of subjects expressed general 
agreement that either judges’ individual partisanship or ideology impacted sentencing outcomes 
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than any of the four exogenous factors discussed above.  Given the legal community’s reluctance 
to admit the impact of partisan/ideological factors on outcomes even in the face of clear evidence 
to the contrary (See e.g. Spaeth and Segal 1999), perhaps we should view subjects’ general lack 
of agreement on the impact of partisan or ideologically factors with some skepticism.  However, 
given the relative lack of attention paid to contextual factors in past research, it is still an 
important finding that subjects found partisan/ideological factors to be relatively less important.   
b) Prosecutorial/Systemic Factors 
On the other hand, consistent with recent studies (Lynch and Omori 2015; Ulmer 2005), 
several subjects volunteered that the prosecutorial practices of district U.S. Attorney’s Offices 
could ultimately impact sentences.  When subjects were asked to elaborate on this point, many 
cited the obvious fact that if the offender was convicted of an offense with the mandatory 
minimum, then district court judges were unable to unilaterally
123
 sentence the offender to a 
lower sentence.   When questioned further regarding cases where judges do have discretion to 
implement below-Guideline sentences, many subjects still believed that the prosecution’s 
practices could impact judges. 
One defense attorney discussed how defense attorneys were merely “reactors” to U.S. 
attorneys.
124
  In other words, the parameters of a potential sentence are initially defined by the 
U.S. attorney’s argument for why a Guideline sentence is appropriate.  Thus, the likelihood of 
judges granting a below-Guideline sentence was greatly dependent on whether and how 
vigorously U.S. Attorneys initially sought Guideline sentences, even in non-mandatory minimum 
cases.     
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This finding of the importance of  prosecutorial practices is consistent with previous 
findings that individual districts have varying prosecutorial practices which impact sentencing 
practice and help explain interdistrict variation in outcomes (Lynch and Omori 2014; Wu and 
Spohn 2010; Ulmer 2005).  The finding also serves as a reminder of the constrained power of 
district court judges within the federal sentencing system.  While ultimate sentencing decisions 
often do rest with district court judges, these judges still must operate within sentencing 
institutions and are not free to simply impose their preferred sentences.   
c) Increased Hostility towards Guideline Sentences: Judicial Habit 
Regardless of any district-specific prosecutorial practices, the puzzle of ever-decreasing 
Guideline adherence and shorter sentences since Booker (“Puzzle #1) suggests that there has 
been a more national revolt by district court judges against relatively punitive, Guideline-range 
sentences.   Existing explanations for this phenomenon were simply that district court judges 
were “getting used” to the authority granted to them under Booker (Epstein, et. al. 2013).  Under 
this theory, even after Booker, district  judges were simply accustomed to granting Guideline 
sentences and continued to do so in the years following Booker.  As judges began realizing their 
sentences would not be overturned on appeal from 2006-2015, they gradually imposed more 
below-Guideline sentences. 
As noted above, I was initially skeptical that district court judges would take such a long 
time to react to the Booker decision. The alternative explanation I posited and inquired to 
subjects was that district court judges became increasingly aware of the high costs of 
incarceration and were responding to the failure of the policy of longer Guideline sentences.  
Indeed, as discussed in detail above, many subjects expressed support for this explanation and 
argued that judges were becoming more and more acceptant of the argument that long sentences 
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for certain offenses were unjust and that many were willing to use their power to correct this 
inequity.   
However, and contrary to my own expectations, many subjects also expressed support for 
the predominant “habit” theory.  One subject described the post-Booker landscape as follows:  
Booker began the revolution, but it took a little while for it to kick in.  Humans 
are creatures of habit. It’s also very judge dependent.  Judges have different 
attitudes about sentencing.  Some see it as part of their job to use their discretion.  
Others are more rule-bound and creatures of habit.
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Another subject described the lack of an immediate surge in below-Guideline sentences 
after Booker as follows:  
Booker was significant.  It would be wrong to underestimate Booker.  But judges 
felt more constrained right after Booker. As they became more experienced and 
other cases came down, the judges recognized their own authority.
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Thus, contrary to my expectations, many subjects with years of sentencing experience 
agreed that the incremental increase in proportions of below Guideline sentences was due to a 
gradual recognition by judges that they had the power to issue these types of sentences.  Still, I 
argue this finding should be read in tandem, rather than in opposition, with many subjects’ 
acknowledgment of judicial awareness to the incarceration problem and legal elites’ hostility 
towards Guideline sentences.  The two perspectives are not mutually exclusive and expanded 
inquiries into their relative explanatory weight, perhaps through a comparison of judges 
appointed pre-Booker and post-Booker, would advance understandings of why and how judges 
adapt to dramatic changes in legal policy. 
 
 
                                                 
125
 Interview No. 5. September 21, 2015. 
126
 Interview No. 9, November 6, 2015. 
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Discussion 
This study, while initial and exploratory, adds insight into how federal district court 
judges render criminal sentencing decisions.  The opinions of extremely experienced actors in 
federal sentencing presented in this research, demonstrate the strengths and shortcomings of both 
my own argument of local exogenous influence and alternative perspectives.   In sum, there are 
several general propositions that can be derived from the results of the interviews. 
First, there is strong evidence that some judges are sensitive to certain exogenous local 
contextual factors.  Four factors were studied as part of this research: local legal community 
opinion, public opinion, the incarceration rate, and the crime rate.  The results as to all four 
factors were clearly mixed.  For each of the variables studied, more than one-third of subjects but 
less than two-thirds of subjects agreed that the factor affects district judges’ sentencing.  
However, and importantly, only two of the nineteen interview subjects believed that these 
contextual factors were all generally unimportant to judges’ ultimate sentencing decisions.  
This general finding is important, as it supports the notion that where/when judges make 
decisions affects those judges’ decisions.  While this general point might seem uncontroversial, 
the specific sources of contextual influence on sentencing have been understudied in past federal 
criminal sentencing research.  There is no doubt however, based on the responses of some former 
and current district court judges themselves, that certain judges take these matters into account 
when sentencing individual offenders.  This important finding is consistent with Ulmer (2005) 
and Lynch and Omori (2014) suggesting that district court judges, while operating in a national 
level system, cannot be compelled into behaving similarly by legal changes at the national level.   
Not to overstate the results, the subjects’ general acknowledgement of the importance of 
contextual factors, but their lack of consensus on the importance of each individual factor 
149 
 
suggests that more empirical testing is needed regarding contextual influence. As discussed in 
the Results sections, it is quite possible that some inputs, such as the crime rate and public 
opinion, are conditional or contingent on other factors, such as media attention.  Future studies 
could address many of these possible conditions to help determine when contextual factors are 
likely to be most important.   
The lack of consensus among interview subjects on specific sources of influence is likely 
also the product of the second important conclusion of this study: differences in judges.  Nearly 
all of the subjects went out of their way to emphasize how much variation there was in how 
district judges approached sentencing, even within the same district.  In the words of one subject, 
“every judge is a unique individual.  Their personal attitudes will always inform their sentencing 
decisions.”127 
When probed on the potential sources of these differences in judges, subjects were 
hesitant to give simple and specific answers (e.g. partisanship, ideology, sensitivity to the 
community) and often relied on generalizations such as different “world-view.”128 When pressed 
further on these differences, several subjects cited many different variables including, 
upbringing, education, and prior profession.  In describing why contextual factors may influence 
some judges but not others, some subjects suggested that its impact depended on whether judges 
saw their judicial role as limited to applying the legal framework to the facts or each case or as 
active participants in public policy.   
The upshot of these varied responses is that students of judicial behavior must pay more 
attention to variation amongst judges.  While it is certainly valuable to make parsimonious 
generalizations about judicial behavior, much individual judicial behavior can be missed.  Stated 
                                                 
127
 Interview No. 9, November 6, 2015. 
128
 Interview No. 15, December 21, 2015. 
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differently, how judges behave depends on what they care about, and there is no doubt that 
different judges care about different things (See Baum 2006). Future studies of sentencing 
behavior and judicial behavior more generally should use more mixed-method and direct 
observational studies to better understand differences that exist amongst district court judges. 
This latest point on judicial variation relates to the third important takeaway from this 
study: the potentially overrated impact of judicial partisanship on sentencing decisions.  Subjects 
were generally hostile to the notion that partisanship explained district court judges’ sentencing 
behavior.  This finding highlights the limitations of more simplistic models of district court 
sentencing behavior, based largely on partisanship (See e.g. Epstein, et. al., 2013).   
This is not to suggest that judges appointed by Democratic Presidents sentence identically 
to judges appointed by Republican Presidents on average.  Past findings suggest that, although 
the effects are small, Democratic judges are more likely to grant Guideline departures (Epstein, 
et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).  Still, the findings of this study suggest that 
partisanship and ideology are not always strong predictors of a judges’ sentencing preference.  
The potential lack of import of district court judges’ personal partisanship/ideology on 
sentencing behavior has major implications for judicial behavior and sentencing policy.  First, it 
might be that consistent with Zorn & Bowie (2010) and Ashenfelter, et. al. (1999), but 
inconsistent with Rowland, et. al. (1996) and Sisk and Heise (2012) personal policy preferences 
are not all that important in explaining district court decisions. If this is the case, dominant 
theories of appellant judicial behavior, such as the attitudinal model (Segal and Spaeth 2002) 
would be in need of serious modification when applied to trial judges.  On the other hand, 
another interpretation of limited partisan/ideological influence in sentencing is simply that 
criminal justice policy is becoming a bipartisan issue that mitigates partisan/ideological 
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differences between judges (See Zlotnick 2009).  Indeed, as discussed above, many subjects were 
sympathetic to this view.  More global studies of district court behavior across different policy 
areas could potentially test the relevant weight of these explanations.    
The final point worthy of discussion relates to the extent the results improve upon past 
studies of federal sentencing. Specifically, to what extent do the results shed light on the two 
“puzzles” identified at the outset of this research: 1) the gradual and continued increase in below-
Guideline sentences after 2005; and 2) inter-district variation in sentencing outcomes?  The 
answer to this question demonstrates both the strengths and limitations of the results.   
As to the gradual increase in the proportion of below-Guideline sentences, the results 
both provide support for “habitual” explanations and for the alternative theory of judicial policy 
evaluation.   In other words, it remains an open question whether district court judges are still 
simply “getting used” to their authority to sentence as they please as opposed to them actually 
altering their sentencing preferences as they observe the problems associated with long 
sentences.   As discussed previously, results from the interviews suggest that both theories have 
some merit.   
Even if not solely resolving the puzzle, the finding that at least some judges are softening 
policy preferences in the face of evidence of the incarceration problem is important.  This 
conclusion implies that district judges have some power to rationally change policy, even in the 
absence of explicit policymaking power.  Whether this power for district judges is interpreted as 
a normatively positive development probably depends on one’s view of the ideal role of the 
judiciary.  Yet strictly from an institutional standpoint, evidence of some policy evaluation and 
adaptation by district court judges is independently intriguing. 
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As to Puzzle #2, the results were less successful in explaining why sentencing differences 
in districts persist.  In general, many subjects agreed that local cultural effects explained district 
differences.  However, in general, it was difficult to detect any patterns of responses or clear 
differences between subjects in one district vs. subjects in other districts.  Part of the difficulty 
was the small number of subjects within each district, making it difficult to generalize on district 
differences.  Another difficulty was the fact that many subjects had themselves only practiced it 
their home district, which prohibited them from opining on how their district was (or was not) 
different.   
These limitations of the study should not undermine its contributions.   The subject 
interviews provide strong evidence that some judges in certain situations are sensitive to local 
contextual matters when making sentencing decisions.  This conclusion, while certainly 
conditional and not entirely satisfying, is nevertheless extremely important.  Federal district court 
judges, even if unelected, remain members of local communities.  A subset of district court 
judges clearly care both about both their local reputations and the consequences of the policies in 
these local communities.  So long as these judges exist, district court behavior is unlikely to be 
fully explained by either partisan/ideological factors or by top-down legal rules. 
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Table 1: District Traits 
District Trait Traits of at Least one 
Selected District 
Traits not Represented by 
Selected Districts 
Region -Mid-Atlantic 
-Southern 
-Midwestern 
- Northeastern  
- Western 
Population -large (> 5 million residents)  
-medium (>2 million but < 5 million 
residents) 
-small (<2 million residents) 
Urban/Rural -majority urban 
-majority rural 
n/a 
Partisan Composition of 
Judges Last Decade 
-majority Republican  
-majority Democrat 
n/a 
Racial/Ethnic 
Demographics of Districts 
-10-20% African American 
population 
-greater than 20% African American 
population  
-10-20% Hispanic population 
-less than 10% Hispanic population 
-less than 10% African 
American population 
-greater than 20% Hispanic 
population 
 
Political Ideology of 
Citizens in Districts 
-conservative 
-liberal 
n/a 
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Table 2: Aggregate Subject Characteristics 
Experience Median Subject Experience: 24 years 
Minimum Subject Experience: 13 years 
Maximum Subject Experience: 43 years 
Total Years Experience: 460 years 
Profession 4 former federal district court judges; 
2 federal district court judges; 
3 federal public defenders; 
4 private practice criminal defense attorneys; 
2 assistant U.S. Attorneys; 
4 “hybrid” former U.S. Attorneys current 
private practice criminal defense attorneys. 
Gender 16 Males 
3 Females 
Race/Ethnicity 17 White 
2 African Americans 
0 Hispanics 
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Table 3: Percentages of Subjects Agreeing that Contextual Variables Impact 
Federal District Court Judges Sentencing Decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
129
 Due to time constraints, one interview subject was unable to answer questions regarding local public opinion. 
 
130
 Due to time constraints, two interview subjects were unable to answer questions regarding the incarceration rates. 
  
131
 One interview subject insisted that while the actual crime rates were probably not important, judges’ “perceptions 
of the crime rate” were influential.  This subject was coded as “Qualified Agreement” as it is consistent with the 
theory that judges are sensitive to local criminal issues, even if that concern is based on perception, rather than 
reality.   
Contextual Source of 
Influence 
Unqualified 
Agreement 
Qualified 
Agreement 
Total Agreement 
Local Legal Community 
Opinion 
37% 26% 63% 
Local Public Opinion129 
 
33% 11% 44% 
Incarceration Rates130 
 
12% 41% 53% 
Crime Rates131 
 
21% 32% 53% 
161 
 
 
Appendix A: Question Bank 
 
Thank you for taking the time to speak with me today and answer some questions.  
The interview should take 45 minutes to 1 Hour.  Please remember that your 
participation in this research is entirely voluntary and you can cease your 
participation at any time.  Please also feel free to add any thoughts and/or 
impressions you may have. 
 
First, I have some general questions about you and your experience in [Name of 
Federal District Court] 
 
1) Please state your name, job title, business address, and business telephone 
number. 
 
2) What is your experience in criminal law in [Name of Federal District Court]? 
 
3) What job titles or positions have you held that give you this experience, and 
what years were you in each position? 
 
4)  How familiar are you with general federal sentencing practice in [Name of 
Federal District Court]? 
 
5)  How familiar are you with the application of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines in [Name of Federal District Court]? 
 
6) Which judges, if any, in [Name of Federal District Court] do you have experience 
appearing in front of, and/or working with? 
 
Now I have some general questions regarding your opinion of sentencing practice in 
[Name of Federal District Court] 
 
7) What is your overall opinion of sentencing practice in [Name of Federal District 
Court]? 
 
8) What is your overall opinion of the US Sentencing Guidelines [Name of Federal 
District Court]? 
 
9) What would you say are the strengths of the US Sentencing Guidelines and their 
application? 
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10) What would you are the weaknesses of the US Sentencing Guidelines and their 
application? 
 
11) In general, would you say criminals are treated fairly or unfairly under the US 
Sentencing Guidelines in [Name of Federal District Court]?  Please explain. 
 
12) In general, would you say that federal district court judges have too much 
discretion, not enough discretion, or about the right amount of discretion in 
making sentencing decisions? 
 
13) How familiar are you with the procedure of “departures” from the US 
Sentencing Guidelines? 
 
14) Based on your experience in [Name of Federal District Court], do you generally 
think there should be more departures form the Guidelines, less departures form 
the Guidelines, or about right? 
 
15) In your opinion, why do you think a given judge in [Name of Federal District 
Court]  may depart from the Guidelines in the case of some offenders, but not 
other offenders? 
 
16) What are some reasons you believe that some judges in [Name of Federal District 
Court]   might grant departures from the Guidelines more often than other 
judges? 
 
Now I’m going to list some possible explanations for why a judge may depart from 
the Guidelines.  For each, please tell me whether or not you believe the potential 
explanations to be valid, and if so to what extent. 
 
17) Generally speaking, do you believe the race of the offender affects departure 
decisions?  If so, in what way? 
 
18) Generally speaking, do you believe the gender of the offender affects departure 
decisions?  If so, in what way? 
 
19) Generally speaking, do you believe the race of the sentencing judge affects 
departure decisions?  If so, in what way? 
 
20) Generally speaking, do you believe the gender of the sentencing judge affects 
departure decisions?  If so, in what way? 
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21) Generally speaking, do you believe the opinions or preferences of the local  legal 
community impact district court judges in their departure decisions?  If so, in 
what way? 
 
22) Generally speaking, do you believe the opinions or preferences of the general 
public impact district court judges in their departure  decisions? If so, in what 
way? 
   
23) Generally speaking, do you believe the type of crime the offender committed 
(drug trafficking, firearms, etc.) affects departure decisions?  If so, in what way? 
 
24) Generally speaking, do you believe that whether the conviction is reached by 
plea agreement or jury conviction affects departure decisions?  If so, in what 
way? 
 
25) Generally speaking, do you believe the U.S. Attorney’s Office prevalence of 
charging crimes that carry mandatory minimum sentences affects departure 
decisions?  If so in what ways? 
 
26) Generally speaking, do you believe the U.S. Attorney’s Office prevalence of 
using “substantial assistance” departures, or other government-sponsored 
departures affects departure decisions?  If so in what ways? 
 
27) Generally speaking, do you believe the political party of the sentencing judge 
(based upon the political party of the appointing US President) affects departure 
decisions?  If so, in what way? 
 
28) Generally speaking, do you believe the personal ideology of the sentencing judge 
(based upon the political party of the appointing US President) affects departure 
decisions?  If so, in what way? 
 
29) Generally speaking, do you believe the political ideology of the local area affect 
departure decisions?  If so, in what way? 
 
30) Generally speaking, do you believe the prevalence of crime, or the crime rate in 
the local area affect departure decisions?  If so, in what way? 
 
31)  Generally speaking, do you believe the incarceration rate in the local area affect 
departure decisions?  If so, in what way? 
 
32) Is there anything I haven’t mentioned that you believe impacts departure 
decisions?   
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Now I have some specific questions regarding your opinion of sentencing practice in 
[Name of Federal District Court] 
 
33) Do you believe [Name of Federal District Court]?  is more punitive or less 
punitive than average? 
 
34) Why would you suspect this is the case? 
 
Now I’m going to ask you some questions regarding how you think sentencing 
practice has changed in [Name of Federal District Court] sine your experience began. 
 
35)  From a general perspective, how has life in the areas of jurisdiction of the [Name 
of Federal District Court] changed since your experience began? 
 
36) Do you think these general changes have affected sentencing practice in [Name 
of Federal District Court]?  If so, in what way? 
 
37) In your opinion, how, if at all, did the 2005 US Supreme Court case of US v. 
Booker alter sentencing practice in your district? 
 
38)  Do you agree with the portion of US v. Booker that holds that the US Sentencing 
Guidelines cannot be mandatory on sentencing judges? 
 
Finally, I’m going to conclude by asking you some general questions?  
 
39) Is there anything you would like to add that we have not covered that you think 
is particularly relevant to this subject-matter? 
 
40) Is there any other person with experience in [Name of Federal District Court] 
that you believe could answer some of these questions or otherwise be beneficial 
to this research effort? 
 
Thank you for your time.  I truly appreciate your participation in this research. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
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The major argument I advance in this dissertation is that the criminal sentencing 
decisions of federal district court judges are dynamic and complex.  These decisions cannot be 
fully explained by district judges’ individual partisan preferences.  Nor can different eras of 
judicial discretion (e.g. pre-Booker or post-Booker) account for certain peculiarities in federal 
sentencing policy, such as differences in districts or the continued increase in below-Guideline 
sentences post-Booker.   
Instead, I theorized in Chapter 1 that district judges’ decisions are likely impacted by 
certain contextual conditions that exist in their community.  In particular, I argued the punitive 
preferences of both the local legal community and the general public would likely impact judges’ 
sentencing decisions.   In addition, I argued that pertinent objective conditions, such as crime 
rates and incarceration rates, had the potential to alter district judges’ sentencing preferences and 
thus influence outcomes.   
 In this Conclusion, I assess the degree to which the findings of each empirical chapter 
support this argument.  First, I discuss the results for each of the four specific variables as well as 
contextual determinants generally.  Next, I relate the findings back to the societal problem of 
incarceration and discuss some important implications for understanding the role of the judiciary 
in addressing policy problems.  Finally, I discuss potential avenues for future research, both in 
federal sentencing policy and in other policy areas.  
Do Contextual Factors Matter? 
The theoretical basis for why district judges might be sensitive to certain conditions in 
their communities when making sentencing decisions is discussed at length in Chapter 1 and 
throughout this dissertation.  In brief, I argue that federal district court judges are, to some extent, 
products of their environment.  They live and work within particular geographic districts, and 
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like all individuals, district judges are to some degree shaped by these places. While district 
judges certainly have personal views and personal preferences that impact their decisions, these 
personal views cannot be divorced from “the sociological impact of the community” (Rowland 
and Carp 1996, 74).  
I argue this “sociological impact” of the community is extremely important when 
studying district judges’ criminal sentencing decisions.  While district judges’ sentences are 
primarily guided by the circumstances of individual offenders, the evidence in the aggregate data 
clearly shows that similarly situated offenders are sentenced differently both across the country 
and over time (USSC 1995-2014; Lynch and Omori 2014; Tiede 2009).   Contextual influences 
largely explain why we see fewer district judges grant below-Guideline sentences in Southern 
Georgia than in Western Washington (USSC 1995-2014).  They also partially illustrate why we 
observe the continued increase in below-Guideline sentences since they were first implemented 
in 1987.   
In operationalizing my theory of contextual influence, I attempt to move beyond abstract 
and general concepts of “culture” or “sociological impact” and empirically test specific 
variables.  In particular, using a variety of different models and methods throughout the 
dissertation, I tested whether:  a) public opinion, b) legal community opinion, c) incarceration 
rates, and d) crime rates affect the likelihood that district judges will issue below-Guideline 
sentences.  A summary of the results for each potential determinant is provided below. 
Public Opinion 
The theory that public preferences impact unelected district judges’ decisions is premised 
on the idea that many judges’ are concerned about their reputation, despite being unelected.  This 
concern about reputation may be instrumental.  District judges who seek to be promoted to 
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higher courts must be approved by elected policymakers
132
 accountable to the public.  Thus, it 
would make little sense for these ambitious judges to engender a poor reputation with the public.  
However, many judges might consider a strong reputation with the public as a goal in and of 
itself (Baum 2006; Miceli and Cosgell 1994).  District judges are almost always long-time 
residents of their particular district (Rowland and Carp 1996).  It would be somewhat curious if 
they were completely unconcerned with their public standing in a place they lived and worked 
for a good part of their lives. 
This connection between public opinion and district judge criminal sentencing was 
studied fairly extensively in past decades (Silver and Shapiro 1984; Kritzer 1978; Cook 1977, 
1971).   However, more recent federal sentencing studies have not assessed the degree to which 
district judges’ post-Guideline sentences are consistent with the “representational model” of 
judicial behavior.  The results from this dissertation provide some conditional evidence of a 
relationship between public opinion and district judges’ criminal sentencing behavior.   
The findings of the panel models in Chapter 3 suggest that judges from districts with 
relatively liberal populaces are more likely to issue below-Guideline sentences than judges from 
districts with relatively conservative populaces.  The findings held both in random and fixed-
effect models
133
, suggesting that, even within districts, changes in the ideology of the local 
population over time were reflected in the sentences issued by district judges.  It is an open 
question whether this observed relationship evidences direct public influence on judges or 
whether it simply indicates that, as members of the public, judges’ preferences move in-step with 
public opinion (See Casillas, et. al. 2011; Segal and Spaeth 2002; Mishler and Sheehan 1996).  
                                                 
132
 U.S. Senators from district judges’ home state are particularly important elected figures whom district judges 
likely need the approval of in order to achieve promotion (Morriss, et. al. 2005).  
  
133
 Although the magnitude of the effects was smaller in fixed-effect models. 
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Nonetheless, the result is broadly supportive of the “representational model” of judicial behavior, 
holding  that judges’ decisions will reflect the preferences of the public (Cook 1977).  
In addition to the quantitative results, results from the phone interviews conducted in 
Chapter 4 provided conditional support for representational behavior by district judges.  A 
significant subset of both attorneys and former district judges stated that judges were sensitive to 
public concerns about crime and punishment.  Many of these subjects also noted that public 
opinion was more likely to play a role in sentencing outcomes in cases with high levels of media 
attention.   This emphasis on media attention is consistent with a “reputational” theory of district 
judge decision making.  If unelected federal district court judges derive utility from having a 
good reputation amongst the public (See Miceli and Cosgel 1994; Posner 1993), it makes a great 
deal of sense that they would be most likely to be influenced by public sentiment in criminal 
cases when they knew the public was paying attention to the outcome (i.e. high-publicity cases).    
Other dissertation results were less supportive of the connection between public 
preferences and sentencing outcomes.  For instance, the national-level analysis conducted in 
Chapter 2 failed to establish a relationship between the country’s general punitive preferences 
and district judges’ sentencing behavior.  One potential interpretation of the seemingly 
inconsistent results regarding pubic influence is that district judges are responsive to the 
preferences of the public within their own geographic jurisdiction, but not to the general public 
throughout the country.  This interpretation is consistent with conceptions of district judges as 
representatives of local areas, rather than as agents of a national legal system (Ulmer 2005; 
Rowland and Carp 1996; Peltason 1971; Vines 1964).  Moreover, this interpretation is generally 
supportive of the above-discussed “reputational” theory of why judges might respond to public 
preferences.  Since few district judges are known by the public outside their district (Goulden 
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1974), it makes a good deal of sense that any public influence on district judges’ sentencing 
decisions would be local rather than national. 
Legal Community Opinion 
The effect that the preferences of the local legal community have on district judges’ 
criminal sentencing was also examined in this dissertation, albeit only in Chapter 4.   The logic 
underlying local legal community influence is also based on district judges’ desire to foster a 
strong reputation.  District judges often have a close working relationship with the attorneys who 
practice in their courts (Nardulli, et. al. 1988).  Like all individuals, judges desire the respect and 
esteem of the people with whom they work (Schauer 2000).  Given the large proportion of 
attorneys who view the Guidelines as overly punitive (Hofer and Allenbaugh 2003), it is 
reasonable to query whether district judges would be influenced by attorney sentiment in their 
sentencing decisions in order to foster a better reputation.  
The results from Chapter 4 lend qualified support to the argument that some district 
judges are influenced by local legal community views regarding criminal sentencing.  Consistent 
with the findings of Ulmer (2005) and Kautt (2002), several subjects interviewed in Chapter 4 
cited local legal community practices as a likely cause of different Guideline departure rates 
between districts.  In addition, one subject noted that district judges’ attendance at out-of-court 
functions (e.g. bar lunches) that involved sentencing matters ultimately ended up affecting 
district judges’ sentencing decisions.  Finally, other subjects stated that district judges’ individual 
reputations in the legal community were tied to whether judges were relatively punitive in their 
sentencing.  Thus, there is some qualitative support for the argument that judges’ sentencing 
decisions are impacted by local legal communities.  
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Still, all the evidence did not point in this direction.  Several subjects questioned whether 
district judges were influenced by local legal community views.  Some of these subjects 
suggested that judges didn’t really care about their reputations among attorneys when making 
decisions.  Other subjects suggested that, while district judges care about their reputation in the 
legal community, they don’t let this concern affect their substantive decision-making. 
The mixed results from Chapter 4 suggest that while some district judges can be impacted 
by the policy preferences of legal communities, other judges are disinclined to pay heed to this 
group.  To more precisely understand how many district judges are influenced by local legal 
communities and to what degree, there is a need for an expansion of the interview-based research 
design in Chapter 4 to include more subjects.  In addition, there is a need for better quantitative 
measures of local legal community preferences.  This could potentially be achieved in future 
research by sending questionnaire/surveys to attorneys’ with sentencing experience in various 
federal districts.   
Incarceration Rates 
In addition to testing whether district judges’ sentences are influenced by the opinions of 
certain constituencies, this research also probed whether certain objective conditions could 
impact district judges’ sentences.  Social scientists have previously analyzed whether certain 
policymakers’ positions could be impacted by changing facts (Jones & Baumgartner 2005; 
Cohen 1999).  Yet there is little to no research on whether objective facts could also influence 
judges’ policy preferences.   Instead, “policy preferences” in the judicial behavior literature is 
generally treated as conceptually identical to “ideology” (Segal and Spaeth 2002; Epstein & 
Knight 1998).  Yet ideology is not static, and there is recent evidence that even conservatives 
have become increasingly hostile to the notion of long sentences for federal criminal offenders 
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(Act, et. al. 2015).  Accordingly, it is very plausible that changing objective facts related to crime 
and punishment are a partial cause of district judges’ reduced adherence to Guideline sentences 
in recent years.  
The federal incarceration rate is one such objective factor that potentially impacts district 
judges’ sentencing decisions.  This rate has exploded since the Guidelines were adopted (U.S. 
DOJ 2015).  Somewhat ironically, however, the explosion largely coincided with a marked 
increase in the proportion of federal offenders’ receiving below-Guideline sentences (USSC 
1995-2014).
134
  I argue that the former trend partially caused the latter.  As many district judges 
observed the damaging societal effects of mass incarceration, they adjusted their sentencing 
preferences in a less punitive direction.   
Results from the dissertation suggest many district judges have become attentive to the 
incarceration problem.  The time series results of Chapter 2 evidenced a relationship between 
higher federal incarceration rates and a higher proportion of downward departures.  The 
relationship was observed in models of both total downward departures, and models of 
departures excluding substantial assistance cases.
135
   
Due to the lack of regional variability in the federal incarceration measure, the variable 
was not tested in the panel designs of Chapter 3.  However, the qualitative results in Chapter 4 
provided further evidence that many district judges have altered their sentencing behavior in the 
face of climbing incarceration.  Several subjects, including some current and former district 
                                                 
134
 This apparent irony is largely explained by increases in the criminal case-loads for federal courts, the growth in 
cases with mandatory minimum sentences, and more aggressive law enforcement practices by the federal 
government (USSC 2012).  There is also a “lag-time” effect as shorter sentences in a given year will take some time 
to be reflected in overall incarceration rate statistics.  Still, it appears the increase in below-Guideline sentences is 
finally having some effect on the objective data, as the federal incarceration rate began declining in 2012 (U.S. DOJ 
2015). 
 
135
 Recall that in these models, a certain subset of government sponsored below-Guideline sentences were excluded.     
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judges, cited anecdotes of judges justifying below-Guideline sentences by citing the problem of 
over-incarceration. 
As with other determinants studied, the degree to which the incarceration rate is 
influential is not perfectly clear.  Objective incarceration statistics are doubtless intertwined with 
public and elite evaluations of the incarceration problem, which could also impact judges.  
Furthermore, as set forth in more detail in Chapter 4, district judges’ sensitivity to the 
incarceration problem may be related to their personal political ideology or to their individual 
conceptual framework for judges’ policymaking roles.  Still, the findings regarding the impact of 
incarceration levels on district judges’ sentencing preferences is perhaps one of the more 
important and timely of the dissertation.  It suggests many district judges play an active role in 
addressing policy problems, even when legal standards remain static.   
Crime Rates 
Finally, the dissertation sought to examine any connection between crime rates and 
district judges’ punitive sentencing habits.  There are several reasons district judges would likely 
be aware of crime rates.  First, they are residents of the community and may have direct 
experience with crime.  Second, judges are well-educated and ambitious individuals who are 
very likely closely follow local media reports about crime.   Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, they are professionally exposed to the problem of crime through their role as judges 
in federal criminal cases.   
Assuming judicial awareness of crime levels, the basis for why these levels would impact 
district judges’ sentencing preferences bears similarities to the aforementioned argument for the 
effect of incarceration rates on judicial sentencing behavior.   Essentially, I argue that judges are 
not solely driven by ideological or reputational concerns but are also individuals who seek to 
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attain the “best” consequences with their decisions (Posner 2009).  Since both punishment and 
general deterrence are stated goals of federal sentencing
136, it’s likely that district judges’ 
conceptions of “appropriate sentences” are shaped by their evaluation of the crime problem in 
their community.  Thus, the larger this problem (the higher the crime rate), the more likely 
judges will seek to punish criminals and deter future criminals by issuing more punitive 
sentences (See Ulmer and Bradley 2006; Gibson 1980). 
Evidence from the dissertation regarding the crime rate’s effect on district judges was 
mixed.  The national-level model in Chapter 2 failed to show any significant relationship 
between crime rates and punitive sentences.  On the other hand, the panel design of Chapter 3 
provided fairly strong evidence that district judges in higher crime areas issued more punitive 
sentences.  Evidence from interviews conducted in Chapter 4 was ambiguous.  Several subjects 
agreed that district judges in high-crime areas are more likely to embrace deterrence.  Thus they 
would be more prone to issue longer sentences to offenders in order to “send a message” to 
future criminals.  However, other subjects suggested that judges were not concerned with the 
problem of local crime when sentencing individual offenders and were content to leave this issue 
up to law enforcement. 
Still other subjects suggested high crime rates might have the opposite effect and actually 
increase the likelihood of below-Guideline sentences.  These subjects surmised that judges who 
reside in lower-crime rural areas would be less familiar with serious crime, and thus more likely 
to issue harsher sentences.  However the models presented in Chapter 3, which control for type 
and seriousness of crime in each district, did not support this alternative theory presented by 
subjects.  In sum, further testing is clearly needed to determine whether or not crime rates truly 
impact district judges’ sentencing decisions, and if so, in what direction and to what degree. 
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 See 18 U.S.C.§3553  
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The Important Role of Contextual Influences 
Overall, what is to be made of the admittedly mixed results regarding contextual 
influence on district judges?  Probably the most reasonable interpretation of the findings as a 
whole is that while no one contextual factor is of paramount importance to district judges, many 
judges will take into account certain conditions in the community when make sentencing 
decisions.  Thus, contextual variables should no longer be excluded from studies of district 
judges’ sentencing behavior (See Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).  The 
importance of these contextual determinants in general is demonstrated by several findings of the 
dissertation.  
First, the explanatory power of quantitative models of district judges’ departure decisions 
presented in both Chapters 2 and 3 were improved once the exogenous environmental variables 
were included.  The relative strength of quantitative models that include these variables implies 
that more simplistic models of district judges’ sentencing are likely to underestimate important 
community-based influences.  In other words, past research studies of federal sentencing trends 
that only assessed the impact of judicial partisanship, policy change, or prosecutorial practices 
are capable of providing only partial explanations for sentencing outcomes (See Lynch and 
Omori 2014; Epstein, et. al. 2013; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2011).  
 In addition, results from Chapter 4 of the dissertation, while mixed as to each individual 
factor, demonstrated fairly strong support for contextual influence in general.  Very few subjects 
(2 of 19) believed that all four of the environmental influences studied were unimportant in 
shaping district judges’ sentencing decisions.  This finding further bolsters the claim that the 
contextual conditions existing in the community are an important aspect of understanding why 
district judges’ derive their sentencing decisions. 
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 Admittedly, the impact of contextual variables on district judges sentencing also appears 
to be highly conditional.  There is variability among district judges as to the degree to which 
community influences are important.  Some district judges are undoubtedly very concerned with 
the local public or the local legal communities’ views on sentencing, while other district judges 
pay less heed to these groups (Schauer 2000).  Similarly, some judges clearly care about broader 
social conditions, such as crime rates or incarceration rates, when making sentencing decisions, 
while other judges will be unaffected.  This finding confirms that judicial sentencing decisions 
are inextricably a reflection of the frame of reference of a given judge. 
As discussed in more detail below, the conditional nature of contextual influence 
suggests future studies of district judges should seek to determine which judges are likely to 
internalize environmental conditions and in what type of cases those conditions are likely to be 
most important.   Still, the findings in this dissertation strongly imply that it would be a mistake 
for scholars to limit future sentencing studies to judicial partisanship or legal rules and ignore the 
differing contextual backgrounds in which sentencing decisions are made.  In many instances, 
these community-level factors will play an important role in determining the ultimate outcome 
for federal offenders.  
District Judges’ Roles and the Incarceration Problem 
Moving beyond the importance of various contextual variables, the results of the 
dissertation also advance understandings of district judges’ role within a punitive federal 
sentencing framework.  There is no doubt the federal sentencing framework that was adopted in 
1984 and implemented in 1987 created a regime that drastically increased the length of prison 
sentences for federal offenders.  This rise in federal incarceration has been disproportionately felt 
by African-American and Hispanic communities, and now over 1 in 300 males of color in the 
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United States are currently serving time in federal prison (DOJ 2015).  Given the problem, an 
important question to ask relates to district judges’ role in this system.  Namely, are district 
judges contributing to the systemic problem of over-incarceration?  Or, alternatively, do district 
judges act as bulwark against even more punitive outcomes?   
From the perspective of critics of punitive sentencing, this dissertation unequivocally 
finds that district judges are part of the solution rather than part of the problem.   First, the raw 
data demonstrates that more than half of offenders in FY 2014 received below-Guideline 
sentences, and offenders are now nearly 25 times more likely to receive below-Guideline 
sentences than above-Guideline sentences (USSC 1995-2014).  These facts demonstrate that 
district judges clearly question the baseline appropriateness of Guideline-level sentences in a 
large segment of cases.   
Secondly, evidence from Chapters 2 and 4 suggest the increase in below-Guideline 
sentences was not merely the byproduct of any increase in the proportion of Democratic judges 
that sat on the District Court.   Instead, the increase in below-Guideline sentences is at least 
partially explained by changes to sitting district judges’ own preferences for optimal sentences.  
Specifically, quantitative evidence from Chapter 2 and qualitative evidence from Chapter 4 
demonstrate district judges’ gradual acknowledgement that long sentences were not only an 
ineffective criminal justice policy, but were also damaging to society.   
Finally, some findings from the dissertation suggest that any connection between public 
punitive preferences and policymaker behavior may soon result in a more dramatic revolt against 
Guideline-level sentences.  Results from Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that district judges’ punitive 
behavior may be related to the local public’s preferences.137  Unlike the previously discussed 
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 Although recall that in Chapter 3, general ideology was used as a proxy variable for public punitive preferences.  
To the extent this relationship between conservative ideology and punitive preferences is weakening in recent years 
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results, this finding is not necessarily indicative of district judges’ resistance to an overly 
punitive sentencing regime.   Indeed, recent scholars of criminal justice policy have attributed the 
decades-long policy of long prison sentences to the effect that a fearful public has on 
policymakers (Enns 2014; Nicholson-Crotty, et. al. 2009).    
Yet, the public’s attitudes are changing.  For instance, a 2014 Pew Poll finds that 63% of 
the public now oppose mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug offenders, up from 
47% in 2001 (Pew 2014).   More broadly, Enns’ (2014) measure of general public punitiveness 
peaked in the early 1990s.  Thus, while the connection between public preferences and 
policymaker behavior has generally been regarded as being partially responsible for the rise in 
incarceration in this country, recent trends suggest that any connection may produce less punitive 
outcomes in the future.
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Future Areas of Research 
Finally, the results of this dissertation provide several opportunities of further study of the 
contextual influence on district judges.  One such opportunity is to expand the interview project 
conducted in Chapter 4 to include more interview subjects from more districts.  This would serve 
several purposes.  First, it would increase the sample of subjects and potentially allow for 
stronger causal statements regarding the effect of contextual variables on district judges’ 
sentencing decisions.  Relatedly, a larger and more diverse array of subjects would improve the 
generalizability of the results.   Two clear limitations of the research conducted in Chapter 4 
were the underrepresentation of female subjects and the total lack of perspectives from attorneys 
                                                                                                                                                             
(See e.g. Act, et. al. 2015), the ability of the findings of Chapter 3 to forecast a future link between public punitive 
preferences and district judges’ sentences is also weakened. 
  
138
 Although as discussed in Chapter 3, the connection between public preferences and judicial sentencing also has 
the potential to exacerbate racial disparities in sentencing.  This is especially likely if Southern populaces are less 
likely to have changed their views on punitive sentencing than other Americans. 
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and judges in Western or small, rural districts.  Third, an expanded project could more 
appropriately analyze any differences in opinion among sub-groups (e.g. defense attorneys vs. 
U.S. Attorneys) as to what factors are most important in explaining sentencing outcomes.   
Another opportunity for future studies of contextual influence on district judges is to use 
direct observation.  Both Kritzer (1998) and Blank, et. al. (1989) argue that observation of both 
lawyers and judges is a particularly useful method for studying trial courts.  These scholars 
suggest that since many of the important decisions of trial courts are made in the courtroom, 
social scientists should observe how both attorneys and trial judges behave during court 
proceedings.  This type of observational research could be used to evaluate how district judges 
respond to attorneys’ arguments that judges should consider broader community concerns when 
sentencing individual offenders.  Results from Chapter 4 suggest that many attorneys do in fact 
appeal to societal issues such as the crime rates or incarceration rates when making arguments to 
district judges regarding appropriate sentences.  Direct observation of sentencing hearings could 
evaluate how often these appeals made by attorneys and how they are received by district judges 
during hearings.  These observations could then be supplemented with analyses of decisions to 
assess whether district judges are more or less likely to ultimately rule in favor of the attorneys 
making these socially-framed arguments.   
Another opportunity for future research is related to a key finding of this dissertation: 
variability among district judges.  As discussed at length by Baum (2006), failure to account for 
differences in judges’ hierarchy of goals is one of the weaknesses of the dominant models of 
judicial behavior.  Some judges’ decisions will be guided largely by their ideology and personal 
preferences.  Other judges might primarily be concerned with their reputations among certain 
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groups and thus decide cases with the goal of preserving this reputation.  Still other judges might 
be concerned with making the best public policy in light of the available information.   
But empirically, how large is each of these groups of judges?  In addition, is there 
anything systematic about each type of judge that would allow us to better understand why they 
are different?  From a research perspective, perhaps the best way to answer these questions with 
respect to district judges is to conduct intensive studies of individual districts.  This type of 
design would allow researchers to determine how different judges potentially respond differently 
to the same environments.   It would also make a strong supplement to the expanded interview 
project discussed above, which would focus on the differences of judges operating in different 
contexts. 
Finally, another potential opportunity for future research is to test the theory of contextual 
influences on district judges in other policy areas.  As discussed in Chapter 3, there are several 
ways in which salient social or political concerns could impact the content of district judges’ 
decisions.  For instance, does income inequality make it more likely that district court judges 
make rulings favorable to individual litigants in suits against business or wealthy litigants?  Does 
the local legal community’s position on tort reform have an impact on judges’ rulings for tort 
plaintiffs vs. tort defendants?  The weight of the evidence from this dissertation is that district 
judges’ criminal sentencing decisions cannot be divorced from the environments in which those 
decisions are made.  But it remains to be seen whether or not this conclusion holds for other 
policy areas.  
Conclusion 
In summary, this dissertation has demonstrated that many district judges’ sentencing 
behavior must be viewed in the context of both local attitudes and local conditions pertinent to 
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crime and punishment.  To scholars who study district courts, and indeed to anybody familiar 
with the heterogeneity that exists in the United States, this conclusion might hardly seem 
revolutionary.  Few persons would likely be surprised to learn that a district judge living and 
working in rural Arkansas would approach criminal sentencing differently than a district judge 
from Chicago.  Indeed, past researchers of district courts have generalized district judges 
throughout the country behave differently due to different “cultures” or different “sociological 
impacts” (Lynch and Omori 2014; Ulmer 2005; Rowland and Carp 1996).   
Still, the findings of this dissertation extend beyond a mere confirmation of regional 
differences among district judges.  Evidence suggests that several district judges have actually 
altered their sentencing preferences over time in the face of changing conditions.  It is this 
finding that has far-reaching implications for how we understand the role of district judges.  If 
changing facts and circumstances lead many district judges to alter their preferences, then the 
argument that many trial judges behave pragmatically is bolstered.  This finding also calls into 
question the conception of district judges as behaving solely ideologically (See Sisk and Heise 
2012).  One of the stronger findings of this dissertation is that the combination of changes to 
legal rules and judicial partisanship were collectively unable to fully explain variation in district 
judges’ sentencing behavior over time.  Instead, judges’ preferences changed in the face of 
changing conditions. 
Thus, the broader implication of this dissertation is that proponents of the attitudinal 
model may be only half-right (See Segal and Spaeth 2002).  Consistent with a legal realist 
conception of judges, individual policy preferences clearly impact the content of decisions.  
However, at least for district judges in the area of criminal sentencing, those preferences cannot 
be simply understood in terms of left/right ideology.    Other factors, such as preferences of 
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salient groups and relevant environmental conditions, also have the ability to impact judicial 
decisions. 
Finally, far from being definitive, the results also raise several new questions.  Many of 
the individual factors studied produced mixed results.  In addition, while the findings suggest 
that different judges will attach different levels of importance to contextual conditions, the extent 
and nature of those differences remains somewhat of a mystery.  Yet as discussed above, these 
new questions create exciting opportunities to conduct further research and ultimately improve 
understandings of how district judges make decisions. 
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